It's with great thanks that I extend my gratitude for the positive reception of the essays posted throughout the last month. Serialising my posts is not something I had seriously considered, but as it allowed me to examine a topic in greater depth while keeping individual components short and therefore more digestible, I found I didn't have to make too many compromises on quantity and quality. With the success of the five posts comprising the examination of Canada's national identity and the war, it has been decided to present another short series looking into a very key component of the war, which is nearing its hundredth anniversary: The formation of the Western Front.
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Very little else defines the popular
imagination of the First World War than the nature of trench warfare. It
The most recent European conflict, the
Franco-Prussian war, had inspired military thinkers in the intervening years
that only such bold offensive strategies could win. This military philosophy evolved into what
British historian Richard Holmes called “the cult of the offensive.”[1] The
effect of offensive doctrine being assumed by both sides is not unlike two
prize fighters determined to throw nothing but haymakers, landing a few hefty
blows pushing from centre to corner and back again until both are reduced to
clenching and exhausted jabs before the end of the first round.
Having had a humiliating defeat against
Prussia in 1871, in which a reliance on a mostly defensive strategy was bested
by the Prussian’s more dynamic tactics, France had seriously re-adjusted her
military thinking prior to the outbreak of the First World War. The prevailing doctrine, which became known
as “offensive à l’outrance” or “unrestrained aggressiveness” became a key
component of French war planning.[2] The
idea was that adopting a defensive stance was linked to a defeatist
attitude. Only bold, continuous attacks
could bring victory in war and the territory lost in 1871 could not be retaken
without such an offensive spirit. In
case of war with Germany, the French had developed Plan XVII. This ready-made strategy would see the army
deploy into the frontier, retaking lost ground and meeting the expected German
advance head-on and hopefully unprepared. As far as strategic thinking goes, Plan XVII
wasn’t that imaginative. In fact, it was
more or less what German military planners had expected France to do. To avoid colliding with a strong French
vanguard in the difficult terrain of wooded hills and narrow passes of the
frontier, the German plan at the outset would largely bypass the most obvious
route into France.
At
the outbreak of war in Europe, Germany was in a very delicate position. The entente between France and Russia meant
that to attack one would mean war with both.
While militarily powerful, Germany lacked the strength to commit
offensively against the two allies simultaneously. The man who was responsible
for German strategy, Field Marshall Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German
General Staff 1890-1905,[3] had
developed plans surrounding this very probable scenario. Simply put, Germany would move aggressively against
France, the weaker of the two, in a grand flanking movement which would avoid the
frontier by way of neutral Belgium. If
enacted swiftly, the German army in the West could surround Paris and force a
surrender. France thus eliminated, the
entire mass of the German army could then be thrown against Russia.
There were huge deficiencies in
Schlieffen’s masterwork. He had spent a
long time and great effort in the coordination of troop movements; calculated
railway capacity and developed timetables.
The precision is admirable, but its exacting nature made the plan
inflexible. [4]
An upset at any point of the process would have no contingency. The assumption was that everything would work
out because it had to. Noticeably
missing from the stratagem was where and how the decisive battle which would
finally capitulate France would take place.
Above all, little consideration had been made that the Generals who
would be commanding the offensive had never taken to the field with such large
formations in any practical sense.
Neither had the French or the British, for that matter, but advancing so
far and so quickly into enemy territory would stretch the limits of logistics
and command and control.
Generaloberst Helmut von Moltke,
the German Chief of Staff had been convinced to move troop dispositions at the
outset, bleeding strength from the right echelon to reinforce the centre. This was contradictory to Schlieffen’s
desires (so much so that the old man is reported to have said “keep the right
wing strong” as his last words[5]). While it can be argued whether the move
proved necessary to prevent a French breakthrough in Alsace and Lorraine,
tinkering with the plan, combined with stronger Belgian resistance than
expected and the presence of an 80 000 strong British Expeditionary Force could
well have skunked Germany in the West. Nevertheless,
the initial phases of the Schlieffen plan went remarkably well, not least because
France had been caught wrong footed with Plan XVII, the bulk of her armies
being drawn away from the main German advance.
The French were forced to adjust their own strategy
by making deployment decisions on the fly.
By following Plan XVII, the French Commander in Chief, Joseph Joffre,
kept pressing attacks along the frontier and wasn’t fully aware of the strength
or intent of the German forces moving through Belgium. As the situation developed, to provide a sufficient
blocking force, Joffre shifted his 5th Army north to meet the German
right and requested the BEF form a defensive line in support of 5th
Army’s movements.
Victory in war often goes to the side
that can be most responsive to the changing situation. In the case of these battles of encounter in
Western Belgium and North-eastern France, the allies made a correct, but often
misinterpreted tactical choice: They fell back.
Retreat should be understood to not always be synonymous with
defeat. Ceding territory to an enemy
which will have to be retaken is regrettable, but a well-executed, organised
rearward movement shortens lines of supply and communication while extending those
of the enemy in pursuit-hopefully to a point of unbearable strain. Attempts to check the German advance having
been unsuccessful, the BEF and French 5th, 9th and 4th
Armies began a series of retreats over twelve days.[6]
The anticipated encirclement and fall of
the French capital was set to take place within the first forty days of the
war. With Russia expected to take six
weeks to effect mobilisation in the East, “Between the thirty-fifth and
fortieth day, therefore, the outcome of the war was to be decided.”[7] Paris
was temptingly close, and some advanced German units were breaking out in
cheers as they passed “Paris 30 Miles” signposts. Despite delays besieging Belgian fortresses
and last minute changes to a plan that demanded no change, the Schlieffen plan
was adhering to schedule.
Joffre was coming under immense
pressure. The fighting retreat had
preserved his armies and slowed the Germans, but they would have to make a stand
somewhere. Paris must not be allowed to
fall. The government had evacuated and
reservists were entrenching in the suburbs in expectation of the German
assault. Even worse was the state of
affairs between him and Field Marshall Sir John French, commanding the
BEF. French, prior to deploying to
France had received a very broad mandate from the Secretary of State for War,
Lord Kitchener: “It will be obvious that the greatest care must be exercised
towards a minimum of loss and wastage. I
wish you to distinctly understand that your force is an entirely independent
one and you will in no case come under the orders of any Allied general.”[8] With
costly engagements at Mons and Le Cateau, French desired to pull the BEF from
line of battle to refit over a period of ten days, even contemplating
evacuation across the Channel, and Joffre could not compel him to do otherwise.
Likewise, Moltke was under tremendous
strain. German forces had covered a lot
of ground in these crucial first five weeks.
Though, the further they advanced the more spread out and beyond easy
reach from his influence they became; the men were reaching their physical
limit. The Germans were running out of
time and the allies were running out of space.
Moltke’s armies would have to move on Paris, and Joffre would have to
counter-attack before that happened.
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