“The front of attack on the Arras
side
was to include the Vimy Ridge,
possession
of which I considered necessary to
secure the
left flank.”-Field Marshal
Sir Douglas Haig
Well before dawn
on 29 March 1917, two small raids put out by the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Brigade made the final rush to their entry points in the German front
line. Their task was straightforward, to
“obtain identification…kill Germans and lower the enemy’s moral.”[1] What they found was the wire mostly cut by
prior artillery fire, and loose, tangled bales of concertina thrown almost
absently over the parapet as an expedient fix.
Trenches were deep and dry, but incompletely constructed- in some cases
very poorly so. Morale, for the most
part, seemed absent. The Germans
“appeared to lack organisation and control.
There was no attempt made to counter-attack from the support line.”[2] All of this was very reassuring, considering
what was not long in the offing.
The time had
come for the men of the Canadian Corps to screw their courage to the sticking
place. In this case, the metaphor holds
truth- as Lady Macbeth intended it to mean that after all the careful
preparation to ensure their plotting would succeed, only a lack of courage to
see it through could cause it to fail.
Vimy was “a low
mountain ridge which the Germans had made, as they had supposed, impregnable by
its heavy defences.”[3] Its imposing stature and situation directly
opposite the lines now occupied by the four divisions of the Canadian Corps
left little doubt that taking this dominant feature would fall to them. Until late March 1917, this task, if given
any thought by the rank and file, could only be imagined in the abstract. That comfort was due to be dispersed. The thing was set. The final acts of preparation were playing
out; orders had been issued.
“The
Canadian Corps has been ordered to take the Vimy Ridge in conjunction with a
larger operation by the Third Army.”[4]
This in itself
was a component of the largest coordinated effort on the Western Front thus
far. “In the spring,” Field Marshal Sir
Douglas Haig would write about his plans for 1917, “as soon as the Allied
Armies were ready to commence operations, my first efforts were to be directed
against the enemy’s troops occupying the salient between the Scarpe and the
Ancre.”[5]
At the very
periphery of this operational area, along the south bank of the Scarpe River,
Vimy Ridge held a dominant vantage, allowing the Germans remarkable observation
along Haig’s proposed axis of advance.
Capturing the Ridge as one of the primary objectives in the opening of
the spring campaign was vital so as to deny this asset to the enemy. In turn, possessing the Ridge would confer that advantage to Allied forces;
the field of observation in the opposite direction- towards German rear areas-
was just as impressive. Such was the
importance of this high ground that Haig believed while it may be possible for
German forces elsewhere in the salient to effect a withdrawal in order to
consolidate on more defensible ground, there would be no such movement from
Vimy. This well suited the
Commander-in-Chief. The enemy “would
almost be certain to fight for this ridge, and, as my object was to deal him a
blow which would force him to use up reserves, it was important that he should
not evade my attack.”[6]
That being the
case, it was critical for those forces assigned to the objective to be prepared
for a hard fight. The four divisions of
the Corps had a desirable mix of combat experience and fresh troops. For months leading up to the offensive, units
had been reinforced to full strength, their time spent out of the line
dedicated to an intense program of work-up training. While in the trenches, constant patrols and
raids had made a survey of the immediate area, an assessment of the enemy’s
capabilities and had leant just that much more to the proficiency of the troops
and the officers who would lead them.
While the
precise day on which the operation would begin had yet to be revealed at the
divisional level, with the instructions now issued, each of the Canadian
Divisions had their tasks made clear.
The battleground
facing the Corps had been divided into sections “dictated by the German zones
of defence, the objectives for each indicated by a coloured line on a map.”[7] In order, these were the Black, Red, Blue and
Brown Lines. Clear and limited
objectives specifically assigned to sub-units was going to be key to success. “The operation will be carried out in four
phases,” orders stated, “the first two phases, which are completed by the
capture of the RED Line, being carried out by Brigades in the front line, the
second two phases, which are completed by the capture of the BROWN Line being
carried out by Brigades in the second line.”[8]
Attacking units
would “leap-frog” through each other.
Lead battalions of the lead brigades would take and hold the first
objective, the Black Line which those brigade’s follow-up battalions would pass
through to secure the Red Line. This
process would then be repeated in turn with battalions of the second line
brigades gaining the Blue and finally the Brown Line. Support troops carrying wire, ammunition,
tools and other supplies along with stretcher bearers were allocated to each
successive line- to aid the wounded and consolidate new ground against
counter-attack. “A strict time-table
governed each stage of the advance….They were allowed 35 minutes to gain the
Black Line.”[9] With each line reached, a pause was arranged
for the infantry to reorganise and for the artillery to shift fire to their
next targets. In a rapid, coordinated
thrust, all four lines were to be in Canadian hands and fully consolidated by Zero
plus 5 hours.
Ground to be
taken would be well primed by an intense artillery schedule. Much of the poor condition of German trenches
observed by the raid of 3rd Bde. On 29 March was credit due to this
active preparation. Corps Artillery was
currently firing its “Phase I” programme.
This was a “general increase of activity gradually intensifying as the
subsequent period approaches.”[10] Starting at three weeks before “Zero” and
being overtaken six days before that by “Phase II”, the main goals of this
initial phase were trench destruction, wire cutting, destruction of enemy
artillery positions and harassing fire on “all known approaches and
communications.” Efforts would be
confined for this period to targets within the first two objective lines, “to
minimize the chances of disclosing intentions.”
In fact, to further obscure the scale of the coming attack, during Phase
I no more than half of available artillery would be active. Guns were being concentrated into a
remarkable density with an average of one medium gun for every 15 yards and one
heavy piece for every 48 yards of a frontage measuring 6,700 yards.
Some of these
guns were still being brought into position and vast stores of ammunition were
being stockpiled in anticipation of the next phase; a dedicated bombardment of
unprecedented intensity.
Likewise, soon
the troops would begin to move forward to their jumping-off points along the
line of departure. Clearly, it is hardly
possible to know what was on their minds, or if many of them were even quite
aware of what they were a part, or how history would come to view what they had
set out to accomplish. Time had come, to
screw their courage to the sticking place as “along the entire length of the
mighty Ridge, Canadian men-at-arms were lying there in the drizzling dark,
waiting for the moment when they would make the first concerted attack of the
war as a Corps, the four divisions side by side.”[11]
The rush of raids, the tension of late night patrols, a great Canadian battle and men on the razor's edge between life and death are all part of my acclaimed premier novel
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[1] 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade “Operations
Order No. 138”, War Diary March 1917, Appendix No. 35
[2] 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Memorandum to
1st Canadian Division re: “Minor Operation March 29 1917” War Diary,
March 1917 App No. 37
[3] Miller, R.F., “A Short Story of the 37th
Battalion” Public Address, 1944, pg. 4
[4] 2nd Canadian Division “Instructions for the
Offensive” War Diary, March, 1917, Appendix 676
[5] Boraston, JH, Lt Col. (ed.) “Sir Douglas Haig’s
Despatches: December 1915-April 1919” JM Dent & Sons, 1919 pg. 81
[7] Nicholson, GWL, Col. “Canadian Expeditionary Force
1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War” Queen’s
Printer 1962, pg. 247
[10] Canadian Corps “Artillery Instructions for the Capture
of Vimy Ridge” Section 2: “Phase I” Canadian Corps Artillery War Diary March
1917
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