No Resistance of Any Account

“After several nights spent in reconnaissance it was

finally established that a mine-head and work of an

important nature was being carried on by the enemy”

-Report on Raid Carried out by the 46^th Battalion

29 January, 1917

The enemy was up to something.  From as early on as the fifth of January, nightly patrols were returning with reports of heavy work and daylight observation had spotted the Germans emptying sandbags over their parapet; notably several containing chalky soil.

10^th Canadian Infantry Brigade HQ was rightly concerned about these goings-on.  If the Germans were pushing a mine, the results could be disastrous. The Brigade’s positions were the extreme left edge of the entire Canadian Corps.  A large enough mine vaporising front line trenches would allow a follow-up infantry assault to hook into and “roll up” an exposed flank from the top end of the Corps all the way down.  It would be, if nothing could be done, a catastrophe of the highest order. Whatever was happening needed to be found out and dealt with.

Weather interfered.  Several days mid-month of accumulating snow fall made patrolling at night substantially more risky.  The sound of boots crunching in fresh powder were to blame for at least one patrol getting “bumped.”  War Diaries and Intelligence Reports  throughout the middle days of January repeat the same lament- that owing to the snow, patrols were unable to advance very far into No-man’s Land.

All the while, what reports 10 Brigade was getting from its battalions in the line were of timber being thumped, heavy items being dragged on tramways and sharp beats of metal on metal; steel being hammered or otherwise manipulated.

At last, on 24 January, a patrol from the 50^th (Calgary) Battalion pinpointed the location of the mine-head.  “Work has apparently been going on for some time as well-worn trail visible.”[1]  With a solid map reference to hand, a direct strike could be made.  Planning became the responsibility of the 46^th (South Saskatchewan) Battalion, who took over front line positions from the 50^th the same day.[2]

It just may have been fortuitous.  The Officer Commanding was the extensively experienced Lt Colonel HJ Dawson; who before the war had been an Associate Professor at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario.  To lead this operation, he had at his disposal Lieutenant Reginald Percy Cattell, arguably one of the most veteran junior officers of the 4^th Canadian Division..  It was he who had led one of the Division’s first patrols in enemy territory when it had become active the previous summer.  Between that point and this, Lt. Cattell had continually made proof of his ability, particularly in the scraps at Regina Trench.

This raid would be a small affair, very much unlike the multiple-company Calonne Raid of two weeks prior.  A definite target-the suspected mine shaft- required only enough men to penetrate and hold the German line for a quarter hour in order to “blow up (the) Shaft and to obtain identification.”[3]  Lt. Cattell had just five days to work his 34 man raid into shape, and to incorporate the two Sappers from 10 Field Company, Canadian Engineers who would be coming along to assess the enemy mine and set the demolition charge.  Artillery was laid on to supress the German front line at Zero Hour, shifting after three minutes to a “box barrage”, heavily shelling the periphery of the raid’s area to cut it off from the rest of the local trench network.

Lt. Cattell took the lead, precisely at two minutes past eight on the evening of the 29^th, advancing into No-man’s Land while the artillery was still blasting the German lines.  Hoping to close the distance as much as possible before the guns lifted, the raid would spring into the trench before the enemy could recover.  “Slight wire obstacles were encountered,” in front of the entry point, “but were surmounted with little trouble.  The German front line was reached at 8.06 p.m.”[4]

Organised beforehand into three sections, one the trench was reached, they split off.  No. II Party went left, to proceed forty yards and establish a block, No. III Party cut to the right with the same intention, with No. I following behind.  “At the junction where the German front line follows the edge of Craters, and another leads to the rear, the parties separated.”[5]

No. III Party advanced “a considerable distance…no enemy being encountered and further advance rendered impossible by the barrage.”[6]  They found the trench in poor condition, not being well built and in place just a screen of sandbags four feet high with no parados behind, often without the protective pattern of traverse. These “trenches” would not be easy ground for the enemy to hold, the sub-standard construction pointing towards an illusion of a front-line rather than a stalwart defensive position.

