If Ye Break Faith

This blog is dedicated to the promotion of educating about the Canadian experience of World War One. To discover who we are as a nation in the 21st Century, we must understand our past.



Monday, 9 February 2015

For Bravery in the Field

In a war where battles were waged over weeks and months, a subsidiary action can all too often be
overlooked.  This is particularly true if the fight gained little, was inconclusive or considered a loss.  Oversights in this regards might be common, but it does tend to complicate matters when trying to find details relating to the actions or movements of a single person.  With last week’s post having been so well received, I had hoped to repeat that success with another story of personal courage.  What I really wanted was to find more details on my great-grandfather, Sergeant John Harvie of 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

I’ve known that he was a recipient of a decoration for bravery at some point in WWI.  My own research has turned up that Sgt Harvie (at the time, Corporal) was listed on page 6830 of a Supplement to the London Gazette, 9th July 1917: “4/9742 Cpl J Harvie, A &S Highrs” awarded the Military Medal.[1] The Military Medal (MM) was created during the war, instituted on 25 March 1916.  Specifically, it was to recognise non-commissioned officers “for gallantry and devotion to duty when under fire.”[2] Not quite as prestigious as the Victoria Cross,
the MM was an effort to ensure extraordinary acts which may not have been to the very exacting standard required by the highest level of decoration were nevertheless brought to notice.  Finding out exactly what Cpl Harvie did to earn this honour is lost to history.  Unlike higher awards, the number of MM’s issued and a shortage of paper meant that the medal was not presented with a written citation.[3]

The best I’m able to do is form a general idea of the overall situation for the day Cpl Harvie was most likely to have performed his notable act.  A difficulty within that is it very likely occurred during one of the subsequent actions which filled the void between the major battles and campaigns of the war. “Arras was a major Allied offensive, fought in the spring of 1917. Falling chronologically between the much higher profile battles of the Somme in the second half of 1916, and Passchendaele (or Third Ypres) in the second half of 1917, Arras today is not a battle that is particularly well remembered. The battlefields also are much less known than those of the Somme and Flanders, and are less visited.”[4]

Arras had been planned well in advance, in cooperation with the French.  A hero of the desperate Battle of Verdun in 1916, General Robert Nivelle had gained command of the French Army and boasted of a devastating offensive to be begun in the spring of 1917.  The British holding Nivelle’s left flank through the Ypres salient would support this offensive by keeping the Germans opposite them under pressure and thus unable to reinforce the units falling under Nivelle’s attack. General Nivelle had convinced the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George in January during a military conference in London that diversionary attacks by the British were required for his offensive to succeed.[5] Part of this effort would include the Canadian Corps attack on Vimy Ridge.  In planning these operations, Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig noted “Prior to our offensive, the new German lines of defence on the British front ran in a general north-westerly direction…. Thence the German original trench systems continued northwards across the valley of the Scarpe River to the dominating Vimy Ridge, which, rising to a height of some 475 feet, commands a wide view to the south-east, east and north….The front attacked by the Third and First Armies on the morning of the 9th April extended from just north of the village of Croisilles, south-east of Arras, to just south of Givenchy en Gohelle at the northern foot of Vimy Ridge, a distance of nearly 15 miles.  It included between four and five miles of the northern end of the Hindenburg Line, which had been built to meet the experience of the Somme Battle.”[6] These new defenses were known to the Allies as the “Hindenburg line.”

On the Western Front, German forces of roughly two and a half million men organised into 134 divisions
faced combined Allied forces 175 divisions strong, numbering nearly four million men.[7] "The creation of the new line would also enable Ludendorff to install, from scratch, the kind of physical infrastructure needed for a new kind of defence.  Under his new approach, there was no longer to be a German front line in the traditional sense.  The now-customary continuous line was replaced by small, mutually supportive steel-and-concrete camouflaged blockhouses laid out in a checkerboard pattern and manned by machine gun crews"[8] These constructions were fronted by vast ditches as a countermeasure for tanks and several tens of yards of wire obstacles.  The blockhouses would absorb the initial brunt of an attack, but were to be abandoned prior to being overwhelmed.  The line to be moved back to under pressure was a true trench line, but lightly held.  The majority of reserves were units particularly trained for rapid counterattacks.  Before the enemy could consolidate any gains, these "storm troops" would push them out when the attacking forces were at their most vulnerable.

