Just to the south of the village of
Avion there is
a colliery called Fosse 4, with…a
large and ugly slag
heap…a veritable nest of machine
guns and trench mortars.”
-Capt.
E.P.S. Allen, Adjutant, 116th (Ontario County) Bn[1].
Early in the
morning of the 23rd of July 1917, two outposts, each of platoon size
(35-40 men) were hastily consolidating ground beyond the German front line
positions which had been wrested from the enemy in a bitter and close-quarters
fight. The outposts were the remnants of
the battalion sized raid that had smashed through the defensive garrison,
destroyed dug-outs and heavy weapons emplacements, captured more than fifty
prisoners, including an officer and senior NCO and then withdrawn back to
Canadian lines. Primarily, these
remaining men were to provide a rear guard for the main body of the raid, and
had been placed on either flank of the raid’s operational boundary. Ideally, consolidating parties starting from
Canadian trenches were to reach the outposts via freshly dug communications
lines, thus incorporating the posts into the existing defensive network.
This, the leaving
of small units behind on raided ground, was a potentially dangerous idea. It
was seemingly borne from a directive which had come down from the
Commander-in-Chief himself. To keep
pressure on the enemy, Haig had ordered that “all ground must be held, by rifle
and bayonet alone if no assistance is available from other arms.”[2]
“Pressuring the
enemy” was of prime concern to Haig, particularly as it applied to the planning
of the major offensive which would become known as the Third Battle of Ypres,
set to begin at month’s end. Part of the
difficulty in gathering forces and materiel for a large battle in trench
warfare was concealing any build up from enemy observation. To that extent, it became necessary to mount
diversionary efforts.
Their purpose
was two-fold. First was to keep the
enemy uncertain as to whether or not any attack was part of the main effort,
the second was to place these diversions against objectives which the enemy
would be compelled to re-take, thus keeping units local to a feint attack tied
down and thereby incapable of being moved to support the areas under which the
principle offensive would fall. Underscoring
this was the desire to reduce German capability writ large by inflicting as
many casualties as possible; the element of attrition which accompanied any
offensive strategy in the war.
These men here,
the two platoons, one each from ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies, 116th
(Ontario County) Battalion, were in actual fact the tail end of a minor
operation that was a diversion of a diversion.
As part of Haig’s plan to obstruct the Germans in their ability to
determine time and place of the main offensive, First Army had ordered the
Canadian Corps to take the town of Lens.
Lens was perhaps more of a prestigious objective than a tactical
one. The liberation of an occupied
French town would certainly be a boon to public opinion and could be a
demonstration that real, measurable progress was being made.
There were,
however, a number of valid concerns about this.
Lens was particularly low-lying and flanked, north and south by two
hills which had excellent fields of observation. The plan of attack, which would have
manifested as a frontal assault on the town with no contingency to reduce
German positions on the surrounding high ground. Between Canadian trenches and the town, the
terrain was vastly unsuitable to the quick movement of artillery guns forward
in support of the infantry holding their objectives. Moreover, any point where the artillery could
be positioned would leave the guns and their crews overwhelmingly exposed on
open ground.
Fortunately, a
decision and the highest levels of the Canadian war effort had recently placed
an astute, if not militarily professional, officer in command of the Canadian
Corps. The Corps’ first commander, the
well regarded General Julian Byng, had been promoted and into his place stepped
Arthur Currie. Currie’s appointment in
itself was innovative, as it was based upon merit rather than strict adherence
to seniority or political connections.
It was also preferable that the Corps had a Canadian born commander,
even if his staff would still mostly be British professionals.
