It
had been my intention to use this space to examine the shifts in the employment
of infantry over the course of the war. Envisioning a two-part series to illustrate
these changes, it occurred to me that I had used the word “evolution”, which
describes a gradual approach to change. Two
parts, I found, would be too abrupt to include all the relevant aspects, and as
such I have decided to expand the series: Looking at the ultimate changes in
tactics a little later on while spending some time now on elements of the war
which served as an intermediary between things as they were at the start, and
things at the war’s end.
The
prospect of a long war was becoming more evident as 1915 wore on.
In
December of 1915, command of British forces on the Western Front was
transferred from Sir John French to Sir Douglas Haig. Haig’s despatches, from this point to the end
of the war lend valuable perspective to the overall situation as seen from the
very top. His first such report, dated
19th May 1916 neatly describes the continual effort required to
merely maintain the defensive lines- it “entails constant heavy work. Bad weather and the enemy combine to flood
and destroy trenches….all such damages must be repaired promptly, under fire,
and almost entirely by night.[1] It must be taken into
account that Haig’s despatches (which were publicly released in supplement to
the London Gazette) have a decidedly positive spin.
This
activity certainly occupied the infantry, but it would come at a cost. Using the infantry in laborious tasks might
ensure the men be kept busy, but time spent in this way reduced the amount of
training such a large body of men mostly new to the army (or new to elevated
levels of command) would need for a successful and complex operation that a
decisive counter-attack required. A lack
of this preparation would become painfully obvious at the Somme in 1916.
“At night,” says Professor Tim Cook, “the
once empty battlefield...swarmed with activity.”[2] Even if no major effort to
bring the fight to the enemy might be in progress, it mattered a great deal to
military planners, reliant on accurate information as well as the morale of
individual soldiers to control the battlefield.
There being no foreseeable opportunity for offensive operations for a
period of several months indicated that the infantry would need the ability to
retain a high level of morale and fighting spirit. Holding a static position gave rise to the
use of patrolling and trench raids to keep the men active while concurrently
maintaining pressure against the enemy. Haig goes so far as to note “One form
of minor activity deserves special mention, namely the raids…which are made at
least twice or three times a week against the enemy’s line[3]
To gain perspective of the enemy
defences and overall intentions, patrols would be sent even closer to and
sometimes within opposing trenches. Such
were the importance of patrols that if a compromise needed to be made between
“facilities for observation (and) facilities for protracted resistance”[4]
the latter took precedence if ample efforts could be made for patrolling. “Their
strength may be from two to eight men under a non-commissioned officer.”[5]
Active patrolling taught men how to act independent of larger commands, a
crucial skill to inspire initiative and a good way to educate NCO's and junior
officers who may have to assume control of a battle when attrition rates leave
them senior. Becoming familiar with the ground had great benefits in
planning offensives and would help to raise the men's confidence during
attacks.
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Raids differed from patrols. The purpose was not to secure territory, but
to cause a limited amount of damage. They
became the epitome of keeping men at a high level of aggressiveness, and to
keep the enemy off balance and over vigilant.
Trench raids varied in size, from the numbers of a regular patrol to
sometimes that which could be counted as a miniature battle. One of the most successful raids, and one
which would set the template for future operations and secure a peculiar
reputation for Canadians, was conducted early in the war against German
trenches near La Petite Douve Farm in November 1915 by the 7th Battalion, CEF. Raids may well have been opportunistic, but a
great many relied on exacting detail.
The operations order to the Petite Douve raid runs five pages in length
and leaves very little to chance.
The German section of line opposite
the 7th Battalion was a meandering collection of sharp angles; its
shape dictated by geography. For the
most part, their trenches ran generally north-south, parallel to and just west
of a main road. Where a quadrangle of
buildings that was La Petite Douve Farm abutted this road, the German front line
followed its outward edges. Nearly one hundred and fifty yards below the farm,
the Douve River, running approximately west-east,
On the night of 16-17 November, 1915
the 7th Battalion, according to the operations order, would attack, (with
a concurrent effort of the 5th Battalion) “2 points in the enemy’s
lines opposite its front for the purpose of draining strength & gaining
information concerning his defences.”[6]
Leading up to the operation, artillery fire was expected to cut the German wire
and damage their trenches while trench mortars fired upon Petite Douve Farm
intending to knock out machine gun emplacements there. In the afternoon and evening of the 16th,
rifle fire from the front trenches would be used to keep the enemy fixed in
place, preventing use of communications trenches, with the noise of gunfire
covering the sound of the attacking party moving into their jumping off
positions. Scouts had gone ahead in the
afternoon as a two man patrol “to endeavour to make a daylight report on the
success secured by the artillery in cutting the enemy wire and breaking the
parapet.”[7] With this report, further patrols went out
with bridging ladders to the determined crossing points and placed them there
for the attack team. At eleven o’clock,
the attack team assembled in the forward trenches. Beforehand, they had removed all identifying
information such as id discs, paybooks and uniform insignia. Each man wore a black “veiling mask” to
reduce visibility, and make quick identification possible. It could also be surmised the use of these
masks was to have a psychological element upon the unsuspecting Germans.
