Pursuit to Mons

I must say I'm very encouraged by the way in which support through social networking has been building.  Above all else it lends credibility to the purpose of the project and, if I dare say it, my appeal as a writer.  I again offer my thanks and recognition to all those that have taken the time to note their appreciation of my efforts, whether that's been through Facebook "likes", Twitter following or Reddit "upvotes".  If you'd like to show support of this project, it can be made can be made through  the PayPal "Donate" button in the right hand column, at IndieGoGo, by joining the Facebook Page,  by following the twitter feed or this blog itself.  Comments and questions can be directed here.  I've just recently become acquainted with the Calgary Military Museums Society a great resource for military history with the very noble mandate of making our military heritage more available to students.  They are a not for profit group, and I recommend visiting their site to learn more about their cause and how you can help.

One of the things I run into from time to time, given my depth of knowledge on the subject matter, is people asking my opinion on certain aspects or events on the war.  I had one such conversation the other day.  A friend said to me "Do you know about the general who decided to attack this town just when the war was about to end?  Didn't he only sacrifice his men for the prestige of it? Wasn't that a waste?"  Not an easy set of questions to answer.  As noted before, I'm a great fan of Gordon Corrigan's expository book on the First World War "Mud Blood and Poppycock" mainly as it is quite successful in waylaying the the misconceptions most have about the war to the point that these mistakes of opinion are taken as fact.  It took me a long time to pick up the book, as I didn't want my perceptions tampered with, yet Corrigan uses straight fact, thoroughly researched, which brokers little argument with the ideas he seeks to change.  I'm very glad I took the time to read it (and re-read it) as I can not pursue an objective look at history without an open mind and all available evidence.

Which leads back to the questions my friend asked.  The general he was referring to was Sir Arthur Currie, the Officer Commanding the Canadian Corps.  The town was Mons.  Currie was an opportunist, and had relied on his Corps' elite reputation to mount difficult operations beginning with Paschendaele in late 1917.  The success of these battles won respect for the Canadians as a fighting force and prestige for its commander.  So was his attack and capture of Mons on 10-11 Nov 1918 just another bid at securing accolades, or in other words, did Currie sacrifice good men only to have Canadians end the war where the British began?  It is a case of a little bit yes, a lot of no.  The thing to keep in mind is that the Armistice going into effect at 11 am on November 11th was not, as many see it, the end of the war.  That took place with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.  The Armistice was only an agreement to a cessation of hostilities.  At any point in between the war could have flared up again.  With that as a possibility, it made strategic sense to have the best possible position to "jump off" from should the fighting resume.  Liberating and holding Mons was absolutely practical.  It is far better to occupy and defend a built up area when opportunity is present, rather to leave it in enemy hands and give the Germans that same advantage if the Armistice wasn't upheld.  The other stipulation was that Germany was in possession of foreign territory, which could be used as a bargaining point at the peace table.  The more gains that could be made against them before the cease fire went into effect weakened their diplomatic position.  Having Mons in Allied hands was a large windfall which helped to undermine Germany's ability to make concessionary demands.   


In the end, of course, the peace process went rather well which is why in hindsight it looks like a waste of lives and effort.  The thing most easily forgotten with looking at history, as I've mentioned before, it that we in the present have the advantage of that hindsight which is not practically available to those at the time of the events studied.


At the end of the war, Canada had come from being an obscure nation from a far off continent with a negligible and amateur military, to one renowned for its contribution to the war effort which concluded with the Pursuit to Mons.  We as a nation hardly flout this reputation, but it's one we've continuously upheld in other conflicts and is present today.


I'd like to express on behalf of the "If Ye Break Faith" project a warm "Welcome Home" to our troops returning from Afghanistan, a heart felt sense of gratitude and thanks for the mission they undertook, and my deepest sympathies to the families and friends of those that gave all.  


