It has been a tremendous week for me. Many of you know that I have been submitting articles to The Centenary News. I have been invited by the editors to continue to write copy, and I am more than pleased to do so. My last article, on Dr. Gusky's photographs, received this reply from the artist: "Thank you for your article. It’s beautifully written and, I believe, one of the best articles I’ve yet seen on the Hidden World of WWI." In return, it must be said that this is the highest praise that I've ever received. As always, comments, questions and suggestions are most welcome, and I invite you to follow "If Ye Break Faith" on Twitter and Facebook.
Earlier in this series, it was explained
that the prevailing sense of identity held by Canadians prior to the war was
one that reflected the British roots of the majority of the population. Through their experiences in training and
combat in the early stages of the war, a new sense, a more national sense of
being was beginning to emerge. As the
war continued and involved ever more Canadians both at home and at the front,
this new nationality spread and developed, eventually becoming the notion of
what it is to be Canadian which would form the basis of the type of national
identity present in the modern era.
Canada would commit ever more resources
to the war in Europe. Speaking strictly of
manpower, not only would the losses of battle need to be replaced, but three
whole divisions were to be recruited, equipped and trained to be sent to France
joining the 1st Division in turn to form the Canadian Corps.
This was the beginning of a demographic
shift in the constitution of the Canadian army overseas. While the men of the First Contingent had
been largely British born, those that followed would increasingly be younger,
on average, and more likely naturally Canadian.
Much like the First Contingent, all provinces of Confederation were
represented, including the first francophone regiment, the 22nd. Geographical recruiting still existed and
battalions of the 2nd, 3d and 4th Divisions were composed
of nuclei from the same area. With
casualties, though, it would become more common that men of one part of Canada
would wind up in a unit from another.
The impact of this integration can not be underestimated in its
influence on a national identity, particularly with a country as geographically
wide as Canada. Being under adverse
conditions would have helped to create a commonality amongst men who in other
circumstances would not have known each other.
This would foster an understanding that people from other parts of the
country or different walks of life had more in common than could be thought.
The four divisions of the Canadian Corps
went into action together for the first time at Vimy Ridge. In an effort to protect the left flank of the
British who themselves were making diversionary attacks in support of a general
French offensive, the Battle of Vimy Ridge has entered Canadian mythos precisely
because it was a great success for the Corps’ first full commitment. In capturing the Ridge, the Canadians were, in
the opinion of General Henry Horne, British 1st Army commander, “the
pride and wonder of the British Army.” [1] What really secured the Corps’ reputation, and
thus tempered the sentiment of this fledgling nationality was a far more
difficult, but more crucial victory later in 1917.
The Third Battle of Ypres, or more
commonly, the Battle of Passchendaele had begun on the 31st of July
1917. Involving British and Australian
units, by mid-October casualties had reached more than 100,000[2] with
very little gain. Passchendaele Ridge
was a high feature in the area and taking possession of it would grant a large
tactical advantage. Multiple attempts to
take the Ridge on the 9th and 13th of October had met
with failure. In what was becoming a
habit of the British General Staff, the Canadian Corps was requested in an
expectation it could succeed where others had not.
Years of continuous shelling in an area
with a low water table mixed with unseasonably heavy rain had turned the Ypres area
into a horrific muddy mess: “Of all the battlefields in which Canadians fought
during this war, Passchendaele was by far the worst.”[3] The
attack would have to be made across hundreds of yards of glutinous mud,
defended by the interlocking fire of the concrete pillboxes and dense barbed-wire
entanglements of the carefully engineered German defenses known as the “Hindenburg
Line.” Movement would be agonisingly
slow and under observation from the high ground which was the battle’s
goal. General Arthur Currie, the first
Canadian born commander of the Corps was reluctant to commit to the attack. His opinion was that the ground had been
fought over for months without any advantage, and further attacks would prove
useless. Passchendaele, he thought wasn’t
worth “one drop of Canadian blood.” Protesting
his orders to the highest level, he told Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig that
the Corps would sustain 16, 000 casualties in such an assault. Haig insisted that Passchendaele “Must be
taken” but he couldn’t freely state why.
The officers of the Canadian Corps would have to accept his word of the
critical necessity.[4]
Only Haig and a few of his top aides
were aware of the highly suppressed details of the near collapse of the French
Army through widespread mutinies that had happened in June. By October, the situation was more stable,
but the incidences had so weakened French resolve it was a serious concern that
if the Germans were to mount a concerted effort against them, the French Army would
disintegrate. It fell to their chief ally,
the British, to keep the enemy occupied until the French could get back on
their feet.
Time, therefore was of utmost
concern. While Vimy had been planned and
prepared for over a period of months, Currie was only given nine days before he
must execute his attack. It is here that
the Corps proved itself as having grown into war. Showing a remarkable aptitude and adaptability
at all military levels, the Canadians were achieving a professional competence
not expected of non-professional soldiers.
A knack for thoroughness and detailed planning showed a desire to
succeed. General Currie himself believed "Thorough preparation must
lead to success. Neglect nothing."[5] Their
reputation having been made, there was no option but to uphold it through
continued success. Terrain, weather
conditions and a shift of German tactical doctrine were all incorporated into
the Corps’ battle plan, which took shape as a three stage attack against
limited objectives with fresh units moving forward through the consolidated
gains. Known as “bite and hold” this
British developed strategy was quickly replacing the wide-front mass attacks of
the early years of the war.
Over sixteen
days, the Divisions of the Canadian Corps struggled forward through diabolical
mud. The artillery fire supporting the infantry was some of the heaviest of the
war, but in most places it proved impossible to move the guns forward, leaving advanced
units without fire support. Momentum was staggeringly slow, the terrain deep in
muck and littered with waterlogged shell holes that were death traps for the
wounded. As the Divisions advanced, unit
cohesion devolved as elements worked around the wire obstacles and thick-walled
bunkers. Often the battle was reduced to
skirmishes of platoon and section strength rather than massed assault. By the 10th of November, they held
the Ridge, at a cost of 15,654 casualties, of which 2,600 were fatal[6] (JM 177), eerily close to Currie’s initial
estimate.
The
growth of the reputation of the Canadian Corps, which had seen its genesis with
the 1st Division’s stubborn defense at 2nd Ypres and
maturing at Vimy, coalesced with the tough victory at Passchendaele. Colonel Nicholson, in his Official History
sums up this reputation, and the factors relating to its cause “There has not been lacking testimony from senior Allied commanders that
in the latter part of the war no other formation on the Western Front surpassed
the Canadian Corps as a superb fighting machine. ‘Whenever the Germans found
the Canadian Corps coming into the line’, wrote Lloyd George in his War Memoirs,
‘they prepared for the worst’. Much of its success the Corps owed to the fact
that…the Canadian Corps was in the unique position of being able to preserve
its composition unchanged….The men who made up its units were heartened by the comradeship
that comes from shared experiences in the face of difficulty and danger, whether
the result be reverse or triumph. Their morale was high, and they endured grievous
hardships and bitter setbacks with a dogged optimism and irrepressible cheerfulness.”[7] It is how these men would take those notions
of pride home with them that would help create the dynamic shift of Canada
feeling as a small component of Empire to a country of itself.
[2] Zuehlke,
Mark “Brave Battalion”: The Remarkable Saga of the 16th Battalion in
the First World War, John Wiley & Sons, 2008 pg 175
[3] John Marteinson
“We Stand on Guard”: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army, Ovale
Publications, 1992 pg 170
[7] Nicholson, GWL, “Official History of the Canadian Army
in the First World War”, Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1964, pg
507
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