The Arras diversion being planned over a number of months allowed ample time for training the attacking troops to a proficient standard which had not been possible to achieve in other battles earlier in the war.  Haig continues:  “The attack on the front of the Third and First Armies was planned to be carried out by a succession of comparatively short advances, the separate stages of which were arranged to correspond approximately with the enemy's successive systems of defence.  As each stage was reached a short pause was to take place, to enable the troops detailed for the attack on the next objective to form up for the assault.  Suffice it to say here that this system consisted really of several systems of trenches, strong points and tunnels, protected by vast networks of wire.”[9]

Because of this, the initial phases of Arras, including Vimy, were incredibly successful.  Failures in follow-up and a complete rebuff of Nivelle’s main attack quickly ground all offensives in the West to a standstill.  Haig still had ambitions for an enveloping assault.  The Field Marshall and his staff “developed a plan of their own, one that would combine a new offensive out of the Ypres salient with an amphibious landing and unhinge the German position in Belgium….they may even be forced back from the Hindenburg Line.”[10]

It’s here that smaller, more limited assaults were conducted, in the hope to give the British forces the best possible positions to renew the offensive, scheduled to begin in the autumn as the Third Battle of Ypres, more commonly known as Passchendaele. Within this period of positioning attacks, Cpl Harvie received his MM.  Based upon other accounts, it’s reasonable to place the exact date at the 23rd of April, 1917.  Two battalions of the British 33rd Division 2/A&S H being one of them were tasked with gaining a portion of the Hindenburg line near the River Sensée.[11] This attack did not go well.  “The enemy began to infiltrate the two battalions’ lines even as they moved towards the river.  One company of each battalion was cut off and recue attempts failed.”[12]

Small parties of men were on their own and without support.  Some tried to move back towards British lines, others were surrounded and either reduced or taken prisoner.  These clusters of Highlanders were desperately fighting for their lives.  Amongst them was the remains of the company under the command of Acting Captain Arthur Henderson which “was suffering heavy casualties and was being attacked from the rear as well.” Captain Henderson, who only recently had been attached to the 2nd Battalion from the Argyll’s 4th Battalion, had already proven himself in combat.  His permanent rank was 2nd Lieutenant, his temporary promotion a reflection of his capability which had also seen his winning of the Military Cross.

Without any help, his remaining men wouldn’t last where they were, and with Germans working their way in
behind, falling back was just as dangerous as moving forward.  Captain Henderson had determined what had to be done.  He ordered bayonets fixed.  Despite being terribly wounded in the left arm, Captain Henderson led his men in a charge against the enemy trench, “through the front enemy line until he gained his final objective.  He then proceeded to consolidate his position, which, owing to heavy gun and machine gun fire and bombing attacks, was in danger of being isolated.  By his cheerful courage and coolness he was enabled to maintain the spirit of his men under most trying conditions.”[13] For these actions, Captain Henderson would be awarded a Victoria Cross. It would be posthumous; his VC citation notes that he – “was killed after he had successfully accomplished his task.”[14] His medals are now on display at the Lord Ashcroft Gallery in the Imperial War Museum, London.[15]

Cpl Harvie may or may not have been with Captain Henderson, but he was most assuredly part of that days attack. His inclusion in the London Gazette for the MM is coincidental with Captain Henderson’s VC citation.  This pocket battle, known as the 2nd Battle of the Scarpe was concluded the following day.  British commanders determined not to push forward in the face of stiff German resistance.