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In the Trenches II

I'd like to thank everyone who took the time to read Monday's post regarding Captain Bath.  I imagine that the published version of the book will contain chapters formatted in much the same way.  As that chapter was included in my book proposal to a literary agency, publication might not be a far reaching goal.  All of your support and belief in this project enabled me to put a great amount of effort in telling his story.  I hope I've done him, and all those stories yet to be told, justice.

There's been no return yet on my submission, though it is still early to expect any yet.  As soon as I hear news (positive thinking here, please) you all will be the first to know.  I have, though, picked up a few new followers on my twitter feed, and would like to acknowledge them here:  TVOntario, The Imperial War Museum, and Ken Reynolds who has an excellent blog on the 38th Battalion, CEF found here.  I welcome them as warmly as I welcome all those who read and enjoy my work.

Now, I've delayed it long enough, but a promise is a promise and I here now follow through with the second part of my essay on the reasons behind the stalemate on the Western Front.  As always, the project requires support to push forward, both in feedback and contributions.  Support can be made can be made through  the PayPal "Donate" button in the right hand column, at IndieGoGo, by joining the Facebook Page,  by following the twitter feed or this blog itself.  Comments and questions can be directed here.

In my last segment it was discussed why the Western Front solidified as it did.  For a refresher, here is the first half.  So the question remains, why did these lines not move?  First, contrary to the general idea, the Front was quite fluid.  Looking at maps that delineate the basic layout of the trench lines over the course of the war, it seems as though they are more static than dynamic but what is usually failed to take into account is the size of the landmass the Front occupied.  It really is a question of scale.  Nevertheless, though it shifted in one direction or the next during the war, neither side effected a breakthrough.  The question then is still a why.  With regards the Allies, their lines of communication, and thereby the means to resupply and reinforce were closer to hand.  Any rupture made by the Germans was only a day or two at most away from being plugged by fresh troops from behind the line.  Not only that, but the Germans didn't put too much offensive action against the Allies in the first place, especially after limited probes in the first half of 1915.  The concentrated effort at Verdun in 1916 and the all or nothing "Hail Mary" of the Kaiser's Battle in the spring of 1918 are the two major exceptions.  While the 1918 Spring Offensives were designed with a break between the French and British lines in mind, Verdun actually stands out as the one battle in which atrrition of the enemy was the primary goal.  In the words of Field Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn the Imperial German Army was to "Bleed the French White."  


Germany was for most of the war fighting on two fronts.  In France and Belgium, they had the advantage of being on captured ground, which meant that they could site defensive works to suit them best, and it would be up to the Allies to dislodge them.  Since they had "first pick" of ground, as it were, and didn't foresee going on a grand offensive until Russia in the east could be sent packing (effected by spring 1918) they used topographical features and resources such as poured concrete to strengthen the gains they had made in the west.  This of course made any prospect of a direct attack a difficult venture to say the least.   Normally, in attacking prepared positions, the aggressive force would want to move towards the flank as opposed to taking it head on.  Problem being, of course, that there were effectively

 no flanks to move for.  Next best thing then is to attack the enemy line where it is weakest, either where one unit's area ends and another begins, or where the ground itself isn't suited for defense.  The inherit problem with this is that since the Germans had the ability to build strong, interlinked entrenchments with many lines in depth, assaults had to be well planned and aggressively mounted.  Due to the inexperienced nature of the British New Armies (raised in 1914) and the French Army, though much larger was made up of conscripts with limited field experience, such efforts were not possible to any great degree of success until well into the second year of the war. 

Even at that point, where great gains could be made, by 1917 the Germans had completed the Hindenburg Line, a masterworks of concrete fortifications, wire and pillboxes with well sighted artillery and preregistered kill zones.  So once the allies learned their trade well enough to effect a breakthrough, they now faced a more insurmountable obstacle.  By the fall of 1918 the beginnings of such a break were being realised, but by that time Germany was exhausted, it's ability to continue the war non-existent and thence set forward to negotiate the Armistice.

