Life on the Line

Today, the Fourth of August marks the 97th anniversary of Britain's declaration of war on Germany for violation of Belgian neutrality, and by Imperial proxy, Canada's entry into what would shortly become known as the Great War.  It's also, as coincidence would have it, my birthday.  Just thought I would mention that, as I'm expecting cake.  Seriously, though, I have received some great gifts, most notably in the way in which my project has grown and raised awareness of the cause it supports.  This blog has just passed two thousand site hits, and I get an enormous sense of accomplishment from that as well as the positive encouragement many of you have sent to me.  I shall show my gratitude in continuing to write posts that will hopefully engage interest and inspire thought on Canada and the First World War.Keeping up with this site and the project it supports can be done by following our Facebook Page, and Twitter Feed.  Any suggestions, questions or comments, please forward them to me here: ifyebreakfaith@gmail.com.  I'm still open to topic ideas or perhaps if you would like to guest blog, post suggestions requests or questions here.

When the war began in earnest, not many believed that it would last very long.  The German plan to capitulate France was based on a six week timetable, and the other major belligerents estimated, perhaps arrogantly, that this conflict would conclude by Christmas 1914.  The most notable voice that decried these assertions was Field Marshal the Lord Kitchener, First Soldier of the Empire and at the outset of the war a popular (if not politically astute) choice for the office of Secretary of State for War.  He was firm that the war would last no less than three years and that Britain would need to field an army of 1 000 000 men.  Never mind that this in itself turned out to be a gross underestimate, at the time he made the prediction, his Parliamentary colleagues thought he was well off base.  As I illustrated in my posts In the Trenches and In the Trenches II the grinding down of the war from one of open manoeuvre to that of mutual entrenchment played a part in the length of duration of the war.  What was it really like; I've often found myself wondering, to live in such conditions?

First, we need to separate ourselves from images of trenches that we've been subject to in popular films and television (more about media misrepresentation of the war in a future post) even many contemporary photographs were staged and as such not truly representative of actual living conditions on the front line.  Trenches were rarely as neatly constructed or well maintained as we would like to think.  There was a standard doctrine on how to construct defensive positions, but often suitability of the land; time and material available and enemy interference dictated how entrenchments were laid out.  In fact, many parts of the Flanders area in Belgium where the Canadian Expeditionary Force spent much of the war is so low lying and has a high water table that many works there were developed by "digging up" rather than digging in.  As deep trenches would be likely to flood, walls of wood, sandbags or other material were built upon natural land features for the men's protection.  Quite aside from neatly engineered textbook positions, trenches very often were a Boschian experience; collapsed in parts from artillery, choked with muddy effluence and the prospect of disinterred remains were quite common.  The struggle was to attempt to maintain the trenches as best they could be, and hygiene was a primary concern, but often that was an impossible task.  Traffic in and out of the line was also tightly controlled, but could become muddled and jammed during times of crisis-bringing up quick reserves to press forward an attack or counter enemy incursion; falling back from overwhelming offensives (fairly common during the "Kaiser's Battles of spring 1918).

Despite a well developed system of rotating units in and out of the front line, so that troops would never be at the front for extended periods of time and allowed to rest, when at the front, men were exposed to the weather, enemy shells and mortars as well as snipers and raiding parties at any given time regardless of there being major offensive actions in the area or not.  Certain areas could be quiet for extended periods, while others experienced constant enemy attention.  Exhaustion was common and a bedlam of noise a constant distraction.  Routine and discipline helped to keep men focussed and attentive.  Each day would begin with

stand to every morning at first light....that every soldier was either on the fire step or ready to get onto it...weapon loaded and ready to fire....(After standing down) would be improving the trench, pushing saps out towards enemy lines, digging sleeping bays into the bottom of the trench wall or in the command trench, or sleeping to order....Much time was spent keeping weapons clean and serviceable, and there was an inspection by officers and NCO's of every man's rifle at least once each day, usually after breakfast

Corrigan, "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" p 113

It is that part of routine which belies the Ross Rifle's malfunctioning due to dirty conditions as extolled in my post Made in Canada.