The other blocking party, No. II, found the same shocking lapse in German workmanship.  “The party felt they could have penetrated the line for a considerable distance without difficulty.”[7] They hadn’t gone too far, less than ten yards from where they had entered before they came across the first German dugout.  “Standing on the stairs with his rifle pointed in our direction a German was encountered.  Before he had time to fire, a Mills bomb was thrown at him, and he fell back into his dugout.  Several more bombs were thrown into the same and the party moved on.”[8]  Two more dugouts were similarly dealt with as No. II Party moved further down the trench.

With their flanks held by Parties No. II and III, Lt. Cattell’s main body could get to work.  “The party taking the mine shaft met opposition about 10 yards past (the) junction.”  Three Germans had come across the party.  Shocked at being overwhelmingly outnumbered they “threw bombs at our men, then ran for all they were worth” in the opposite direction.  “Proceeding on, the men ran across the suspected mine shaft.  This had about 40 steps leading directly down.”  A candle was alight about halfway down, and the raiders could see movement and hear voices from below. A Mills bomb was quickly tossed in, its explosion extinguishing the candle and eliciting cries and groans.[9]

Just as quickly, the two attached Sappers went to work, laying out twenty-five pounds of guncotton- a potent explosive made up of cotton fibres which had been exposed to sulphuric and nitric acid.  Also known as nitrocellulose, it was used as a blasting agent and a propellant for artillery and other munitions.  Twenty-five pounds of the stuff was more than sufficient to collapse this shaft.  

With the fuse set, Lt. Cattell gave two long blasts on his whistle, the signal to retire, and all three parties scarpered for friendly lines.

The sortie was a mixed success.  No identifications were obtained despite there being German bodies in the open; but the main goal of destroying the shaft had been accomplished with the addition of three enemy dugouts destroyed, causing a presumed large number of enemy casualties for the cost of five men wounded, all but one being slight.  

Scout Sergeant Samuel Deane had taken a slug through his abdomen, creating a wound described as the size of a shilling (nearly 1” in diameter).  Despite this, Sgt. Deane stayed upright and on mission.  “His example of bravery inspired his party to carry out their task,”[10] Col. Dawson would later write, citing the sergeant for a Military Medal.  Deane was awarded his medal while recovering in England.  Nine months would pass before he would be fit to return to the Battalion in France.

Lt Col. Dawson would also single out Lt. Cattell for his “Example of fearlessness and fine leadership” for which the Lieutenant would receive the Military Cross.

The rush of raids, the tension of late night patrols, a great Canadian battle and men on the razor's edge between life and death are all part of my acclaimed premier novel

 “Killing is a Sin” 

Now available from Amazon sites worldwide.

Some praise received for "Killing is a Sin":

“Really enjoyed the book, well done.”

“Damn, I think I spilled chili on a rare first edition; I'm enjoying it, couldn't stop reading during dinner.”

“I was fortunate enough to see this in manuscript. Good stuff. If you're interested in WWI Fiction give it a look.”

“Incredible.”

---

[1] 10^th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Intelligence Report, 24 January 1917

[2] 46^th Canadian Infantry Battalion War Diary, 24 January 1917

[3] Dawson, HJ, Lt Col. “Operations Order No. 43” 46 Bn. War Diary Appendix X, 29 January 1917

[4] Cattell, RP, Lt. “Intelligence re Raiding Party” 46 Bn. War Diary Appendix XII, 29 January 1917

[5] Cattell, RP, Lt. ibid.

[6] Reid, R. Capt. (Brigade Major) “Report on Raid Carried Out by the 46^th Battalion” 10^th CIB War Diary, Appendices, 29 January 1917

[7] Reid, R. Capt. Ibid.

[8] Cattell, RP, Lt. ibid.

