By 1918, for the infantry, things had changed. The preceding years of costly
Much more intricate planning was to be put into
offensive operations. As we have seen in
Part II, even a small scale
operation of a trench raid was heavily planned.
Lt Col Odlum’s Operations Order for the Petite Douve Raid runs five
pages in length giving exacting detail on each man’s role in the
operation. The artillery had learned a
great deal in the interceding years as well; but more importantly, there was
much better coordination and cooperation between arms. While still not reliably able to fire to
order, artillery units could range, locate and destroy enemy batteries, supress
particular areas with gas, and walk a wall of fire and iron just ahead of the
advance. Mobility though, was still a
setback.
The Germans had also incorporated doctrinal shifts,
and this in itself would need to be addressed.
In the spring of 1918, the Germans had launched a last-ditch general
offensive in the west. Supplemented by
troops lately moved from the east after Russia’s capitulation and begun before
the Americans could take to the field in force, the “Kaiser’s Battle” had
stretched, but not broken the Allied lines.
Materially exhausted, by summer, the Germans retained a defensive stance
where they had penetrated; prepared to fall back on the well-constructed
Hindenburg Line of concrete machine gun bunkers, jungles of barbed wire and
anti-tank ditches.
As formidable as it was, the Hindenburg Line
amounted to not much more than a shock absorber. By design, the forward defenses would slow
down and break up the momentum of any attack into fractured and isolated
units. These then could be easily
overwhelmed by local reserves, beyond the reach of supportive Allied artillery,
but well within the range of their own guns.
Overall, the Hindenburg Line “proved far too formidable for the humble
term trench warfare to remain
appropriate….This was defensive warfare raised to a new plane. It appeared invulnerable.”[1]
Allied planners were compelled by what they faced to develop strategy to
compete. If an attack devolved into a
collection of isolated skirmishes, attention had to be given to tactical
awareness and leadership at the lowest levels of organisation. Maps were more widely issued, scale models of
objectives called “sand tables” were built with painstaking accuracy for troops
to study when out of the lines. More
attention was paid to training overall, the development of the Labour Corps in
1917 relieved the infantry of most of the chores they had to undertake while
not in trenches which had been done in lieu of training.
The Allied counter-offensive, begun in August, was
aimed at re-taking lost strategic ground, break the Hindenburg Line and put the
Germans to the chase in the open ground beyond.
That it was successful is why this campaign became known as the “Hundred
Days”; as it was still driving the enemy back by November. Strategy from the top down dictated the
time-table more so than reverses in the field.
Each objective would be a miniature battle of its own, with not only
large headquarters, at Corps level, but companies, platoons and even sections
having been briefed on their role-and crucially, the role of higher formations.
Infantry platoons had become better armed. Introduction of effective hand grenades and
especially the Lewis light machine gun gave a comparative level of firepower
against well-defended positions. The tactics developed around these weapons-
more a modification of existing notions than anything entirely new had been
proven successful; at least in a limited way, in the offensives of 1917. What is noteworthy is that despite these
adjustments and improvements, the 1909 Field Service Regulations-the infantry’s
instruction manual- was still not only being used as the definitive resource,
but was still very much relevant. In
fact, much of this century old manual would be understood on a practical level
by a modern day infantryman. This draws
the conclusion that while situations and technology may change- and had best be
adapted to- the role of the infantry is immutable.
Perhaps it would be best to examine the
effectiveness of these changes by making a comparative study of two actions
with similar objectives- one from early in the war and the other closer to the
end. In the first part of this series,
“To Close With and Destroy the Enemy”, the hasty counter-attack of the 10th
and 16th Battalions at Kitchener’s Wood in April of 1915 was looked
at.
Despite the Canadians at Kitchener’s Wood making
their objective, the oversights and inexperience of these men made this attack
more costly than perhaps it needed to be.
When the bombastic Lt Col Boyle, CO of the 10th Battalion was
mortally wounded, there was the loss of one of the few men who knew the battle
plan, and the remaining officers and men failed to consolidate the ground they
had taken. This made it all the easier
for the Germans to force them back in a counter attack of their own. Strict adherence to orders trumped
initiative, leaving German troops in possession of Oblong Farm, where they were
able to effectively fire upon the Canadians’ flank. Again, gaining one’s objectives cannot alone
be the benchmark of a successful attack- as the ultimate proof of success is to
be able to hold the ground taken from the enemy.
Kitchener’s Wood and Bourlon Wood were both dense
copses requiring clearing
This was an artificial commercial waterway of grand
proportions, in which “a frontal assault offered little but the prospect of
disaster. The canal itself was nearly
100 meters wide, and on each side a further 400 meters was flooded
swampland….the ground for several thousand meters on both banks was completely
open and dominated by strong German positions on the heights on the far side.”[2] Fortunately, the war had interrupted the
canal’s construction, and a 4km length had been dug but remained
unflooded. This would give the Canadians
ample protection to begin their advance, but it meant that leading units would
have to maneuver obliquely after crossing to press the initial objectives.
