It can become incredibly easy, when gifted with all
the information hindsight allows to be too critical of past events. The writing of this short series on Gallipoli
has given me pause for thought as to whether or not the course of action taken
was correct, considering the outcome. In
studying these events, I have information on their progression and depths of
situational intelligence (enemy dispositions, terrain) that the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force’s commander,
General Hamilton had it in mind that the landings to
be made by the 29th Division around Cape Helles would be the main
effort in opening the ground campaign.
To confound the Turkish forces defending the area, the French units and
the Royal Naval Division under Hamilton’s command were to make feinted landings
far removed from the 29th’s beaches.
Directly supporting the actions at Cape Helles, the Anzac portion of the
MEF were to put ashore at a midpoint on the peninsula, designated Z Beach. Scheduled to land moments before the Cape
Helles embarkations, this covering force had as its objective the high features
of successive ridge lines a few miles inland from the beach. “The Anzacs, the biggest part of the Allied
force, were to be taken up Gallipoli’s Aegean coast….Their destination was a
promisingly easy-looking beach leading to flat terrain at a point called Gaba
Tepe.”[1]
This would give them a dominant position over inland roads, allowing the Anzacs
“to cut off Turkish reinforcements heading south towards the main British
landings at Helles.”[2]
0415 hrs., 25 April 1915, 3rd Brigade 1st
Australian Division came ashore not at Z Beach, but due to tidal current at a
point 1.6 km north of the indented location,[3]
which would become known as Anzac Cove.
This mistake may well have been fortuitous, as even though 3rd
Bde would suffer heavy casualties on landing at Anzac Cove, it is speculated
that the defences at Z Beach may have made landing there more costly. As it was, once ashore at the wrong place,
further actions would have to be improvised so that the day’s objectives could
be met. “Instead of the flat and easy
ground that supposedly lay beyond Gaba Tepe, they found themselves having to
clamber up into steep craggy hills and rock-lined ravines in the face of
gunfire from Turkish riflemen concealed in the nearby hills.”[4]
Despite the setbacks, the 3rd Bde fought forward to gain the heights
along Chunuk Bair and Sari Bair. Within
the first few hours of making landfall, the Divisional War Diary notes “Bde
considerably mixed but roughly in order 9, 10, 12, 11 (Battalions) from right.”[5] At 0700, the battalions reorganised to “push
on” and within the hour had repulsed a Turkish counter-attack. Even in the face of fairly heavy casualties,
the Australians had managed to overcome a difficult start and their own
inexperience so that by late morning, the outlook of the operation was
projecting success. Limits, however, had been reached “Unaware of this numerical advantage,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ewen Sinclair-Maclagan, commander of the 3rd Australian
Brigade, makes a crucial tactical decision at 400 Plateau: he persuades Colonel
James McCay (2nd Australian Brigade), to reinforce his right flank rather than
head up Hill 971 as originally ordered. Sinclair-Maclagan then orders his men
to dig in at 400 Plateau rather than advance further. These decisions would be
subsequently criticised as tactical errors.”[6]
Lt Colonel Mustafa Kemal,
the officer commanding the 57th Turkish Infantry
In the first twelve hours, some 12,000 Anzacs had
come ashore; “they…had formed a
beachhead, albeit much smaller than intended. In places they were clinging onto
cliff faces with no organised defence system. Their precarious position
convinced both divisional commanders to ask for an evacuation, but after taking
advice from the Royal Navy about how practicable that would be, the army
commander decided they would stay. The exact number of the day's casualties is
not known. The ANZACs had landed two divisions but over two thousand of their
men had been killed or wounded, together with at least a similar number of
Turkish casualties.”[9]
Those still fit for duty were short on
ammunition and exhausted from the day’s efforts. As night fell, the Australians were ordered
to dig in on what ground they still held.
“The Australians and New Zealanders remained crowded into, and unable to
break out of the wretched toehold.”[10]
Hindsight, once again, makes it far too easy to
assign an evaluation of history. Dan
Snow, a BBC presenter on military history diminished the accomplishments of the
Anzacs at Gallipoli by reminding the present observer that their contribution
to the campaign was peripheral. “Far
more British soldiers fought on the Gallipoli peninsula than Australians and
New Zealanders put together. The UK
lost four or five times as many men in the brutal campaign as its imperial
Anzac contingents. The French also lost more men than the Australians.”[11] In response, it can be taken that such things
do not always rely on how many of one nation’s forces fought. For Canadians, Vimy Ridge is a touchstone of
national emergence, but would also be seen as a small measure placed in context
against British efforts in the Arras campaign, of which Vimy was a diversionary
objective. However, these assessments
while not untrue, are a little unfair.
Australia, very much like Canada had wholeheartedly committed itself to
the Imperial war effort. Such as Sir
Robert Borden, Canadian Prime Minister had declared his country’s answer to
Britain’s call was “Ready, aye, ready”, his Australian colleague, Prime
Minister Andre Fisher had responded to the war with the promise that “We shall
pledge our last man and last shilling.”[12]
Australia very nearly did. “Australian
casualties for the Gallipoli campaign amounted to 26 111, comprising of
1007 officers and 25 104 other ranks. Of these, 362 officers and 7 779 men were
killed in action, died of wounds or succumbed to disease. Nine Victoria Crosses
were awarded to soldiers in Australian units.”[13] Overall, the tiny, worlds-away nation has
much to take pride in. In his book on
travelling through Australia in the early 2000’s, American author Bill Bryson
provides this insight: “It is a fact little noted outside Australia- and I
think worth at least a mention here- that no other nation lost more men as a
proportion of population in World War I than Australia. Out of a national population of under 5
million, Australia suffered a staggering 210,000 casualties- 60,000 dead,
150,000 injured. The casualty rate for
its soldiers was 65 percent.”[14]
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