So, what of Canada in all of this?  Our country went through a tremendous learning curve with trench warfare, beginning with 2nd Ypres in 1915.  By the time two years had passed, the experiences on the front coupled with taking on board British doctrine that existed prior to the war but difficult to execute with uninitiated civilians turned soldiers enabled our Divisions to successfully assault and capture Vimy Ridge.  Throughout the war, our infantry gained high reputations for the aggressive nature of mounting patrols into enemy trenches, crucial for intelligence gathering.  Our engineers were looked upon as experts in mining, that is digging under the enemy trenches in an effort to place explosives.  The Canadian artillery made first good use of new techniques of flash spotting and sound ranging to locate enemy guns.  The only successful cavalry actions of note in the war included the charge of the Fort Garry Horse at Cambrai in 1917.  Overall, we displayed what has become endemic to our national personality of taking an adverse situation and overcoming it in our own particular way.  Something to be proud of, for certain.

Mentioned in Dispatches

As most of you know by now, I love using my discretion in the publication of my blog, as exhibited in my delaying to complete my essay on trench warfare in favour of a special post for Canada Day.  Well, once again I'm delaying that essay, but for some very good reasons.  On Thursday morning, I received an email from a literary agent requesting I send them a book proposal.  This is a very important step as I am led to believe that agents don't make requests unless there is at least some interest in the work being proposed.  I have submitted this proposal just this morning, and in it was included a sample chapter of the first book.  I include this chapter below to share with you the work I hope to achieve.

Edward Osler Bath

Edward Bath, known to his family as “Tod” was born in Oakville Ontario in 1892 to Percy and Alice Bath who had recently moved to the town from East York. The Bath family was rather well to do and were able to provide well for Tod's education. He was enrolled in Upper Canada College at the age of twelve, continuing his secondary education at the exclusive private school of St. Andrew's College until 1907. Perhaps due to his privileged education and his father's influence, by the time of his enlistment at the start of the war, Tod was employed as a clerk with the standard Reliance Mortgage Corporation in Toronto.

Shortly after war was declared, Tod enlisted in the 48^th Highlanders, a local Militia regiment. Due to his level of education and work experience he was awarded a commission to the rank of Lieutenant by the 19^th of September 1914, and was assigned as a platoon commander in C Company of the regiment.

A photo taken around the date of his commission shows a handsome young man with a smooth, gentle face wearing a neatly trimmed perhaps a touch rakish moustache that makes him appear slightly older than his twenty-two years. Deep set, penetrating eyes described as “grayish blue” look directly towards and seemingly beyond the camera. Lt. Bath wears a neutral expression, giving a read of a thoughtful, practical young man who takes his office seriously. There is not a hint about him that impresses a notion of one looking for the romance and adventure of war. The peaked Highland headdress known as a “Glengarry” is canted quite carefully in the stylish manner lending an air of dash that is still practised today.

The 48^th Highlanders arrived as a complete regiment to the training camp at Valcartier Quebec, which meant that as units were organised into the First Overseas Contingent, the regiment was a rare exception in that it wasn't amalgamated with other Militia units. This amalgamation caused some consternation, especially with other Highland units who had to decide which elements of traditional dress and tartan would be worn, an idea for which deep traditions offer little compromise and left many men and officers disappointed and upset that they would not be wearing their tartan into battle.

Not so with the 48^th. The cap badge of a calling falcon and the Davidson tartan taken from the heraldry of John Irving Davidson, the Toronto banker who raised the regiment in 1891 would remain a strong sense of tradition and pride for the unit throughout the war. One point of controversy was that the regiment was officially renumbered the 15^th Battalion. All documents, reports, maps and other correspondence would be sent with this title, but those of the regiment never accepted this new nomenclature. They refused to wear a standardised maple leaf badge stamped with the number 15, always referred to themselves as the 48^th and kept a fierce regimental pride that exists still today.