The operation had been conceived with an eye to a
new tactical development known as “Bite and Hold”. Initial objectives-in this case the securing
of a bridgehead across the canal- would be the responsibility of units in the
van. Subsequent objectives, including
Bourlon Wood were to be taken by fresh battalions moving through positions
consolidated by preceding outfits. A major factor in the Canadians’ favour had
much to do with improved co-ordination between the infantry, artillery and
engineers. “The key to the Corps’
victory was its barrage, but the depth of the planned advance meant that most
of the final objectives were out of reach of the guns.”[3]
Infantry outpacing its own artillery had been a constant difficulty throughout
the war, and a major factor in the ability to “win the firefight.” A greater reliance was needed on all elements
of the army working together. Infantry
would be unable to continue its advance without supporting artillery, which in
turn was reliant upon combat engineers to help move their heavy, horse-drawn
guns and limbers across the canal and the rough battlefield beyond.
Canadian sappers did quick work- “With one bridge
completed, the first guns were across the canal at 8:40 am,” this after a 0520 H-hour, followed by “(f)our more
pre-fabricated bridges were in place within four hours, with three larger
bridges available for bigger guns by 6 pm.”[4]
According to Professor Tim Cook, “the battle hinged
on the capture of Bourlon Wood….The heights of the wood towered over the
battlefield.”[5]
German defences were well dug in and fortified, the woods offering natural concealment. Canadian Artillery had blanketed Bourlon Wood
with gas shells. At this point in the
war, the use of gas was fairly ubiquitous, but precautions in defense against
chemical weapons meant that casualties from its effects were marginal. Its main purpose was to prevent reinforcement
from beyond the wood, and force those defending within to operate in physically
limiting gas masks. Gas was also
employed with the design to cull draft horses upon which the artillery was
reliant. Overall, the preparation for
the assault by use of gas held the Germans where they were; making it that much
easier for the infantry to locate and close in on their positions.
One of the battalions assigned to take Bourlon Wood,
the 102nd, exemplifies the confidence, comprehension and instigation
of the developments undertaken since 1915.
Very early in their part of the battle, some seven hours from the 0520
start at the canal, a lucky hit from German artillery effectively decapitated
the battalion. The war Diary reports “HQ
(E.17.c.8.5) were struck by a shell about noon, killing Lieut. SG Moore, the
Signalling Officer and 3 Runners from other units and seriously wounding
Lieut-Col F Lister, DSO MC and Capt SH Okell, MC, the adjutant.
“Lieut CH Packman filled the breach temporarily and
notified the GOC (General Officer Commanding) who promptly appointed Lieut Col
Thompson, DSO…to take command of the 102 Battalion as well as the 75th
Battalion.”[6]
Junior officers, of companies and platoons well forward of Battalion HQ
probably weren’t aware of this potential disaster. Each knew what his sub-units’ task was and
pursued these objectives regardless of developments elsewhere.
Fighting in a wooded area is particularly
tough. Dense woods reduce visibility and
make it easy for units to become separated and lost. Preparation beforehand-by use of maps and
models- ameliorated this; confident leadership making up for any
deficiencies. Lieutenant Graham Lyall,
in his part of the attack provides an outstanding example of this. He first led his platoon on a flanking move
against an enemy strongpoint that was holding against the lead attacking
company. Lyall and his men overwhelmed
the Germans, taking 13 prisoners, a field gun and four machine guns, and
allowing the advance to continue.
“Later, his platoon, now much reduced by casualties, was held up by
machine guns at the southern end of Bourlon Wood….(Lyall) rushed the position
single handed and
At a cost to the battalion of 6 officers, 44 other
ranks killed, 8 officers and 151 other ranks wounded, the woods were cleared by
the time third Brigade was prepared to pass through on the next phase of
attack. “The success was great and in
addition to the strategically important ground taken, we captured 257
prisoners, 15 guns and 18 machine guns and inflicted heavy casualties.”[9]
In one day, the Canadian Corps had advanced almost
half-way to the final objective of Cambrai.
Hasty German reinforcements moved to defend the town would make the next
phase of the operation much more difficult than the startling success of 27
September. However, employing skills,
weapons, tactics and leadership not present in the early stages of the war are
what can account for the opening phase being as well executed as it was.
Lt Lyall was placed in command of his company and
would continue to lead from the front; taking yet more prisoners and guns the
following day. For his part in the
battle over the 27th-28th September, he was awarded the
Victoria Cross. Lyall would die of a
heart attack in Egypt in 1942, while serving as a Lt Colonel in the Royal Army
Ordinance Corps.
[2] Marteinson, John, “We Stand on Guard, An Illustrated
History of the Canadian Army”, Ovale Publications, 1992 pg 200
[3] Cook, Tim, “Shock Troops, Canadians Fighting the Great
War 1917-1918”, Penguin Canada, 2008, pg 512
[6] 102nd Battalion CEF War Diary, Appendix “H”:
“Narrative of Operations from 27 September to 2 October 1918” courtesy Library
and Archives Canada
[8] London Gazette, ibid.
