“No plan of operations extends with
any certainty
beyond the first contact with the main hostile
force.”
-Field
Marshall H.K.B. Graf von Moltke (1800-1891)
Chief
of the German General Staff (1871-1888)[1]
It all nearly
went to Hell in the first five minutes. “Beyond
enemy front line, Lieut. Swinton was killed, and Lieut.’s Henderson and Rix
were wounded, together with several of the NCO’s in charge of sections. This caused temporary disorganisation.”[2] A
delay, even a faltering step, could easily become the loose thread which would
unravel the entire raid. It was a
precisely timed operation with very little margin for error.
This complex
scheme, the brainchild of Lt Col. Rhys Davies, O.C. 44th (New
Brunswick) Battalion required the intricate cooperation of infantry from four separate
battalions of the 4th Canadian Division’s 10th Canadian
Infantry Brigade, engineers, the artillery and a handful of other
supports. Everything, from Colonel
Davies’ proposal and orders to all the arrangement, organisation and execution
had taken place within five days.
Therefore, the potential for error was a great deal larger than the thin
margin allowed for.
Davies’ raid was
more ambitious in scope an size than the Calonne Raid mounted by the 2nd
Canadian Division the month before, while being carried out with much less time
to prepare. As a practical exercise,
this raid had potential. Involving companies
of different battalions, integrating engineers and coordinating a complex
artillery fire plan would provide valuable experience in developing and
preparing large scale combined operations. All of this would be contingent on the raid’s
success. A failure would only provide
the example not to be followed.
“With reference
to the Operation to be carried out by 10th Brigade,” wrote the
brigade’s commander, Brigadier General Hilliam in a memorandum to brigade
officers, “I ask you to acquaint all Officers, NCO’s and men of your Commands
that this will be one of the biggest raids yet carried out….Do not allow the
minutest detail to be neglected.” Brigadier Hilliam encouraged his battalion
commanders to think in more collective terms- appealing to them that any honour
to be gained would be shared amongst all units of the brigade and that “all
ranks must work for the success of the operation as a whole.” The Brigadier was astutely laying the
groundwork for inter-unit cooperation at a higher level which would be
essential to the success of future operations. In closing, he enjoined his
troops to “Kill, destroy and capture what you cannot kill.”[3]
This aggressive
suggestion wasn’t proving too hard to fulfill, even as early on as the first
ten minutes, right about the time that the company from the 50th
Battalion lost half its officers in the blink of an eye.
Companies from
the 50th and 44th Battalions were in the van of the raid,
rushing through a gap blown in the wire by a special team of sappers and
pioneers, bypassing the enemy front line trench while keeping pace with the
artillery’s rolling barrage. Follow-up companies,
men of the 46th and 47th Battalions would secure the
front line and provide flanking protection through successive trench line,
allowing the leading companies to advance directly to the final objective- the
Quarry nestled in the rear-most German trenches. The raid’s intention overall was “for the
purpose of destroying enemy works and emplacements in the trench system”[4]
and it was believed the Quarry held a minenwerfer
battery. All four companies had
attached sappers and pioneers with mobile charges to deal with any hard
construction. A generous amount of No.
27 Mk I white phosphorous grenades- “P” Bombs- had also been issued.
But here, on the
raid’s left flank, with most of the 50th Battalion’s leadership gone
at a stroke, the Quarry may not even be reached. The artillery’s barrage was programmed to lift
in stages during the advance; but it was also arranged to come back on itself
to cover the withdrawal. Timing was down
to the minute and no adjustment was possible.
In the meantime, the party from the 46th Battalion providing
cover for the 50th was “met with very heavy resistance…on extreme
left of raid frontage, where a number of dugouts forming a small Strong Point
were located.”[5] Deep trenches-some as much as twelve feet-
and crowded dugouts made for liberal use of the “P” Bombs; the blooming acrid
smoke of phosphorous and resultant fires fueled by the trenches’ woodwork only
added to the confusion.
“Great credit is
due to Lieut. Murphy of 46th Battalion,” the after action report
reveals, “who, seeing the situation pushed forward and rallied the 50th
Battalion left parties in a most gallant manner, sending them forward.”[6]
Lt. Murphy, a 23 year old former Royal Military College student from Nova
Scotia would be given the Military Cross for his dash. It no doubt saved the raid from potential
collapse, though in the process of this courageous act, Murphy caught a piece
of steel, badly fracturing his left arm, a wound which would end his short
military career.
Sufficiently
checked, however, the 50th carried on, Lt. Morgan taking his party
to the Quarry and with his attached sappers “several dugouts were located and
mobile charges placed with good effect.”
In the meantime, the party from the 46th were holding a flank
more heavily defended by the Germans than expected. Their job was to keep the enemy pinned while
the Quarry was being raided, and in so doing, keep the route of withdrawal
open. “Very few prisoners were taken
here, all of the enemy offering stout resistance.”[7]
On the right
flank, where the 44th and 47th Battalions mirrored the
efforts of the 50th and 46th, the operation was going
more smoothly. Lt. Tinkess, in charge of the 44th’s raiding party
had been killed, but control was maintained by Lt. Baker, whose “great
gallantry and initiative” took his men to “the extreme end of the task allotted.”[8] As with Lt. Murphy, Lt. Baker was awarded the
Military Cross.
No minenwefers were found during the raid,
though Lt. Baker’s party of the 44th found six rounds for the
weapon. Of the 53 prisoners taken (all
belonging to the 11th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment) some were
found to be crewmen for minenwerfer. It’s possible the weapons may have been destroyed
by artillery; a large ammunition dump in the Quarry had been hit, or by the
demolition of dugouts, some 41 in total throughout the raid area[9]
where they may have been stored.
Notwithstanding,
the raid which had been conceived and executed on such short notice, was
considered a resounding success. Canadian
casualties amounted to 8 killed, 130 wounded and 15 missing. These were understandable losses for what was
gained. “The German lines were
penetrated to a depth of 700 yds., all parties returning in good order.”[10]
An inflexible timetable had been kept, the artillery barrage considered “perfect.”[11] Besides the dugouts wrecked and prisoners
taken, sappers blew seven mine shafts and the raid accounted for nearly 200
German casualties.[12]
What’s more is
that Lt Col. Davies’ quick-fire notion could be looked to as a positive example
of a combined-unit task; but that it turned out so was entirely reliant on the
will and courage of the men who carried on through potential disaster.
The rush of raids, the tension of late night patrols, a great Canadian battle and men on the razor's edge between life and death are all part of my acclaimed premier novel
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[1] "On Strategy" (1871), as translated in Moltke
on the Art of War: Selected Writings (1993) by Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell,
p. 92
[2] 4th Canadian Division War Diary, February
1917 Appendix “E”
[3] Quotes from Hilliam, W., BGen “Message from G.O.C. 10th
Canadian Infantry Brigade” 09 February 1917
[4] 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade “Operations Order No.
100” War Diary February 1917, Appendecies
[5] 4th Canadian Division War Diary, February
1917, Appendix “E”
[8] Supplement to the London Gazette No. 30023 17 April
1917 pg. 3689
[9] 44th Battalion War Diary, 13 February 1917
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