The training at Valcartier was fairly basic and there was little sense of direction. This was due to the fact that Canada had quickly raised a large force without many experienced officers and NCO's. Those who had recently come into positions of authority, like Lt. Bath, would have had to learn on the job, a delicate balance of keeping enough steps ahead of their subordinates in an illusion of expertise. Usually desirable for a new officer to have a strong and experienced Sergeant to act as a guide and support, at this early stage a dearth of available men with suitable experience meant that this was not a guarantee either.

Things would change in a very drastic way when the First Overseas Contingent sailed for England and further training to take place at a new camp at Salisbury Plain. The British, under whose command the Canadians fell, held the colonials in contempt. They were viewed as undisciplined, rough and extremely under trained. Over the winter months of 1914-15 an intensive program of training was undertaken. Conditions were miserable. The winter was severely damp and cold, with rain far more often than not. Soldiers were billeted in accommodations that weren't adequately heated. Disease and illness such as influenza and pneumonia accounted for some of the first Canadian casualties of the war. Through this difficult and trying regimen the uninitiated such as Lt. Bath were learning valuable lessons in working under adverse conditions that would serve them well once they reached France and the trenches of the front line.

When they had been deemed properly trained, and after an inspection from King George V, the First Contingent was ready to depart for the Western Front. It was slightly reorganised, leaving three battalions of the fourth brigade behind to create the Canadian Training Depot. The remaining three brigades plus supporting units of cavalry, artillery and non-combat support comprised the Canadian Division, commanded by the very able British officer, Lt. General Alderson.

Lt. Bath and his battalion comrades left England aboard the SS Mount Temple on the 11^th of February 1915, landing in France four days later. The following month was one in which the Canadian Division, so new to the front, continued it's learning curve. Battalions practiced trench occupations, routines and proper reliefs in a well established nature of rotation. The idea was to keep new units in quiet areas in order to indoctrinate them to the war, and such rookie elements would never be thrust into a “hot” sector for the reason that it would do far more harm than good.

The 15^th Battalion spent their first month in France in the area of Esteres, rotating from billets to trenches. Though deemed a “quiet” area, the battalion war diary notes a few casualties from enemy artillery fire, including some fatalities. By mid April they had moved to Ypres, also considered quiet, and continued a routine of taking up trenches just outside of the small town of St. Julien to the north and east of the larger city of Ypres. This occupation including the entire 3d Brigade to which the 15^th Bn belonged occurred on th 20^th, with Lt. Bath's company, now known as No. 3 Coy in the middle with 4 Coy on the left shoring up with elements of the 13^th Bn, and 1 Coy on the right.

The Germans, at the time, were planning an offensive in the area, despite British belief to the contrary. Higher command felt that the area would remain non-active. On the 22^nd, canisters of chlorine gas were released against the French Colonial troops holding the line to the left of the Canadian Division, forcing them to retire and leaving an open gap. Hasty counterattacks by the Canadians mounted that night and throughout the next day towards Kitchener's Wood where the line had dissolved prevented a German breakthrough. The effort had strained the Canadians, with the rapidity of the German advance and the fluid nature with which the battle was joined disrupting the usual chain of command and communication. Contradictory orders were issued at different levels of organisation, and misunderstanding of the situation led General Alderson to misdeploy elements. These were all good lessons to be learned as battles rarely unfold in an orderly fashion, and perhaps it was the Canadians knack for disorder that allowed them to respond effectively to a fluid and dynamic situation.

By the 24^th , units could no longer rely on cohesive command from higher levels, and it fell to junior officers and NCO's at the Company and platoon level to direct the battle when it came upon them. The Germans renewed their efforts that morning, pushing forward past Kitchener's Wood, once again using poison gas in advance of their infantry. This attack came directly against the 3d Brigade. The 13^th Battalion, on the left of the Highlanders retired, overcome by the gas, but the 15^th remained in place despite, as the diary entry on that day states “heavy casualties.”