[1] London Gazette, Supplement 9 July 1917 pg 6830
[5] Falls, Cyril, Captain Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917Imperial War Museum, Dec 1, 1992 pg 16
[6] Boraston, J H, Lt Col (Ed.) “Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915-April 1919)” J M Dent & Sons Ltd 1919 pg 86
[7] Meyer, G.J., "A World Undone"  Delta Books 2007 pg 493
[8] Meyer, G.J., ibid. Pp 493-4
[9] Boraston, J H, Lt Col (Ed.) ibid. pg 88
[10] Meyer, G.J., ibid. pg 554
[11] Gliddon, Gerald, “VCs Handbook: The Western Front 1914-1918” The History Press, 2013 Entry 201
[12] Gliddon, Gerald, ibid.
[13] The London Gazette Publication date: 3 July 1917 Supplement: 30167 Page: 6697
[14] The London Gazette ibid.

Monday, 2 February 2015

Guns Fired; Ammunition Gone

The Victoria Cross is the highest award for bravery permitted by the Commonwealth.  Prior to its inception, only officers had been eligible for decorations of valour.  Instances of brave conduct reported by journalists covering the Crimean War helped inspire the notion that a medal for “gallantry of the highest order”[1] be created for all levels of service.  On the 29th of January, 1856, the Victoria Cross was made available and today remains as the highest level of recognition a meritorious act can receive.

In total, 1,357 Victoria Crosses have been awarded worldwide, and three times a bar has been issued; meaning that only three people have earned this decoration twice.[2]  Ninety eight Canadians have been decorated with the VC.[3] One of the first awarded to a member of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was to Captain E D Bellew of the 7th Battalion.

A graduate of the Military Academy at Sandhurst, Bellew came from a long lineage of military service.  He had, in fact, been born “on the high seas” while his family was en route to Bombay India where his father, Colonel Patrick Bellew, was to be stationed, in 1882.[4] After several years as a lieutenant with the 18th Royal Irish Regiment, he travelled to New Westminster, British Columbia as a harbour construction engineer.[5] Bellew’s sense of duty compelled him to volunteer for overseas service with the First Contingent on the outbreak of war in 1914.  He attested for service at Valcartier, Quebec, on the 24th of September, commissioned as a Lieutenant with the 11th Irish Fusiliers of Canada, which would be renumbered with other BC units as the 7th Battalion.[6]

Assigned as the battalions Machine Gun Officer, Bellew was in charge of a machine gun section, comprised
of two Colt Model 1895 machine guns, operated by twelve men- six per gun.[7] The MG Officer was responsible for the disposition of these weapons in the front line, and most importantly, that they were continually able to provide supporting fire to the battalion.

“The machine gun, which so came to dominate and even to personify the battlefields of World War One, was a fairly primitive device when general war began...and decidedly ill-suited to portability for use by rapidly advancing infantry troops.”[8] They were not in any way ideal offensive weapons, though “When established in fixed strong-points sited specifically to cover potential enemy attack routes, the machine gun proved a fearsome defensive weapon.  Enemy infantry assaults upon such positions invariably proved highly costly.”[9] The Canadian decision to purchase Colt manufactured weapons as opposed to the British issued Maxim gun was based on the ready availability of Canadian built guns.  The Colt had advantages over the Maxim.  It was lighter and less mechanically complicated.  However, it did have a slower rate of fire and sometimes had issues with British made .303 ammunition.  It was air cooled, in opposition to the Maxim which was water cooled. This made the Maxim able to withstand longer periods of firing, where the Colt would have to be taken out of action if it grew too hot.[10]

Even today, machine guns are a critical aspect of infantry firepower; but in the early stages of the war, the underestimate of how many weapons would be needed meant that the two machine guns at the battalion level (which would be one machine gun for every five hundred riflemen) were supremely important to keep in good order.

This became apparent during the Second Battle of Ypres in April of 1915.  Gas attacks had created
worrying gaps in the trench lines.  This left empty areas where German infantry could advance in massed formations.  Riflemen with bolt action weapons couldn’t manage to keep up a discouraging rapid fire to halt the enemy; even if the rifles they had been issued didn’t fail spectacularly as did the Ross for the Canadians.  The pair of machine guns for each battalion was in most places the only hope to buy time to re-establish a new defensive line to prevent a German breakthrough.  If the Germans could get as far as Ypres, the entire western Front would be in danger and the crucial Channel ports exposed.