[9] Quotes from: Cattell, RP, Lt. “Intelligence re Raiding Party” 46 Bn. War Diary Appendix XII, 29 January 1917

[10] Dawson, HJ, Lt Col. “Memorandum to O.C. 10^th Canadian Infantry Brigade” 46 B. War Diary Appendix XIII, 30 January 1917

A Most Successful Enterprise

“The 4^th Canadian Infantry Brigade will raid the enemy system

of trenches….To effect casualties, make prisoners, and wreck

all dugouts…in the area attacked”- Operations Order No. 85

4 Cdn. Inf. Bde., 10 January 1917

Shortly before five o’clock in the morning of 17 January 1917, telephones rattled in the headquarters of the 20^th and 21^st Battalions, the canned voice on the other end at Brigade HQ breathing just two words: “Lloyd George.”  The message had nothing to do with the British PM, except that use of his name was the go-code for the largest trench raid yet to be mounted by Canadian troops.

Two companies, No’s 1 and 2 from the 20^th (Central Ontario) Battalion and three, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ companies of the 21^st (Eastern Ontario) Battalion now moved from rest positions at Bully-Grenay to their jumping-off points opposite their objectives.  In three hours from the call, just after full light, the artillery barrage would commence and nearly 900 officers and men would advance along an 800 yard front in three waves.  They were to hit the enemy front line, hold it, penetrate the secondary line, fulfill their objectives and then withdraw, all within sixty minutes of Zero Hour.  Throughout, the raid would be protected by a barrage of medium and heavy artillery precisely timed to adjust fire as the operation proceeded.

What would become known as the “Calonne Raid” “constituted a record up to that time for a raid of its magnitude and result.”[1]  Nothing could be left to chance with such an ambitious raid.  Both the planning and preparation had to be meticulous.  Raids were not only to deal a quick shocking strike against the enemy, they had become a means to gain practical experience which would benefit future operations. 

Prior to the raid, constant patrolling and aerial observation had made a thorough survey of the target area.  These patrols had discovered that “the enemy frontage for a depth of 300 yards is held during the day by sentries and detached posts.  The garrison of this area being in deep dugouts and cellars.”[2]   Also determined were the locations of machine gun emplacements.  It was clear that the Germans didn’t need a heavily occupied front line.  Machine guns were mounted at the apices of a portion of Front Line Trench which bowed inward.  Structured this way, the trench presented a concave line to the attacker; designed to draw assaulting troops in and across an expanse which could be covered by enfilading fire from the two ends.  Essentially, the two machine guns would be sufficient to stall an attack while the garrison, situated in the second line could be made ready to go in for a counterattack.  Here was a perfect example of “Elastic Defence” in action.  In order to overcome this, the raid would have to hit quick, hard and with absolute precision.

Once assigned to the raid, the five participating companies “had been relieved of all duties for ten days and in that time built practice trenches of the Enemy lines to an exact scale.”[3]  Troops spent their time becoming intimately with the layout as they would specifically encounter on the raid, and “for the last few days practised the assault with every detail as set out in orders.”  Such intense rehearsal was becoming more usual than exceptional, and in the case of the Calonne Raid “these companies advanced…under cover of an excellent smoke and artillery barrage (and) entered the enemy front line with a rush that carried before it all opposition.”[4]

Major G.S.S. Bowerbank DSO MC

In fact, the Germans showed “A noticeable tendency to ingratiate against little show of opposition.  Except in cases of dugouts when bombs were thrown out until overcome.”[5]  This was the personal experience of Major George Scott Stanton Bowerbank, O.C. ‘B; Company, 21^st Battalion who was present at the epicentre of the raid.  Major Bowerbank would be awarded the Military Cross for his leadership during this operation.[6]  He was no professional soldier; a slight and slender myopic accountant, Major Bowerbank epitomised the typical Canadian officer.  Born of Essex, England, he had his professional credentials, but very little military experience besides Militia service before the war where he had been the accountant for the Sarnia, Ontario branch of the Canadian Bank of Commerce.  When put to the test in battle, however- and like so many of his colleagues- he excelled.