Ever present in all of this, through tedium of routine and daily attrition of four or five days in the firing line was the notion that at some point an advance would have to be made to root the enemy out of his works.  The idea of "live and let live" did exist from time to time along various points of the line, but that attitude could easily dull an army's required offensive spirit.  To counteract this, patrols would be mounted across no man's land, from groups as small as four men or so to extravagant raids of hundreds at a time.  Their purpose was to gather intelligence, capture prisoners, cut wire and reduce strong points, or to make a general nuisance to keep the opposition on edge.  Canadians seemed to flourish in this phase of operations, to the point that just prior to the attack on Vimy Ridge the Canadian Corps was ordered to stop patrolling altogether as the large parties were seen as being too aggressive and causing needless casualties.  This wasn't the case of over ambitious leaders sending men out without cause, as every man who went on patrol was a volunteer.

We can read in Will Bird or Donald Fraser's accounts as well as other good first person sources on what it was like to exist in a subterranean world, cluttered by detritus, a blank and burned landscape where death was a constant factor and disease close to hand.  We can never truly know, however, what a bleak land looked like to eyes seen in colour, the sounds of shells and scrape of spades, the smell that must have been beyond vile, the taste of tea tinged with petrol from being carried in interchangeable canisters, the feeling of damp feet and present dread that the next "one" might be yours.  It's a wonder, then, how men ( mind you from a time where everyday life was more a hardship than we can easily understand) endured these conditions.  But thank goodness they did. 

The Home Front

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World War One was not the first "Total War", even though that turn of phrase came to define it.  The term means that economy, industry and the civil population are all engaged in efforts to support the country's military actions.  This idea is as old as warfare itself, but perhaps it hadn't been seen on such a scale since before 1914. I don't even think it can even truly be defined as the first industrial war, as the American Civil War was won on the factory floor (the Union's industrial output far overshadowed that of the Confederacy) as much as it was on the battlefields of Antietam and Gettysburg.  It was, however due to the sheer size of the campaigns that required a level of participation on the home front such as never been seen.


For Canada, as with other countries, this required government control of resources in the form of rationing as well as collection of waste material from scrap iron to hog fat for recycling into military materiel.  As so many men were away on the Western Front, essential farming and factory work fell to those who had been previously viewed as unsuited for this type of employment.  In small ways this meant children volunteering for the harvest, but the large benefit was that women for the first time began to enter the workforce as never before.  Even though it was largely understood that women were working for the purpose of the war and because men were absent, the belief was that the status quo would return at the end of the war, this gave rise to the movement that would first secure the vote and eventually lead to the equity of women under the law.


Propaganda directed at civil society expounded the patriotic nature of the duty of civilians to support their country's effort.  This drive took on a monetary nature in  the form of "Victory Bonds", private savings lent to the government for the prosecution of the war, such as the poster I use as my masthead advocates.  These savings did help to provide for the war effort, but didn't prevent Canada from incurring its first national debt.  One way of thinking about it is that we are still paying for the First World War.


Canada's ability to produce resources for the war, from munitions to food and fodder, even a large market for horses, coupled with the supremacy of the Royal Navy to secure lanes of transit helped our young county to come into its own as much as our reputation on the battlefield. 


Of course, with all these positive outcomes, there were detractions.  Opportunists and profiteers abounded, some in very secure positions in or strong links to the government.  War, as is often quipped, is good for business so it is not difficult to see how corruption and graft would occur, particularly as the preceding decades were witness to a terrible recession.  Whenever goods are rationed, black markets and hoarders will take advantage, and industrialists will grow rich off of the abundance of secure contracts to produce for the war.  

Perhaps the most detrimental and divisive aspect of the Home Front was the issue of conscription.  The struggle to fulfil the commitment of manpower on the front in regards to losses with a lack of appropriate numbers of volunteers inspired the government to pass legislation for conscription in 1917.  This led to protests and riots enacted by groups opposed to involuntary enlistment, especially among the Canadiens who felt marginalised by not having equity of French language regiments, and a deep disdain for participation in what was felt as a British war.  The agitators in this cause mainly had political objectives of their own, not the least being the issue of language laws to protect Francophone interests and even the genesis of the separatist movement, and were using the conscription issue to rally supporters to these objectives.


All of these aspects showed us as a country what we could accomplish when we worked together to a common goal while at the same time that aspects of this cooperation could serve to keep us divided.  It gave us the framework for moving forward during a time of crisis that would also see us through the Second World War a generation later.