“In mid morning the Germans mounted another major push....Amongst the hardest hit of the units was the 7th Battalion.  Its right hand company had been all but destroyed in six hours of shelling, and the remainder were barely able to hold against the ever-increasing weight of the German effort.”[11] Those Colts had to be kept firing, barring all cost.  Lt. Bellew knew this.  He had brought his guns forward of the 7th Battalion positions and had set them up to put concentrated fire across the front of the right edge of the line.  Their post was on high ground and exposed to enemy fire.  Despite this, Bellew and his men continually assaulted the German waves, often waiting until the enemy was only a hundred yards distant before firing.  

By this time, the situation had become most desperate.  The Canadians were being forced back to supplemental positions, under fire all the way, trying to escape the latent wafts of chlorine.  Lt. Bellew resolved to keep his post to attempt to hold the enemy off as long as possible.  Only he and Sergeant Peerless remained of his section.  “The right Company was soon put out of action, but the advance was temporarily stayed by Bellew, who had sited his guns on the left of the right Company.  Reinforcements were sent forward but they in turn were surrounded and destroyed.  With the enemy in strength less than 100 yards from him, with no further assistance in sight, and with his rear threatened...Bellew and Sgt. Peerless, each operating a gun, decided to stay where they were and fight it out”[12] It was a no-win situation. “With time, however, the...German numbers began to tell. Peerless was shot dead.  Bellew was wounded.”[13]

On his own, Lt. Bellew kept up his fire until his ammunition was completely spent.  Not wanting the Colt to fall into enemy hands, Bellew “then seized a rifle, smashed his machine gun”[14] and advanced towards the enemy, continuing to resist with rifle and bayonet, then his pistol.  “Fighting until the last,”[15] his adversaries later reported “one machine gun crew fought so long until the brave gunner was rendered incapable of fighting by a blow from a rifle butt.”[16] It is believed that his resistance is “credited with having checked the German attack on his battalion.”[17]

It was reported later by a message “Communicated through (the) Foreign Office 31 May/15. (Bellew was) Prisoner of War at Bischofswerde.  Reported by Senior Officer Major P. Byng-Hall, DSO of the 7th Canadian Battalion, and forwarded through the American Embassy under date of 22 May 1915.”[18] His award of the Victoria Cross, “For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty near Keerselaere on 24th April, 1915, during the German attack on the Ypres salient,”[19] was kept under wraps by the British Government until he was released after the war, “fearing he would be treated harshly.”[20] He was, though, promoted to the rank of Captain during his captivity.

Discharged after the war, Capt Bellew was noted to be suffering from long term effects of gas poisoning and neurasthenia, what would be called PTSD today.  He returned to British Columbia and continued his work in construction and surveying.  Captain Bellew passed away in his retirement at Kamloops, BC in 1961.



[4] Bellew, E D, Captain, Military Records; courtesy Library and Archives Canada
[5] Cook, Tim “At the Sharp” End Penguin Group (Canada) 2007 pg. 153
[6] Bellew, E D, Captain, Military Records; courtesy Library and Archives Canada
[10] http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/boer/coltmachinegun_e.shtml
[11] Marteinson, John “We Stand on Guard”: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army, Ovale Publications, 1992 pg 114
[12] London Gazette, no.31340, 15 May 1919
[13] Greenfield, Nathan M., “Baptism of Fire”: The Second Battle of Ypres and the Forging of Canada, April 1915,Harper Collins 2007 pg 239
[14] London Gazette, no.31340, 15 May 1919
[15] London Gazette, no.31340, 15 May 1919
[16] Greenfield, Nathan M., ibid.
[17] Marteinson, John, ibid.
[18] Bellew, E D, Captain, Military Records; courtesy Library and Archives Canada
[19] London Gazette, no.31340, 15 May 1919
[20] Cook, Tim, ibid.