The fighting was close and confused, men weeping and wheezing from the gas, their only protection being urine soaked handkerchiefs and cloths. Officers shifted men in the shallow trenches to respond to enemy movement, shouted orders given in hoarse voices that would have been hard to hear over the fire of small arms. Rifles jammed under the stress of rapid fire, machine guns overheated and became inoperable, hand to hand fighting took place along the line. With their left flank “up in the air” the Highlanders maintained their post, plugging gaps as they occurred and preventing the Germans from exploiting an opening to the Canadian rear, keeping the rest of the front from collapsing. Lt. Bath was suffering from the gas, but was still able to direct his platoon in defending their front. He took a bullet wound in his left hand, probably incurred as he was exhorting his men to keep up the fight. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. J A Currie later related about Lt. Bath in his narrative on the battle, describing him as a “quiet and mild mannered youth” who “greatly distinguished himself.” By the time the battalion was relieved the next day, Lt. Bath's whereabouts were unknown. In the after action casualty report 17 officers and 674 other ranks are detailed as killed, wounded or missing. Eleven officers, which included Lt. Bath are listed as missing. It was not until the 30^th of April when a telegram was received from a Captain Harvey that informed his battalion that Lt. Bath was now a prisoner of war. Following this telegram he was reported to be at a prison camp at Hof Cusmar, transferring later to a camp at Hanvo-Munden, from which he successfully escaped.
He was recaptured not long afterwards and placed in the Citadelle Wessen, a fortress of sorts where prisoners who had shown determination in escaping captivity were held. It is the express duty of those who have been captured to use any means they can to free themselves from the enemy. The purpose of this is twofold. Primarily, it's the notion of being able to return to duty to continue the fight. Secondly, escape attempts disrupt and disturb the enemy, forcing them to use assets to prevent escapes and recapture those who've made good attempts that otherwise might be used on the front line.

Lt. Bath spent 7 ½ months at Wessel, and was then placed in a camp at Gefeld. He was moved twice more, to Holzmunden and Schwarmstadt. These frequent moves indicate he continued in his duty to agitate his captors. By March of 1918, in time for his twenty-sixth birthday he was exchanged and interred in neutral Holland, on account of being ill with bronchitis. Upon his arrival in Holland he was promoted to the rank of Temporary Captain in recognition of his attention to duty, having the promotion backdated two years to 1916, the idea being to give his rank some seniority, a particular privilege reserved only for those considered worthy of the distinction. In a letter written to his mother during this time he tells about “the best sailing we've had yet but the weather was pretty bad most of the time, being cold, blowing a young gale and thunderstorm....we had to drop our anchors and a little while later the dingy swamped.” Also expressed is his desire to be able to spend the winter in the town of Haarlem with a friend of his. This didn't occur. Capt. Bath's condition worsened and he was allowed to be repatriated on the 4^th of November. He was taken from France by hospital ship and admitted to the Prince of Wales Hospital for Officers at Marylebone Road in London with influenza and pneumonia. A week later, Capt. Bath was transferred to Endsleigh Hospital with his condition noted as “seriously ill.” He died the next day, his condition believed to have been aggravated from his exposure to poison gas during the fighting at Ypres.

For his attempts to escape from captivity, Capt. Bath was mentioned in dispatches, a rather particular honour for recognition of service beyond the regular call of duty. His citation, printed on page 1235 of the January 30 1920 Supplement to the London Gazette notes that he was “brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for War for gallant conduct and determination displayed in attempting to escape from captivity.”

Captain Bath's body was brought back to Canada and he is buried in a family plot in Oakville. His name is also noted on the Upper Canada College Memorial Tablet.

Dominion Day

If anything my own military experience has taught me, it is that one should never expect the expected.  It is more often than not that the situation will develop beyond that which is planned for, and so a good lesson in contingency and flexible preparedness.


Tomorrow is Canada Day.  On the First of July 1867, Confederation came into effect, and thus the country of Canada was created.  Unlike many other nations which arrive at their inception through revolt or revolution, our nation was brought forth in a spirit of compromise, and as those nations forged in a crucible of violence seem to have that nature endemic to them in their later affairs, so has Canada maintained that compromising ability throughout our history.


