This article, including original source material
(letters, diaries and photographs) and particularly the input of BGen Greg
Young was made possible through the gracious assistance of the 15thBn CEF Memorial Project ; a voluntary organisation
dedicated to preserving the history of this proud regiment.
Battalion HQ, Farm “ARBRE” April 24/15. “Enemy attacked our line of
trenches (front line, adv HQ & St Julien).
Heavy casualties. Weather- fine
& warm.”[1]
That terse assessment, in less than twenty words describes
the single highest one day loss of effective strength of any Canadian Battalion
in the entire war. After months of
training at Valcartier in Quebec and a miserable winter on Salisbury Plain in
England, the 15th Battalion (48th Highlanders), along
with the rest of the 1st Canadian Division had taken to the field in
France, along the Western Front. There
had been a short period of work up training with British units but by April the
Canadians were operating on their own.
Assigned a “quiet sector” the 1st Division took possession of
trenches just outside of the Belgian village of Ypres. The 15th Battalion occupied front
line positions on the 20th.
A lot has been made of the Canadian’s performance at
the 2nd Battle of Ypres. Much
has gone down in the annals of history as a fine feat of arms; a foreshadow of
the great national achievements yet to come in the unfolding years of the Great
War. There remains little doubt that
despite terrible odds and a terrifying new weapon that the 1st
Canadian Division held a succession of lines during the battle which prevented
the Germans from breaking through to the town of Ypres.
A battle on the scale of 2nd Ypres is
fluid, involving thousands of men in different units along a varying landscape
and changing circumstance over several days.
Looking at events broadly might bring a wide perspective and a general
comprehension of the battle. Examining
it from the point of view of a single unit, over the span of a single day will
certainly overlook key dynamics of events, but may help in understanding the
experience. This type of focus can tell
more, perhaps, about how men behave under fire-in this case under fire for the
first time.
The battle had begun on the afternoon of the 22nd
when the Germans opened
These events were only on the periphery of the men
of the 15th along their section of line, which they had occupied
since the 20th. Any word that
was getting to these forward units was fragmentary-incomplete and
confusing. What was understood was that
the 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders of Canada) to the left of the
15th which had shored up with the French units now departed, had
become the left edge of the salient and “that the entire left flank of the Canadian
position was now in danger of being 'rolled-up',” says BGen Greg Young of the
15th Bn CEF Memorial Project. The initial collapse had been blocked by the
British 13th Brigade supported by the 10th and 16th
Canadian Battalions. This formed a
ragged line sweeping west south west from the Royal Highlanders’ left elbow to
the Yser Canal. “The entire line from the Canadian boundary with the 28th
Division near Gravenstafel round to Kitcheners Wood was now manned by the
equivalent of eight battalions. These
were to be attacked by at least three times their number of German
Battalions. The 5th and 8th
Battalions (of the 2nd Brigade) and the 15th Battalion
held the original front on the east side of the Salient.”[2]
The ideal place for an attack in a scenario such as
this would be to do so at the least defensible portion of line, close to the
apex of the salient so that it could be easily enveloped, and if possible near
to a command boundary. The 15th
Battalion were, to their misfortune, exactly in this type of place. Of four companies (from positions right to
left), No’s I, III and IV were in the line, No II Company being held as
Battalion reserve outside of St Julien.
Captain McGregor, Officer Commanding (OC) No I Company was on the far
right , abutting (with a hundred yard gap between) the 8th
Battalion, marking the boundary between the 3rd and 2nd
Brigades. Major Osborne, OC
No IV
April
23/15-“Enemy
shelled trenches and St Julien and Adv Bn HQ.”[5]The
15th Battalion’s officers had all done what they could to make their
positions more defensible, building up with sandbags or even relocating to
better ground. Constant shelling had
prevented movement, particularly of getting the wounded out and rations and
ammunition forward; several probing attacks had determined the point for the
next advance. Orders had been to “stand
to the end,” and each man would have prepared himself for what that might mean. Early in the morning on the 24th,
it was “evident that the Germans were through some of the gaps and were well
behind the 13th Battalion.”[6]
This infiltration threatened Major Osborne’s position will possible surrounding
from the rear. “This danger was very real for the entire forward line. Equally of note,
the entire backside of the 15th line was exposed to fire - both MG and
artillery, from the exposed left flank, made all the more dangerous by the lack
of a parados at the rear of their trenches.”-Gen Young.