Monday, 26 January 2015

Deafening Silence

On Wednesday, January 28th, Bell Canada once again is holding their “Let’s Talk” event, encouraging a more open dialogue about and hopefully reducing the stigma of mental illness.  This is an incredibly important effort which involves the entire population generally and the military community specifically.  Not only is the state of mental health amongst veterans a legitimate concern and a recurring issue, the military itself has been a force of positive change in the development of the field of mental health.  Much of that, in fact, has come as a direct result of the experiences within WWI.

I’ve touched on this subject previously in an essay examining the occurrence of “shell shock” during the war.  It can be found at the University of Oxford’s WWI Centenary Project.  It is not my intent to restate the nature of that piece here.  Rather, I aim to take a wider view on the state of our current understanding of mental illness, and how a terrible event in human history helped to get that understanding to where it is now.

Psychiatry and psychology in their modern iterations are relatively new medical practices in comparison to
other disciplines.  In fact, it has been less than two hundred years since it became a realisation that the mentally ill could benefit from any form of treatment.  Prior to this, it was the practice to segregate suffers for the well being of society rather than concern for the patient.  Asylums where people were habitually restrained cut off from human interaction and treated much like animals was the common practice until the introduction of “moral treatment” in the early 19th Century.  The theory of moral treatment was developed by an early pioneer in mental health advocacy, a layman English Quaker named William Tuke.  Tuke established the Retreat at York, a private hospital in which his philosophy of humane treatment began a progression towards the idea that mental illness can be addressed and its symptoms diminished.  This idea, “the superiority of kindness and judicious treatment over chains and stripes…commenced in that marked amelioration of the condition of the insane.”[1]

There was, perhaps, a lot more to be understood of psychological conditions, and moral treatment was a good starting point.  A great increase of occurrences of neurological disorders among a nominally healthy population could only serve to accelerate this progressive development.  World War One would produce such conditions.  Dr. Stepasky illustrates a particular irony of war- “Out of human destructiveness emerge potent new strategies of protection, remediation, and self preservation.”[2] The notion is entirely true of medicine as a whole within the history of conflict, but reflects particularly to WWI in the case of mental health.

One of the main realisations to come about from the war was that of distinguishing between psychosis and neurosis.   “Although there is a minor rise in the psychosis rate during any war, a major increase in the incidence of neurotic disorders was observed, starting with World War I.”[3] A post war assessment by the US Army concluded “Rates of hospitalization for mental disorders in Army personnel…ranged from 11 to 12 per 1,000 men per year….The incidence of psychotic disorders during this period was from 2 to 3 per 1,000 per annum.”[4]  It also became more understood that aspects of character had little to do with susceptibility. In the official War Office report commissioned after the war on shell shock, British Army historian, the Honourable John Fortesque mentions in particular “my brother, Brigadier General Charles Fortesque, had, in his column in South Africa a Canadian officer who was a proverb of daring; but even this officer broke down for the time after every enterprise of any continuance and needed a fortnight’s rest to restore him.”[5] Prevailing wisdom held that it was not the person, but the exposure to extreme situation which caused neuroses “Like clothes increasingly worn threadbare until they finally ripped…soldiers were steadily worn down to the point where the slow descent into breakdown was accelerated by a traumatic event.”[6]

From a military clinical perspective, a man is an asset.  In this light, with sentimentality removed, the practicality is to return a wounded man to useful work as quickly as possible.  If the injury is too severe to permit employment in his former role, then he should be retrained with those limitations in mind for the most productive work to which he is suited.  When the same logic was applied, in synthesis with the progressive ideals of moral treatment, psychiatric medicine as a whole benefitted from the positive results. “Trial and error treatment efforts by French, Italian, and British psychiatrists and neurologists clearly demonstrated as early as 1915 and 1916 that a majority of the so-called war neuroses could be salvaged for duty by providing care near the front.”[7] This practical approach without sentiment in its implication doesn’t disallow for the application of sentiment in treatment.  Crucially, those suffering from a neurological break were generally treated much better than modern perception of the war usually allows.  “In no case,” states historian Gordon Corrigan “was a soldier whom the medical staff certified as suffering from ‘shell shock’ executed.”[8]