However, the first of July has itself another poignant anniversary.  In 1916 it marked the first day of the Battle of the Somme, a day which remains the single bloodiest in British military history.  It is also significant to the last province to enter Confederation, Newfoundland and Labrador as the Newfoundland Regiment (the title "Royal" was bestowed afterward) lost nearly eighty percent of its active strength on that day and remains in many minds a day of mourning for those men rather than a celebration of nationhood. 


I won't divest on the nature of the battle itself, it's objectives and reasoning, but rather,  I'm going to put a little perspective on the amount of casualties which were caused in the first twenty-four hours.  Most estimates place these numbers at 60 000 of which approximately 20 000 were fatal.  These are difficult numbers to conceive in the abstract.  Meaning it is hard to fathom the amount as, no matter how popular one might be, even on Facebook, it is nigh on impossible to be personally familiar with that many people.  


Consider this, then.  Imagine if you will attending a game at Roger's Centre.  Extend that imagining that the Blue Jays have managed to fill every seat (a bit far fetched, to be certain).  Today, on this notional day, a double header is being played.  Before the end of the second game, everyone sitting along the first base line will be dead, and everyone else in the stadium will be hurt in varying degrees of seriousness.  Much easier to picture it that way, isn't it?  That is the level of loss which the British had to cope, and one in which they were not adequately prepared for.  The perception of that loss is magnified by the way in which the units who went into action that day had been recruited, which was mainly geographical.  This means when such a unit suffered severely, the impact was absorbed by a singular community.  Which is why, then, that Newfoundland and Labrador looks to this day as one of loss rather that the festival nature felt elsewhere in Canada.  


However, a bit of news came up recently that is a cause for, if not celebration than one of the relief of closure.  Remains of a Canadian soldier of the First World War have been recently been positively identified as those of Alexander Johnston of Hamilton, Ontario, believed to have been killed in action on or about 29 September 1918 during the battle of the Canal du Nord.  The Hamilton Spectator has written a great article with regards to Pte. Johnston.  He was conscripted in 1917, which isn't odd for that time as volunteers were not coming in enough numbers to replace losses. Like a large portion of the CEF, he was only a recent arrival Canada.  There is a slight connection in that with me to him as he was born in my mother's hometown of Coatbridge, Scotland.  He will be laid to rest with full honours along side his fallen comrades in France, and I hope his surviving relatives will be able to take solace in that he will now have a known resting place.  


I would then like to dedicate this Canada Day posting of If Ye Break Faith to the memory of Pte. Johnston and his family.  His name liveth forever more.

In the Trenches

I have decided, as this project grows, ever so slightly, to adjust the format of my blog once again.  Still posting on Mondays and Thursdays, I will give a brief project update in the opening paragraph each day, but will follow on both days with my subject essays.  I find the writing of them much more enjoyable than what has become a bald appeal for financial means , and I do hope they are that much more enjoyable to read.

When I say the project is growing slowly, I couldn't think of a more apropos way of describing my progress.  Many of you are aware that my ability to continue research towards the project's mandate has been suspended, but I've had a good amount of feedback pointing me towards usable links and resources (with thanks to Reddit user PHDepressed).  Not only that but I've picked up a solitary follower on this blog, s it feels as though I am writing directly to a single reader which is a nice way to think about it, and my Facebook and Twitter posts have been receiving positive feedback.  As always, support for the project moral or otherwise can be made through  the PayPal "Donate" button below, at IndieGoGo, by joining the Facebook Page,  by following the twitter feed or this blog itself.  Comments and questions can be directed here.


One of the questions that is often asked by those with little study in World War One is why did the war on the Western Front stagnate into that of nearly four years of entrenchment?  The quick reply is that the technology brought forth by this new industrial emergence of war had the main opponents equally matched in that regard, being led by fussy old generals who had no idea how to cope.  Like most quick replies, though, there is very little actual understanding of the entire situation.  There is a little truth to it, but not nearly enough to provide a comprehensive answer.


