The
Purpose of the Battle of the Somme Part II: Execution
At 0720 hrs, 1st
July, 1916, an underground gallery sited beneath the German line and packed
with 20 tons of ammonal[1]
was detonated. Ten minutes before
zero-hour, Hawthorn Mine, as it was known, devastated the land on which it was
buried; creating a shockwave felt for miles, the debris flung upward returning
as heavy clods of earthen rain. For all
the noise and bother, detonating the mine did more to alert the Germans of the
coming attack than being an aid to it.
Overall, artillery preparation had been poor. Only at the southern end of the planned line
of advance, where the British and French met had there been any significant
reduction of German defenses. French
artillery in the area operated differently from the British and had a greater
availability to (and understanding the employment of) high explosive shells.
Regardless of what lay
ahead- shattered trenches or intact works- the men were going. They were as ready as they could be, well, as
they were ever going to be. For a great
many, this preparation was grossly deficient as well. What followed has become legendary, a
slaughter of 60,000 men for no result.
Military historian Major Gordon Corrigan puts it succinctly: “The Somme
is often cited as an example of naïve bravery pitted against hopeless odds,
coupled with stubborn pursuit of goals that were, quickly obvious as being
incapable of achievement.”[2]
However, Corrigan was expressing the common sentiment so that he could
illustrate how fact refutes perception.
There can be no denying
the terrible loss experienced by the British on 1st July. One third of the day’s casualties were fatal,
and many of the wounded would never return to active duty. The Germans were still in possession of their
defensive line, for the most part, so any Allied gains can be easily
overlooked. In actuality, what gains had
been made, though diminished in afterthought by objective failures gaining
precedence, were proof that adequate training, preparation and resources could
be sufficient against a fortified trench system.
North to south, from
Beaumont-Hamel to La Boiselle very little, if anything was
For the 29th
Division, attacking at the northern end of the line, around Beaumont Hamel,
“The casualties were severe. They
numbered 5,000. The loss of officers…was
disproportionately heavy.”[3]
Some battalions in the 29th lost upwards of eighty percent of their
effective strength; the loss of leadership a critical blow to maintaining
fighting capability.
Sir John Keegan, the
much admired historian, assigns much of the blame to the failures of the first
day to deficiencies in artillery preparation.
By and large, he is not incorrect.
What gains were made had been mostly in the area where the French
artillery had been active in support of the line where they and the British
abutted. Keegan gives something away in
his inaccurate description of shrapnel shells.
He opines that the ground into which these shells were fired absorbed
the impact and thus negated effectiveness reveals a military ignorance. Shrapnel is
I raise this point not
to castigate Sir John, put to illustrate that he doesn’t completely comprehend
the subject matter he is describing and as such any conclusions he may draw
will have at least a shadow of ignorance attached to it. Reading Keegan for historical poignancy
requires, at times, to cut through the treacle of his sentimentality and bias
towards the British and a blind eye to his technical ignorance. He is correct that the New Army formations
had not been adequately trained- but doesn’t seem to understand what regular
standards, particularly battlecraft were in 1916. The Regular Army of the pre-war years was
proficient in the type of “fire and movement” Keegan notes as being newly
developed and of French origin. In personal conversation, I have more than once
heard these so-called “new-tactics” (which are illustrated in the 1909 Field
Service Manual) as having provenance with other nationalities, particularly
Canadians and Australians, so Keegan is not alone in this oversight. These things do call into question
conclusions made upon misunderstood fact.
It certainly can’t be
said that thirty percent of objectives taken would be considered adequate
against losses and failures. Some minds
will then point to the apparent futility of continuing operations at the Somme.
The core of this argument is whether the battle was meant to be the war winning
breakthrough, an attritional battle or first one and then the other when that
failed to materialise. “This setback”,
of the first day, according to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, “negatived the original
idea of a ‘breakthrough’ to Bapaume and Cambrai, and Haig for a time fell back
on the attrition method- of limited advances aimed to wear down the German
strength.”[4]
Haig’s overall plan for
his army’s part in the 1916 offensives had to consider the factors of what was
occurring elsewhere, particularly where the Germans were operating offensively. His stated objectives, reproduced in the
collection of his despatches, for the combined Anglo-French offensives of 1916
were:
I. To relieve the pressure on Verdun
II. To assist our Allies in the other
theatres of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the
Western Front
III. To wear down the strength of the forces
opposed to us[5]
That breakthrough isn’t
mentioned leaves opinion open to believe Haig wanted an attritional
battle. For many, believing that the
Somme was supposed to create the sought after breakthrough, the subsequent
months of repeated attack must seem either foolish or stubborn. However, as the battle’s main objective was
to wear down Germany’s ability to resist-urgently in light of a similar
strategy affected by the Germans against the French at Verdun. The extension of thought is along the lines
of Niall Ferguson’s notion of “when the breakthrough failed to materialise, all
resorted to the arguments of attrition.”[6]
It is a fair shock to
see Haig’s first reference to 1st July contain the observation “the
success” of the opening day “came as a surprise to the enemy and caused
confusion and disorganisation in his ranks.”[7]
seems a trifle generous of an assessment, or even willingly obtuse. Haig’s
despatches, if taken at face value seem at least a little separate from reality
to the point of near delusion at times.
It would be, however, prejudicial to make assessments of his character
based upon these writings. The field
Marshal submitted these despatches as progress reports to his employer, the
government. Not being made redundant
involved putting all events in the best light possible. That the despatches were concurrently
published in newspapers also influenced Haig to write with a positive spin, to
keep public opinion of the war likewise positive. It would be a pity to think that Haig’s
reputation for being out of touch, emotionally cool and heartlessly calculating
may have basis in his own words which were not meant to be anything approaching
expository. Brigadier Sir Richard Holmes
makes his assessment clear that Haig’s envisioned purpose for the Somme battle
is at best unclear. “The evidence
suggests that he hoped to break through the German lines.”[8] The
disagreement on the nature of the attack between Rawlinson of 4th
Army and his C-in-C Haig wasn’t as polar as attrition v. breakthrough but along
the lines of what was achievable in regards the limit of the first day’s
planned advance.
Haig wanted the result
of any offensive he undertook to be an exploitable
In any event, wearing
the enemy down would be by its nature, crucial to attempting to push through the
deadlock and bring the war back to mobile operations. Given that most of the first day’s objectives
were not met and thus creating an uneven line in danger of being over-extended,
reliance of piecemeal attacks up and down the frontage to shore up the lines
would be necessary before a general advance could be resumed. In this period, all efforts would be made to
wear the enemy down, either physically or morally, so, yes, attrition, but only
with a conclusive mind towards transitioning from a wearing out process to the
breakthrough which might win the war.
[1] Firstworldwar.com
[3] Gillian, Stair “The Story of the 29th
Division: A Record of Gallant Deeds” Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 1925 pg. 82
[5] Boraston, JH (ed.) “Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches
(December 1915-April 1919) JM Dent & Sons 1919 pg. 20
[8] Holmes, Richard “Britain at War” Hylas Publishing, 2004
pg. 268
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