‘B’ Company had a little difficulty from the get-go in passing through their own wire.  “Gaps were not frequent which caused a tendency to bear to the left.”  Initially, this prevented his men from remaining in touch with those of ‘D’ Company on their right (under the command of Captain Brokelbank, also an accountant), but once through the wire the “waves kept well apart and advanced under cover of our barrage in well-appointed formation.”[7]  The enemy wire, on the other hand was “completely smashed and offering no obstacle whatever,” allowing the first wave to gain the Front Line Trench rapidly.  “A small amount of opposition was met but quickly overcome, the second wave going on as arranged towards the final objective.”[8]

It hadn’t been a clean rush, though.  Despite little resistance from enemy infantry, the raid suffered quite a number of casualties from artillery fire.  It is undetermined whether this artillery which concentrated on the enemy Front Line Trench was German retaliatory fire or shelling from Canadian guns which had failed to lift their fire an adequate distance.

“My company,” Major Bowerbank would later report “suffered casualties by a burst amongst a Lewis gun grew, wounding three and completely smashing the gun.”  The Major’s officer in command of ‘D’ Company’s second wave, Captain Goudy was struck down by a shot  to the chest, but the men knew their task so well they were able to carry on after Goudy had been moved back for treatment (he would survive this wound and later return to the front).

‘D’ Company alone captured “not less than thirty” prisoners, a machine gun and also “a considerable volume of letters, booklets, etc.”[9] Major Bowerbank could also report that the trenches were in good condition, generally ten feet deep with sloping sides with dry ground at the base, indication of careful workmanship and efficient drainage.  “Several dugouts were effectively smashed, especially in one case by the use of a prepared Stokes shell, killing all the occupants.”

It was all in the bag by nine o’clock.  The Calonne Raid “did serious damage to the enemy works and exploded an ammunition dump.”  Approximately twelve dugouts were destroyed, and it was estimated one hundred Germans had been killed.[10]  Additionally “during operation this morning we captured 1 Officer, 75 Other Ranks unwounded and 5 O.R. wounded, 2 Machine Guns, and 1 Trench Mortar.”[11] 

The cost had been 46 killed and 125 wounded, or twenty percent casualties.  However, Major Bowerbank whose company lost twenty-five percent of its strength was confident that those wounded were “chiefly of a slight nature.”[12]  Despite the loss, it was a resounding triumph, securing valuable intelligence, dealing a softening blow to the enemy and providing crucial experience and opportunities to absorb lessons and improve technique.  “All plans and arrangements for this operation carried through so well that all ranks concerned feel that it was a brilliant success.”[13]   

The rush of raids, the tension of late night patrols, a great Canadian battle and men on the razor's edge between life and death are all part of my acclaimed premier novel “Killing is a Sin” 

Now available from Amazon sites worldwide.

Some praise received for "Killing is a Sin":

“Really enjoyed the book, well done.”

“Damn, I think I spilled chili on a rare first edition; I'm enjoying it, couldn't stop reading during dinner.”

“I was fortunate enough to see this in manuscript. Good stuff. If you're interested in WWI Fiction give it a look.”

“Incredible.”

---

[1] Canadian Bank of Commerce, “Letters from the Front: Being a record of the Part Played by Officers of the Bank in the Great War 1914-1919”

[2] Operations Order No. 73, 21^st (Eastern Ontario) Battalion, CEF

[3] Barber, Percy L., Lieut. “21^st Cdn. Battalion Report on Operations of 17 January 1917”

[4] Lt. P.L. Barber, ibid.

[5] Bowerbank, G.S.S., Major, “Narrative of Raid 7-1-17”

[6] Supplement to the London Gazette No. 29981, pg. 2480 12 March 1917

[7] Maj. G.S.S. Bowerbank DSO MC ibid.