It becomes much more clear when it is understood as to why armies adopt a defensive stance in the first place.  The primary reasoning for this is that they do so because they lack the ability to continue offensive action.  Denying one's enemy important territory or hoping to force his attacks in a particular direction are definite benefits to being on the defensive to  be certain, but not reason enough to stall or cease an advance.


With that reasoning in mind, we go back to the initial question, that being why in the case of the Great War did the opposing forces both take up defensive postures at much the same time in the Autumn of 1914 and remain so (more or less) until November 1918?  By September 1914 Germany had overextended its lines of communication.  the German plan at the outset of the war was to advance rapidly through Belgium and France before the latter could be adequately prepared so as to gain a quick victory in the west whereby they then could concentrate on Russia in the east.  This, known as the Schleiffen Plan after the German chief of staff who developed it, relied on a strict adherence to timetables in order for it to capture Paris within six weeks.   Ergo when the German army encountered harder resistance than anticipated, the scheduling of the plan was, in a sense derailed and necessitated a defensive posture to shore up their forces before resuming the advance.


In the case of the Allies, the rapidity by which they countered the initial German advance had greatly depleted their initial strength and they required time to reinforce against those losses.  In Britain's case this was very pertinent as they were possessed of a small professional force and were in the process of raising armies from scratch (which was to include the arrival of the Canadian Contingent).


Both sides attempted to turn the other's flank in what became known as "The Race to the Sea", but both lacked the means to make a decisive thrust, which then only extended the defensive lines until they ran from the North Sea to the Swiss border.  Of course, the misconception of one long line of dug earth between these two points is a fallacy.  Trenches can only be dug where ground is suitable.  Land features, natural obstacles and built up areas not able to be entrenched were otherwise defended.  


Taken that reason into account, why then did the war fall into stalemate for the following three years?  that question answered plus the Canadian perspective on the trench war in Thursday's update, so stand to for that!

The Empire Called to Arms

People are reading my posts, that much is certain.  Some have been very kind in offering advice and moral support.  It's also been made clear to me that my solicitations for donated funding, since I'm unable to make assurances of how these funds would go towards the production of the printed works, will be difficult or impossible to realize.  For those of you who do not know me, my name is Christopher Harvie, an enthusiastic self taught historian with no academic credentials and no previous publication experience.  So, I can understand why folks would be shy to part with donations to a cause someone such as myself is championing.  The corollary is that this is my passion, and the only work to which I wish to dedicate myself.  I may never get it to the point where I can make it a professional endeavor as is my goal, simply put, but as this is work I feel called to do, I will continue to do it as long as I am able.

That being said, support for this project, moral or otherwise can be made through  the PayPal "Donate" button below, at IndieGoGo, by joining the Facebook Page,  by following the twitter feed or this blog itself.  Comments and questions can be directed here.


The problem with a study in history is that everything is done in hindsight, with knowledge that those who went through the events in question may not have had.  What this does is leave a lot of leeway in the interpretation of the past.  History, though is a fairly linear subject summed up succinctly by three questions:  What happened, how did it happen, what was the effect of it happening?  It is, of course rarely as simple as that, but those three questions serve as a good guideline to examine what has occurred.


With regards to the First World War, an objective study is hard to come by.  the commonly held perceptions are taken not from the war itself but from the sense of disillusionment coming afterward from writers and poets wishing to divorce themselves of the notion of romance which occurred at the onset of the war.  from these popularly held notions comes the idea that World War One was an avoidable waste.  With hindsight it is easy to see how conflict could have been avoided or at least contained.  If Serbia had acquiesced to Austria's demands following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (which was impossible anyway as the concessions Austria required were designed to be rejected) the war may not have happened.  If Russia and Germany had not mobilised their armies to support their respective allies, the ensuing conflict may have been contained to the Balkans, not drawing in the rest of Europe.  But to paraphrase Ben Elton's "Blackadder" TV series, "It was too much bloody bother not to have a war."  Gordon Corrigan, in his book "Mud Blood and Poppycock", which I cannot recommend highly enough, states that all the major players had geographic, economic and political ends to be met by going to war, and the circumstances leading to the war were ripe for the belligerents to achieve their goals.  It is not whether or not the war was avoidable based on a series of "if's", the fact remains that it did happen.  