Lieutenant
General Currie, foremost, brought a level of discerning exactitude to his
command. “I’m not clever enough to guess
at this game,” he would admit, “I have to set everything down and figure it
out. It’s harder work than being
brilliant—but safer.”[3]
In the question
of the proposed diversionary attack on Lens, Currie revealed his calculated
prudence at a first Army conference on 10th July. He was able to persuade his superiors of the
folly in this attack and that the Corps’ objective should be to take the high
feature to the north of the town, “a treeless expanse of chalk
downland…which…dominated Lens and gave a commanding view of the Douai plain
beyond.”[4]
It was known,
simply, at “Hill 70.” “Possession of the
hill, giving observation far into the German lines, would be so intolerable to
the enemy that he would be compelled to attempt to retake it.”[5] Of real concern was that Hill 70 was an
obvious target and recent operations in the area further indicated that it was
being considered as an immediate objective.
Currie proposed
his attack begin on 30 July, one day prior to the start of the Ypres
campaign. Weather would intervene and
force the delay of the Canadian attack to mid-August.
This placed the
Corps in the position of having to obfuscate the enemy of their intentions of
an operation which was in itself meant to be an obfuscation. With that to mind, the 116th
Battalion had been given the task of raiding enemy positions around Fosse 4,
the colliery on the outskirts of Avion, well south of Lens and Hill 70.
The nature of
the outposts remaining in captured German lines as a rearguard and, ostensibly,
part of a deepened line met the criteria of Haig’s directive to hold taken
ground. Had the raid been mandated the
usual “smash and grab”, the positions raided would have been re-occupied by the
enemy and an opportunity to both make the Germans believe that Fosse 4 was an
objective of a larger attack and reduce enemy strength by repulsing
counter-attacks would have been lost.
Sensibly, orders indicated that the outposts “be held in the event of
(the enemy) not endeavouring to re-occupy his trenches in force.”[6] Should a large counter-attack develop, the
posts were instructed to engage in a fighting withdrawal towards friendly
lines.
A large
counter-attack was all but certain. The
German defensive doctrine was that “Immediate
Dangerously, the
two platoon-sized outposts were positioned on the flanks in such a way to
better observe enemy movement, but were spaced too far apart to be mutually
supportive. Further, they were sited on
what had been the raid’s final objective, a railway embankment “about 300 yards
behind the German front line and running parallel to it,” which was “scarcely
less than 24 feet in height.”[8] These outposts were, then, exposed, extended
and isolated. With conditions such as
these, disaster loomed.
From the
beginning, before the raid had even set off, a thread of possible catastrophe
ran through the operation. The night
prior, as the men of ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies shook out into assembly
positions, the Germans commenced a gas attack.
Both sides had
been making liberal use of gas, most of the Canadian chemical weapons being
directed at Lens. Fortunately for the 116th,
this gas was lachrymatory (tear gas) rather than poisonous. Tear gas is still terrifically unpleasant,
but not deadly, at least. Initially, the
gas seemed to be taking the desired effect as the troops assembling were thrown
into confusion, some platoons becoming lost or separated from each other in the
fog. “For about 30 minutes, the
situation was critical, and fraught with the greatest difficulties.”[9] Succinctly, if the men did not advance at the
appointed time (Z-Hour was 1.00 a.m. 23 July) they would be left to the mercy
of the German counter barrage which the scheduled artillery fire meant to
provide cover for the attack would certainly instigate.
“Providentially,
the gas became gradually dissipated, the Battalion rallied and the Officers and
men moved into their assembly positions….All the details had been carefully
planned and were carried out according to orders.”[10] The men had trained and rehearsed for this
raid in the days prior to coming into the line.
One such practice had been reviewed by brigade and divisional staff who
were reportedly satisfied with the level of preparedness demonstrated. This would prove to be a deciding factor in
the overall success of the raid.
“At ZERO hour
the barrage opened and ‘A’ Company took their first objective on schedule time,
without much opposition.”[11] The objective was the German front line—code
named “METAL Trench.” This the prefacing
bombardment had roughly handled. German
casualties were numerous, and those left unscathed were more prone to give
themselves up than offer resistance.
With Metal Trench taken and held by ‘A’ Company, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies
passed through, moving on to the final objective; the Railway Embankment.
Resistance along
this line was more determined and the position “was only carried after vigorous
and sustained hand-to-hand fighting.”[12] As planned, the raid destroyed several
dugouts with mobile charges and set the outposts on the flanks, the main body
then withdrawing.