[8] ibid.

[9] ibid.

[10] Lt. P.L. Barber, ibid.

[11] 4^th Canadian Infantry Brigade, War Diary Entry 17 January 1917

[12] Maj. G.S.S. Bowerbank DSO MC ibid.

[13] Lt. P.L. Barber, ibid.

The Rest of the Night Passed Quietly

“At about 6.25 p.m. a party of 25 to 30 Germans

were observed at a point about 30 yds. From head

of Sap B.5”- Intelligence Summary No. 14, 12 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 

08 January, 1917

It was the first full moon of the New Year.  Corporal Worthington and his Lewis gun crew were standing sentry at ‘King Street’; a portion of front line trench currently the responsibility of ‘D’ Company, 73^rd (Royal Highlanders of Canada) Battalion.  From this point, they had a good view of ‘Surprise Crater”, which lay halfway between friendly and enemy lines, and Sap ‘B.5’, a shallow ditch meandering from the Canadian front line trench to the crater.  Currently, no one was posted at ‘Surprise Crater’- which would have been an ideal spot to get eyes on the enemy works.  Worthington’s section were then the furthest forward elements in their Battalion’s patch.

Damp cold and fatigue were more present adversaries than the Germans.  Long, dark winter nights, coupled with the strain of daily efforts at surviving and nowhere near enough sleep could play funny with the mind.  This was why the fleeting figures out in No-man’s Land required a second glance to assure their existence.  No mirage, this- it was indeed a large body of enemy troops making for Canadian lines; not more than two dozen yards distant- a raid!

Worthington tapped his gunner, pointed out the grey ghosts.  “Open up!”

The past few days had been dull, heavy with showery clouds limiting visibility along the front.  This close weather had earlier on scrubbed the only grand plans for the day along 4^th Canadian Division’s front; which was now the North-west edge of the Canadian Corps position opposite Vimy Ridge.  “It was proposed,” for January 07, “to have a bombardment of the enemy trench system….subject to proper weather conditions, but had to be postponed owing to the mist which prevailed during most of the morning.”[1]

As it was, the day passed for what could be called “normal”.  Overall, there was the usual exchange of artillery and trench mortar fire, much more harassing than deliberately destructive as would have been the cancelled bombardment.

The opening months of 1917, according to Canada’s Official History of the war, “was for the Canadian Corps a period free from major operations- a time to be used in recuperation, training and strengthening defences….A pattern of limited hostilities that was to continue in general throughout the winter was soon established…a periodic exchange of mortar fire, extensive patrolling, and occasional trench raids.”[2]  About the only item of note during this time was that the Germans were using a larger than usual number of flares at night.

From this quiet night, the rip of fire from Worthington’s Lewis at King Street put the front line on high alert.  On of ‘D’ Company’s subalterns, Lieutenant Joseph Griffiths “who was near hurried to the spot and took charge of the situation.”[3]  Griffiths had farmed before the war, not yet thirty he had settled in Canada from his home in Wales.  In this pacific life he’d led, he’d not had any prior experience in the military.  Griffiths had volunteered as a private soldier in December 1914, within the war’s first few months.  The young man seemed to gel quite well with the army, accelerating through the ranks and finally being granted a commission before being sent to join the 73^rd Battalion in the field in September, 1916.

Corporal Worthington’s quick action had scattered the German raid back to their lines.  Shortly after, though, they had re-formed and a second attempt “approached nearer and threw bombs in Sap B.5 but was again driven back leaving several wounded or dead.”[4]  A third approach was likewise scattered “and a fourth time a few come out and attempted to gather up their casualties.  They were, however, fired upon and had to retire.”[5]

Determined though the enemy was, the handful of men under Lt Griffiths and Cpl Worthington were enough to prevent the German raiders from making their objective.  The only casualty was Lt Griffiths, and his wound was slight enough for him to remain forward.

