“The splendid work of your Battalions is worthy of the highest praise, and will add greatly to the prestige and morale of our troops in further operations.”-Maj. Gen. D Watson, O.C.
4th
Canadian Division, 11 November, 1916
Last week’s
article was a good opportunity for an open dialogue on how well the Battle of
the Somme fulfilled its purpose; notwithstanding differing views of what that
purpose may have been or whether any purpose existed at all. It was altogether the exact kind of dialogue
I hope to create with my work- to encourage thoughtful discourse and allowing
the lessons that the past can give us to be continually applied in the present.
So, to all of you who participated in furthering that discussion, thank
you. I return this week with an example
to support my thesis that the benefit of adapting technique to situation was
certainly a positive outcome from the fighting on the Somme.
Regina Trench had
become the proving ground for the 4th Canadian Division. As October gave way to November, most of this
line had been taken, consolidated and held.
Only its eastern-most edge remained out of reach. The last attempt made at it on the 25th
October by the 44th Battalion had been repulsed with heavy
losses. An inability to secure this
portion left the extent of Regina Trench in Canadian hands vulnerable to a
flanking attack. Despite the losses and
setback the 44th had suffered, this ground had to be taken for the
risk of losing what had already been gained was too great.
“The operation,”
on the 25th, “failed owing to insufficiency of artillery
barrage. The Battalion suffered
heavily.”[1] It was evident that better artillery
preparation was required, and with that, better coordination between the
artillery and infantry. Also, it was
re-assessed as to how best to deploy the infantry units in a subsequent
assault. Plans for the next attempt
would include three battalions instead of one.
Trebling the number of battalions to attack the same width of frontage
the 44th had attempted gave the attack a depth in waves- each
battalion putting two companies in the advance, with each company attacking “on
a platoon frontage in 4 waves.”[2] It would be an incredibly dense attack. Planning assigned specific tasks to these
waves. While the first wave was
primarily responsible for gaining lodgement of Regina Trench, following platoons
would act as a mopping up force, clearing any resistance while the leading
platoons worked to make the ground defensible.
Other waves would pass through the taken ground to establish posts and
blocking positions. Once that had been
achieved, an entire company which had been held back from the assault (‘D’
Company, 46th Battalion) would go forward and work to connect the
right edge of Regina Trench to an existing Allied line. Orders as to intent were clear- “All Posts
and Blocks will be maintained and held at all costs.”[3]
The difficulty
with artillery barrages at this stage of the war was that any increase in
intensity would signal the enemy that an attack was imminent. This would prompt
a counter barrage on jumping-off points and assembly trenches which sometimes
was sufficient to halt an advance. A
conceivable option would be to forego a heavy covering barrage, though this was
risky in itself. Without the barrage to
keep the enemy pinned, attacking waves would be at the mercy of enemy rifle and
machine gun fire.
A prescient
solution was attempted in the attack of 10/11 November 1916. Zero-hour was midnight, and under cover of
darkness, the attacking waves crept forward, 150 yards ahead of the front line
trench. By the time the initial barrage
hit the German trenches, and the enemy had sent their SOS signal rockets up,
replying artillery struck empty ground.
As it was “the enemy’s reply to the barrage was feeble in the extreme.”[4] While the Canadian barrage pasted the German
line, the attackers were to “get as close as possible to REGINA TRENCH where they
will lie down and wait for the first life (upon which) the assault will be
delivered.”[5] It was a daring strategy, and at nine minutes
after Zero, the barrage shifted, adding 150 yards to its range and the leading
platoons fell upon the enemy trench.
Later reports, taken from prisoners’ statements was that the attack had
“come as a surprise.”[6]
“This time, all
went well,” says Nicholson in his Official History, “the Canadians were able to
move well inside the enemy’s counter-barrage, and aided by a full moon and a
clear sky quickly reached and stormed their objective.”[7] Colonel Nicholson is being a bit generous, as
the attack didn’t go without some difficulty.
The 19th Canadian Infantry Brigade recorded “On the right,”
where the 46th Battalion was attacking, “when the barrage lifted it
was not concentrated over a sufficiently narrow area to allow of the attacking
party entering the objective. They therefore waited for the next lift. The trench was then assaulted. Parties of the enemy put up a strong
resistance but were mopped up and many others who retired hurriedly towards
PYS…were killed by rifle fire and by the barrage.”[8]
The 47th
Battalion had come under enfilading machine gun fire and took quite a few
casualties, including most of the officers who had gone forward. Counterattacks
were few, mostly falling upon the 102nd Battalion, and were
dispersed with little difficulty. The 46th’s
outpost positions fell under the protective barrage, causing them to be
re-sited closer to the captured trenches, but not before some had been wounded
by friendly shellfire.
Through a quick
process of attempt and adjustment the Canadians had gained this long sought
goal.
Having been contested over the
preceding months so much that the trenches were “found to be much damaged and
was so bad that it was difficult to recognize.”[9]
Overall, this new ground was a “disappointment as regards construction and
dugouts. It was knee deep in mud and the
dugouts had only just been commenced.”[10]
Efforts at consolidation meant having to almost start the trench anew.
Poorly
maintained trenches was one indicator of how the campaign had succeeded. The battle “had forced the Germans out of
their strongly fortified first and second line of trenches, and out of much of
their third line, inflicting enormous casualties upon them.”[11] This pressure was beginning to tell in the
degradation of fighting quality of the German defenders. In September, the 1st and 2nd
Canadian Divisions had been rebuffed by fresh regiments from Marine
divisions. These troops had defended
stubbornly and counter-attacked efficiently.
By the time the 102nd, 47th and 46th
Battalions of 4th Canadian Division gained possession of crumbling,
shallow works, the Marines had long since been moved off the line, replaced by
the 58th Division which had only been at the Somme a short while,
having fought earlier in the year at Verdun, in the butcher’s yard of Fort
Douaumont. Their tenacity was
considerably less. Intelligence reports
on prisoners stating “they one and all repeated what had almost become a
formula ‘We are fed up and tired of the war.’”[12]
In the grinding,
gradual fashion of an attritional fight, measurable progress was being made,
although the process had taken far too long for this progress to be
definitively exploited.
[1] War Diary Entry, 44th Battalion, 26th
October, 1916
[2] 46th Battalion Operations Order No. 28, 10
November 1916
[3] 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade Operations
Order No. 22, 10 November 1916
[4] 4th Canadian Division “Report on Operations
on Night of 10/11 November 19916”
[7] Nicholson, GW, Col. “Official History of the Canadian
Army in the First World War” Queen’s Printer, Ottawa 1962 pg. 192
[8] 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, “Report on
Operations 10/11 November”
[11] Gilbert, Martin,
“The Battle of the Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War” McClelland &
Stewart, 2006 pg. 257
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