H-hour was 11:30 pm. The attack team moved out through gaps cut in
the Canadian wire and traced along the right bank of the Douve, led by the
scouts who had determined the route to the bridging point. Once
in place, the support team took up their positions at the listening post, the
covering team moving over the bridge.
Midnight was when “the assault will be delivered from the bridging
point.”[8] With maximum speed and aggression, the
assault team crossed the river, guided by scouts to the breached wire. The artillery hadn’t been completely successful
and wire cutters were employed to widen the breach. Once in the trench, one group moved down the
length of the trench to the left, clearing their path with hand grenades. At a predetermined point, just beyond the
junction with a communications trench, bales of wire were dropped and men with
shovels went to work to create a barricade. The remainder of this group carried
on down the communication trench to the support line, lobbing grenades the
whole way. Another group had moved right, towards the machine gun position,
taking it by force and setting up a similar block as the one on the left. The
men then made their way into the support trench, meeting up with the team that
had come down the communication trench. Within
minutes, the assault team had effectively taken control of a rectangular
portion of enemy line defined by the bent fire trench at the road, the
communication trench and the length of the support line which ran between the
fire trench and the communication trench.
Twelve German prisoners were
manhandled out of the trench and back towards the support team at the LP. While several riflemen kept ready in case of
a sudden counter attack from the direction of Petite Douve Farm, any valuable
information, including the construction and outlay of the trench system was
taken in by the scouts who were moving within the cordoned area. Exactly twenty minutes after the assault team
had made their breach; Lt Wrightson blew one long and three short blasts on his
whistle, to agreed signal to withdraw. The
assault team, again guided by the scouts made their way through the wire,
gathered the bridge party, crossed back to the right bank to rendezvous with
the support team and then back into Canadian lines. A pre-arranged artillery salvo was fired upon
the German line where the assault had taken place. The Germans had put a counter-attack in, but
were too late, the enemy had gone and they were now exposed to heavy fire.
The Petite Douve Raid was a
tremendous success. At the cost of one
man killed and another wounded, the party of men of the 7th
Battalion had struck a fierce blow against a defended line, taken a dozen
prisoners and gained credible intelligence.
It would make the reputation of the battalion, and of the Canadians as
daring “raiders”; which also inspired other Canadian units to mount raids of
their own in a spirit of one-upmanship.
These subsequent raids improved on technique and helped to solidify the
overall esteem of Canadian troops. The
effect of such an operation would be enormous.
It would first inspire confidence in the men taking part of their own
abilities and their leadership. A
successful raid showed them that the enemy could be taken by surprise and kept
the ever crucial fighting spirit at a keen edge. Also, the enemy would be unbalanced, forcing
them to improve their vigilance for such attacks, which wears on physical and
psychological limits; especially if there was a prospect that men in black
masks could drop into a trench at any given time. Information brought back, through prisoners
and the observations of the assault party would go towards the planning of
future operations.
*Lt Wrightson being given command of
the assaulting team is remarkable, considering he is listed as a Private in “D”
Company in the Bn’s nominal role taken upon arrival in England just one year
prior.
[1] Lt Col J H Boraston, ed. “Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches
(December 1915-April1919)” J L Dent & Sons Ltd. 1919 pg 4
[2] Cook, Tim, “At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the
Great War 1914-1916” Penguin Canada, 2007 pg 272
[4] General Staff, War Office, “Field Service Regulations Part
I: Operations” HM Stationary Office, London, 1909 pg 100
[6] Odlum, V W, Lt Col: 7th Battalion CEF
Operation Orders No. 59, 15 November 1915; Appended to Battalion War Diary,
courtesy Library and Archives Canada
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