Their work wasn’t quite done.  Once it became apparent that the Germans had given up the idea of coming over, Lt Griffiths organised a small patrol- himself and two privates, Webb and Greenhalgh- to move out from Sap B.5 into the dead ground in an attempt to secure identification from the bodies left behind.  The patrol moved cautiously, as the evening shower of flares had begun, being constantly sent aloft from the German lines.  From the extent that Webb and Greenhalgh managed to reach they spotted at least two German bodies some 15 yards distant, being watched by a sentry from the cover of a shell-hole.  “They think,” records the day’s Intelligence Summary, “they recognised the sound of shovels being used behind sentry.”[6] 

Two days later, the 4^th Division Diary relates that the “news was confirmed by the 12^th Canadian Infantry Brigade that the enemy had apparently succeeded in getting his wounded, left out as a result of his attempted raid on evening January 7^th.  The nature of the ground prevented our parties from the 12^th seeing anything of the wounded….it is presumed the enemy were able to sap out and reach their wounded.”[7]

Both Cpl Worthington and Lt Griffiths were singled out by their Battalion CO for their conduct.  They had “displayed greatest coolness and bravery and it was entirely due to the acts of this Officer and NCO that the raid was not a success.”[8]

“The remainder of the night passed quietly.”[9]

In the hundred days between New Year’s and the start of the Spring Offensives, the Canadian Corps did just as the Official History describes.  They trained and prepared, each unit becoming intimately familiar with the ground to their front- as it was destined to be the same ground they would cover in the coming attack.  This work built up to a crescendo on the 1^st of March when the entire 4^th Division made a large scale raid of the German lines.

“Promptly at 5.40,” that morning, “our barrage opened up and our attacking parties got over the parapet and went forward.”[10] Overall results were promising.  “A large enemy bomb dump was blown up and part of his F.L.T. was systematically destroyed.  Several Machine Guns were destroyed and approximately 22 dugouts were bombed….A large number of the enemy were killed.”[11]

“Officers and men without exception fought magnificently.”[12] During the raid, Lt Griffiths, who was leading a patrol consisting of a platoon from ‘D’ Company was taken from the field, dangerously wounded.  He was passed back through the lines to Casualty Clearing Station No. 6 where early the next day he succumbed to his injuries.  “Word was received that Lieut. Griffiths had died of his wounds, and arrangements were made for representatives of the Battalion to attend his funeral on the 3^rd.”

Coincidentally, also on the third of March, as Lt Griffiths was being laid down, that day’s Supplement to the London Gazette contained the following citation:

Which announced his awarding of the Military Cross for his brave work in January; an award he didn’t live long enough to receive.  His medals and Memorial Cross were forwarded to his parents, Mr. & Mrs. W’m Griffiths in Wrexham, North Wales.

Some praise I’ve received for my premier novel 
“Killing is a Sin” which is set in the winter/spring of 1917:

“Really enjoyed the book, well done.” 

“Damn, I think I spilled chili on a rare first edition; I'm enjoying it, couldn't stop reading during dinner.”

“I was fortunate enough to see this in manuscript. Good stuff. If you're interested in WWI Fiction give it a look.”

“Incredible.”

---

[1] 4^th Canadian Division War Diary, 07 January 1917

[2] Nicholson, GW, Col. “Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War” Queen’s Printer, Ottawa 1962 pg. 233

[3] 73^rd (RHC) Battalion, War Diary 07 January 1917

[4] 73^rd (RHC) Battalion, War Diary, ibid.

[5] ibid.

[6] 12^th Canadian Infantry Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 14, 08 January 1917

[7] 4^th Canadian Division War Diary, 09 January 1917

[8] 73^rd (RHC) Battalion, War Diary 07 January 1917

[9] 73^rd (RHC) Battalion, War Diary, ibid.

[10] 73^rd (RHC) Battalion, War Diary 01 March 1917

[11] 12^th Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary 01 March 1917

[12] 73^rd (RHC) Battalion, War Diary, ibid.