Methods of treatment, focused on productive employment were part of the emergence of occupational therapy as a component to a holistic approach to mental health.[9] This and other civil practices were vastly improved through military experiences; “after the first world war more modern approaches such as psychotherapy started to evolve, in response to the effects of thousands of shell shock cases.”[10] A rational and scientific approach to the treatment of mental illness is cited as being a result of WWI in a Senate report on mental health and addictions, when psychological casualties “demonstrated poignantly” the wide vulnerability to psychological breaking points.[11]

From the extreme experience of war, understanding and development in the medical field has advanced further than it would have without it.  Indeed, there are indicators that this remains contemporary.  While a
report on civil health services mentions that “the mental health service system and the addiction treatment system have struggled to provide the most compassionate and responsive treatment possible, but both have been dogged by the problem of stigma which had a negative impact on their development”[12]; a military report indicates “Most CAF members now hold largely forward-thinking attitudes about mental health and mental health care. For example, only 6% of CAF personnel returning from deployment in support of the mission in Afghanistan indicated that they would think less of someone who was receiving mental health care. In contrast, the Canadian Center for Addictions and Mental Health statistics indicate that only 49% of the general population would socialize with a friend who has a serious mental illness. Rates of stigma and barriers to care appear to be lower in CAF personnel than in allied military personnel”[13] As well, there is little actual barrier to care for the Service Personnel suffering from a mental illness-while still serving and thus available to CF Medical Services.  The military report does relate that perceived barriers to care may be indicative of the stigma of requiring help for a psychological difficulty, but continues with the availability of supportive services in the civil sector.

As occurrences of mental illness is not markedly different between military personnel and the general population, the factors behind a reduction of stigma and barriers to care in the civil sector might be able to continue to take an example from the armed forces. Even the Hon. Fortesque was forward thinking on this when he asked “Can emotional or commotional shock, induced by battle, be differentiated from the like shock induced by other forms of catastrophe?”[14]

Admittedly, there is much yet to be accomplished; particularly in civil practice and especially when veterans being discharged still need continuing care which is no longer as available as it was while they were serving.  Above all, the need to make these changes and to best help those who are suffering is to reduce the stigma which is the largest deterrent to positive change in mental health effectiveness.  That can only occur through open, honest discussion.  So, let’s talk.  If you are suffering from an Occupational Stress Injury, please visit the OSI Social Support website.  Are you or your family member a current or discharged member of the Canadian Forces and need resources to find the help you may need? The CAF Member Assistance Program is a great place to start.
#BellLetsTalk.



[1] Bewley, Thomas, “Madness to Mental Illness. A History of the Royal College of Psychiatrists” Online archive 1, pg 3
[2] Stepansky, Dr Paul E, adoseofhistory.com “An Irony of War” February 11 2012
[3] Bernucci, Robert J. Lt Col, MC, USA (Ret.) & Albert J. Glass Col, MC, USA (Ret.), Editors for Neuropsychiatry “Neuropsychiatry in World War II Volume I” Office of Medical History, U.S. Army Medical Department pg 4
[4] Bernucci & Glass, ibid. pg 9
[5] Great Britain War Office “Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock’” 1922 pg 9
[6] Cook, Tim “Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918” Penguin Canada 2008 pg 242
[7] Bernucci & Glass, ibid. pg 6
[8] Corrigan, Gordon “Mud, Blood and Poppycock” Cassel Military Paperbacks, 2004, pg 235
[10]  Lawton-Smith, Simon & Dr Andrew McCulloch, “Starting Today - Background Paper 1: History of Specialist Mental Health Services” Mental Health Foundation pg 2
[11] The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology Interim Report on Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Report 1”Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction: Overview of Policies and Programs in Canada” Nov, 2004 pg 135
[12] The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, ibid. pg 133
[13] Zamorski, Mark A. “Evidence-Based Assessment of Mental Health in the CAF” Surgeon General Report, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2014 pg 7
[14] Great Britain War Office “Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock’” 1922 pg 9