Where does Canada fit in to how the Great War began?  The circumstances of the onset of war being what they were, with Great Britain being drawn in ostensibly to protect Belgian neutrality, but in actuality to protect its own interests on the continent (mainly having to do with the balance of power between them and Germany), Canada was automatically involved.  At the time, a Dominion of the Empire, Canada was far less autonomous than perhaps imaginable today so that when Britain was at war, Canada was too.  Even accounting for all the "if's" that really can't be accounted for, in our country's case the war was most definitely not avoidable.


Canada's participation in the war, however, allowed our tiny country to gain recognition on the world stage and was our first real step into international affairs.  Despite the loss and hardships caused by the war, the end result was the emergence of what would become, before the 20th Century was out, the best country in the world.  Which is yet another reason why we continue to remember those that gave their lives, perhaps not so much for the reasons for which they fought but more so the benefit our nation has gained because they fought.

We Shall Not Sleep

This blog will now be updated twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays.  While the purpose is stille to promote the "If Ye Break Faith" project (about which more here), the Monday post will have updates directly related to the project, and the Thursday post will be short essays pertaining to Canada in the First World War.  Support to the initial volume can be made through the PayPal "Donate" button below, at IndieGoGo, by joining the Facebook Page,  by following the twitter feed @ifyebreakfaith or this blog itself.  Comments and questions can be directed here.

I have been thinking a great deal about the four words with which I have given my project its name, the man who wrote them and the conditions under which they were written.  Also, what hasn't slipped my attention is the very fitting nature that Lt. Col McCrae will at some point be given a tribute through the work titled from his famous poem as he died on active service in 1918.

Most anybody who attended primary school in Canada knows some details about him and the lines he wrote which have become a touchstone for remembering those that fell in the Great War.

As a surgeon, McCrae would have been familiar with disease, suffering and death that even in civil practice would have benn beyond our understanding in this advanced age.  It can not be expected that even a doctor of his experience could have been prepared for the volume and type of wounds he was to encounter at his aid post during the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915.  The nature of his work would place him well behind the firing line, the place known as the "forward edge of battle", but his post would have been close enough to the artillery to hear and feel the blast of outgoing shells and to smell the heavy and sweetly metallic scent of carbon and burnt cordite from the big guns.  This smell would have mixed with those of his patients wounds, sickly fecal reeks of exposed intestines, the rusty wiff of blood and perhaps a faint chenical tingle of chlorine gas that was dissapating through a strong westerly breeze.

Operating on several patients as quickly as possible, he would have kept his hands as clean as possible, but the iron in blood stains fast so that his fingers would be blotted with maroon and probably caked under his nails.  He worked solidly as men were brought to his care, more perhaps than he was prepared or expected to treat at any one time, but only taking a short break when word was passed to him that a friend had been killed in the fighting.  It was during this time he took to himself that he composed "In Flanders Fields" to express the grief he felt by the loss of his companion and was to become a fitting memorial to all who died in the war.  That is the idea that has stuck with me, that a man such as McCrae, indoctrinated as a medical professional to accept death on a level others might find complaicent, to carry on his duty surrounded by it, but to be overcome by the news of one individual passing-putting the suffering around him to a personal level.

Such as it was for all the friends and families who lost someone in the war.  Deaths of thousands is a terrible thing, generally understood as such but fails to register until it is directly tied to someone close.  This is where this project sets its aim in that by allowing the reader to know these people on as personal a level as possible, their loss is much more easily quantifiable, the cost of war reduced from an abstract number to a personal level and perhaps a reason to consider why we as a people go to war at all.