Divisional Wedge

Things here are still moving slowly forward, and the gains I've made in the last two months since this project was initiated have been more than worth the effort I've put forward thus far.  Which only goes to indicate that if I put forward more effort, the results will be that much more rewarding.  I have plans to shortly roll out a weekly video blog in order to reach a wider audience, and that will be in cooperation with this column, my Facebook group, Twitter feed and the upcoming content which will soon be available on ifyebreakfaith.com.  Again, I pass along my appreciation to all my followers and supporters, old as well as new.  Feedback is always well received, and I am open to suggestions for topics for discussion on this page.  Submit your ideas here.  If I use your idea, I will be certain to mention your input.

The nature of fighting battles and winning wars is to eliminate your enemy's ability to fight.  Even more simply put it is the goal of an army to close with and destroy the enemy.  That exact phrase is the stated role of the infantry, those at the forward most edge of battle, the rifleman, foot slogger, ground pounder.  It is the infantry's task to take the fight to the enemy, and that aspect of warfare hasn't changed for thousands of years.  Saying that, close your eyes and picture the first thing that comes to mind when the First World War is mentioned.  Perhaps it was something along the lines of a group of men, standing in a deep trench, soaked with mud and water with weapons at the ready, preparing to charge the enemy across a shell marked no man's land.  I'll not debate your visualisations, but I do wish to point out that while an army's purpose is dedicated to the infantry, it takes so much more than that to prosecute a war; many individuals and jobs that tend to be overlooked from time to time but absolutely essential nonetheless.

Known as "supporting arms", their work ensures that those on the front line can do their job.  Of course the attention is paid to the ones doing the fighting and in my own personal experience it was that ideology which had me select the infantry as my trade when I joined the army in 1994.  We of the "PBI" do tend to look down on those who we derisively call REMF's (I won't elaborate, but you're free to look up the acronym if you don't understand it.)  Even looking to tell stories of the war, more people prefer to learn about the fighting and conduct of battles rather than the logistics and administration that goes on behind the lines.

In one way of looking at it, in an effort of fairness, those in the supporting arms are no less heroic than their colleagues at the sharp end.  Men can not fight without bullets for their rifles, food in their bellies and clothes on their backs.  Often, they will not fight without pay or the knowledge that someone will fetch them back and care for them if they get hurt.  I met a man from Sweden once, a pacifist who had volunteered to be a cook when called up for national service.  "I not like to fight," he told me, "so I make food.  When I give food, I make happy."  As someone who has been a the receiving end of a hot meal in my canteen cup after a miserable "day out" I knew straight away what he meant.

In the First World War, the efforts of the supporting arms were nothing short of epic.  At the time, the administration was having to deal with armies much larger than had previously existed, care for and supply it on a level heretofore unknown.  In sometimes appalling conditions they struggled to keep roads open, built new ones and constructed railways. Under fire they risked themselves to get essential supplies to the fighting front.  They rushed out into the danger area to care for the wounded, and ensured as best they could that men would be able to bathe, get clean clothes and rest out of the line.

It was more likely to be killed in action as an infanteer than any other branch of service, and more likely that those behind the lines would lose their lives to accident or illness than to enemy action.  The essential nature of their work and dedication to their task in no small part made winning the war possible. Because of this the losses they incurred are to be held in as high an esteem that we typically only tend to apply to those on the front.


On a lighter note, via Reddit.com user tommygunner91, I give you a short paragraph analogising the First World War as a bar fight.

Germany, Austria and Italy are standing together in the middle of a pub when Serbia bumps into Austria and spills Austria's pint. Austria demands Serbia buy it a complete new suit because there are splashes on its trouser leg. Germany expresses its support for Austria's point of view. Britain recommends that everyone calm down a bit. Serbia points out that it can't afford a whole suit, but offers to pay for the cleaning of Austria's trousers. Russia and Serbia look at Austria. Austria asks Serbia who it's looking at. Russia suggests that Austria should leave its little brother alone. Austria inquires as to whose army will assist Russia in compelling it to do so. Germany appeals to Britain that France has been looking at it, and that this is sufficiently out of order that Britain should not intervene. Britain replies that France can look at who it wants to, that Britain is looking at Germany too, and what is Germany going to do about it? Germany tells Russia to stop looking at Austria, or Germany will render Russia incapable of such action. Britain and France ask Germany whether it's looking at Belgium. Turkey and Germany go off into a corner and whisper. When they come back, Turkey makes a show of not looking at anyone. Germany rolls up its sleeves, looks at France, and punches Belgium. France and Britain punch Germany. Austria punches Russia. Germany punches Britain and France with one hand and Russia with the other. Russia throws a punch at Germany, but misses and nearly falls over. Japan calls over from the other side of the room that it's on Britain's side, but stays there. Italy surprises everyone by punching Austria. Australia punches Turkey, and gets punched back. There are no hard feelings because Britain made Australia do it. France gets thrown through a plate glass window, but gets back up and carries on fighting. Russia gets thrown through another one, gets knocked out, suffers brain damage, and wakes up with a complete personality change. Italy throws a punch at Austria and misses, but Austria falls over anyway. Italy raises both fists in the air and runs round the room chanting. America waits till Germany is about to fall over from sustained punching from Britain and France, then walks over and smashes it with a barstool, then pretends it won the fight all by itself. By now all the chairs are broken and the big mirror over the bar is shattered. Britain, France and America agree that Germany threw the first punch, so the whole thing is Germany's fault . While Germany is still unconscious, they go through its pockets, steal its wallet, and buy drinks for all their friends.