Lt Maxwell-Scott, of 11 Platoon,
No III Company, to the right of Major Osborne’s company describes what he
witnessed that morning “We stood to at 3a.m., Sat. morning. Shortly after 3.30, when it was fairly light,
we noticed far away on our right front a German captive balloon which hadn’t
been there the day before. As we watched
it four red stars were dropped from it, making quite a pretty sight. Our gaze must have lingered a little too
long, for when I turned the men were leaving the trenches on our right and a
great wall of green gas, about 15 to 20 ft. high was on top of us.”[7] The renewed attack fell upon the divide
between the 8th and 15th battalions. Although much narrower than the gas attack on
the French days before it was more concentrated, and thus just as effective.
Gen Young provides further information on an increasingly desperate situation: “the 15th Bn was only unit in line that
had no artillery support. Their supporting battery, unknown to them, had been
withdrawn out of range.”
Here, the popular image is played of stalwart
defenders in urine soaked kerchiefs pouring deadly fire into the advancing
enemy despite the wisps of pure chlorine all about them. It is almost certain that events here were
much different. Those units hit by the
gas, No I Company and the right edge of No III Company of the 15th
and the left edge of the 8th were of little use in the ensuing
battle. No I Coy “was annihilated. Two or three men were seen staggering back
...but they were so badly gassed they had to be helped to the rear.”[8] Lt
Scott recalls of No III
With the Front line reduced and now consisting of
small isolated groups, the concurrent assault from the left flank tore up the
remains of “Devil’s Corner.” The
German’s attacks were pressing the right areas and isolating trouble spots
created by a fragmented line. No I
Company’s positions were vacant from the gas, and were being used by German
infantry to roll up the right flank of the 15th Battalion. Those of No III Company who could get away
did, either to the rear or further left to join IV Company positions. The two forward platoons of No IV Company
were attacked on all sides, and left little option. Says Major Osborne, trying to keep to his
order to stand, “More of the enemy however must have come across further to the
right, for they came down the trench in
considerable numbers....considering the situation more than serious made my way
to Company H.Q. to try and get a message to Major Marshall for reinforcements
and more ammunition.”[10] This he was unable to do, his telephone lines
were cut. So, “I sent Pte Odd out with
Pte Wilson to try to get through on foot with a written message. Whether they were successful or not in
getting out I do not know as I never saw them again.”[11] Major Osborne, who was twice wounded, had tried
to move his men back into a more defensible position, but this proved of little
use as No III Company had indeed been surrounded. He and his party were taken prisoner by about
25 Germans.
The last position along this line, being commanded
by Lt MacDonald- an amalgamation of 15th Battalion men and the
remnants of the Company of the 2nd
By 9:30 in the morning the 15th Battalion
had lost the majority of its three front line companies. A hard fight at St
Julien, which had started with the Germans moving in from the west, and then
supported by their comrades moving south from the reduced front line involved
No II Company and elements of the forward lines who had managed to fall back in
good order. The small village was
quickly cut off and surrendered by noon.
As night drew in and the day came to a close, the
artillery in the gun line providing an artificial twilight with the flash of
each shot, the 2nd Battle of Ypres was over for the 15th. They were moved off, a collection of souls
more than a regiment to the GHQ line where they would remain throughout the
next day, going into support lines further south, beyond Ypres itself on the
Monday.
Monday, the 26th of April, 1915, when Quartermaster
Sergeant Stevens “called the roll of stricken No I Company. Six men answered. The whole regiment numbered about 150- less
than 200 when the band and transport were included. That out of 912 effectives....The casualties
of the Battalion...were: 20 officers and 651 other ranks. Of these, 5 officers and 218 other ranks were
killed or died.”[13]
Professor Tim Cook notes “Within this chaos the
Canadians continued to remain an effective fighting force.”[14]
This observation wasn’t just self generated, praise for the 1st
Canadian Division came from the highest levels:
“In spite of the danger to which they were exposed, the Canadians held
their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage, and it is not
too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a
disaster” said Field Marshall Sir John French, British Commander in Chief. [15]
For the 15th, they may be deserving of
Field Marshall French’s praise, but could not be fitted into Professor Cook’s
assessment. Of the more than one thousand men who had set off in high spirits
from Toronto eight months prior, only slightly more than ten percent could be
counted as effective after their first day of battle. Three long years of war remained before them,
and would be faced by a very different, rebuilt, 15th Battalion.
[2]
Nicholson,
G.W.L (Colonel) “Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War”
Queen’s Printer, Ottawa 1962 pg 71
[3]
Beattie, Kim, “The 48th Highlanders of
Canada, 1891-1928” pub. 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1932 pg 55
[15]
Greenfield, Nathan M., “Baptism of Fire”: The
Second Battle of Ypres and the Forging of Canada, April 1915,Harper Collins
2007 opening leaf
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