It was twenty-five
minutes to two.
For three hours,
the situation remained strangely quiet, and it was just before daybreak that
two platoons from ‘D’ Company were sent forward to relieve the men at the
outposts. Perhaps that was what the
Germans had been waiting for as “the enemy counter-attacked in force at 4.45
a.m.”[13] The counter attack had been preceded by an
intense artillery barrage which managed to make fatal casualties of all four
officers, Lieutenants Lennox, Neil, Weber and Lick, in charge of the outpost
positions and their reliefs.
“Our outposts
put up the ‘S.O.S.’ and the artillery promptly responded, but the enemy had got
inside of our barrage and attacked in large numbers on both flanks.”[14] With the outposts imperilled and without any
officers remaining, Captain Ritchie, O.C. ‘D’ Company in reserve along the
Canadian front line sent a party under Sgt. Houston to gain contact with the
outposts and to provide assistance in the fighting withdrawal. It was a critical and tense handful of minutes
while these men of the 116th fought—at very close quarters—to remove
themselves from the area, under a constant threat of being cut-off.
Sergeant Fraser
Charles Alfred Houston was the right man for the job, as it happens. He had trained, while a student in Toronto,
with his school’s Officer Cadet Corps.
Houston must have been keen to get into it, for he enlisted as a private
soldier and went overseas before he could sit his exams for a commission. He had just turned twenty years of age in
April.
Houston’s force
made their way as far as Metal trench, dead ground in every sense of the word.
An attacking body of Germans came at them by skirting around the slag heap,
hoping to be the last measure of encirclement, from which point they could
reduce or capture the Canadians trapped within. The losses on either side would
have been a “push” in that case- fairly even. The 116th Battalion
would have been hobbled, with the loss of four platoons plus what men Sgt
Houston had with him. More than half of those would have been from ‘D’ Company
alone. Sgt Houston led his men not forward to the outposts, who were then
fighting backwards, foot by bloody foot, but instead to rush the attack coming
from the slag heap.
The citation for Sgt Houston’s Distinguished Conduct Medal
credits him with killing the crew of a
Later in the
war, Sgt Houston would be wounded in the right knee, which rendered him unfit
for further service. Sadly, he would die
of heart disease in 1935- at thirty-eight years old.
Going forward, I will be posting every other week, in order to give myself time to work on the follow-up to my first novel- expect it mid 2018. In the meantime, have you read my breakout book "Killing is a Sin"? If not, why not?
Seriously, thanks everyone for all the support! Back in two weeks!
[1] Capt. E.P.S. Allen as ‘Adjutant’, “The 116th
Battalion in France,” Hunter Ross Co. Ltd. 1921 pp. 31-2
[2] Nicholson, GWL, Col. “Canadian Expeditionary Force
1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War”
Queen’s Printer 1962 pg. 285
[3] Sir Arthur Currie Quoted in Cook, Tim “Shock Troops:
Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918” Penguin Canada 2008 pg. 260
[6] 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary,
July 1917 App. 16 “Operations Order No. 106.”
[7] Lupfer, Timothy T. “The Dynamics of Doctrine: The
changes in German tactical doctrine during the First World War.” Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army July 1981
[9] 116th (Ontario County) Battalion War Diary
23rd July 1917
[10] 116th Battalion, ibid
[11] Lt Col. S.S. Sharpe Memorandum From: O.C. 116th
(Ontario County) Cdn. Inf. Bn. To: 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade 23rd
July 1917
[12] 3rd Canadian Division War Diary, July 1917,
App. 823 “Intelligence Summary 23 July 1917.”
[15] Supplement to the London Gazette No. 30495 pp. 1392-3
26 January 1918
Great work on this Christopher. If you don't mind I would like to reference your piece and promote it on my 116th CEF Battalion Facebook page. I will post as we approach the anniversary of the raid later this coming week.
ReplyDeletewww.facebook.com/groups/1379071039110354/