Why, and Why Now?

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I've been thinking a great deal about a letter I received last week.  First, I'm very flattered by the compliments on my writing and the interest it's generating.  At the same time, the questions that were posed deserve an amount of reflection on my part and how I answer them serves to show the importance of what I've set out to achieve.  

In light of a resurgence of study and popular thought on the First World War, I was asked why I was choosing to embark on my work, and why I had chosen this conflict as my focus.  Perhaps it's simple enough for me to say that this was had always held me in fascination, but the question as poised forced me to think on why it did so.  From a historical perspective, both in a global as well as a national sense it is easy to view this as a crucial event that had long and far reaching consequences in world affairs.  In certain regards, the war, its conduct and conclusion still effect the geo-political situation at present.  For an example of proof, I invite you all to think about the Middle East today and realise the boundary disputes and balance of power issues endemic to the area stem directly from the events of 1914-1918.  


For me, it has not always been a point of the importance of the war in world affairs.  As a young child I had very typical if not naive views of war.  The notion of gallantry and glamour, of abject courage in extreme conditions struck a rather romantic chord with me, perhaps in much the same way that young men viewed the war as it was beginning and those dreamy notions coupled with a patriotism not easily found today is what filled the queues at recruiting offices nearly one hundred years ago.  I've always had a bit of a rose-tinted vision of hard fought struggles, evidenced by my other studies of Operation MARKET GARDEN and the action at Rorke's Drift in Natal Province in 1879.


As I've matured, I would like to think that I've become more objective and understanding.  Though I believe that to be completely objective one cannot divorce entirely from virtues of gallantry and courage as long as its tempered with an equal consideration of the suffering and cruelty which encompass the whole spectrum of human conflict.  To do so would be to devalue the most important aspect of history in my opinion in that it is the study of humanity.

As to the other part, the "why now?" question, that for me is a much more straight forward answer.  The cusp of the events moving from a living memory towards a distant past is well upon us and my feeling is that the importance of the war in a global, national and especially personal sense needs to be preserved with the reflection of these aspects lest we lose touch with part of our story and the lessons to be gained from a broad understanding of the past.  My idea, the project's aim of documenting the stories of those lost to the war, is my effort to maintain that link in a relatable way between the past and the present.  I strongly believe that we owe a great debt to those that gave their lives and to remember them well is a small step to repay them.  The larger balance of payment would be, of course, to ensure that their loss was not done in vain and we collectively will be able to realise their dream of living in peace.

Made in Canada

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The sun has just come up over the horizon and all is tense along the trench line.  Over the past two days the Germans had made several pushes in the area, but haven't come this way yet.  A mist appears from the wood line to the front, starts slowly rolling on, pushed by a rare westerly breeze. Eyes sting and throats burn as the vapour approached the parapet.  "Stand ready!" the young Lieutenant orders, voiced masked by a handkerchief, his pistol in his other hand.  Ghastly figures materialize from behind the gas. "Targets to the front," is his next caution.  The man beside him drops, coughing, struggling for breath.  The advancing enemy is closer now, moving swiftly but careful to stay beyond their poison.  "Rapid rate," he splutters, "fire!"  Ragged shots bang out at the command while the Colt machine gun begins to chatter.  Aster the first shot, a rifleman pulls the bolt back, then closes the breech.  Bang!  The second shot, a miss, and another quick reload, the Germans nearly on top of the line.  Bang!  This one couldn't miss, they're so close now, his right hand reaches for the bolt, having to move quickly there's less outgoing fire.  The bolt doesn't budge, not with all force applied.  His eyes water, from the gas, from the effort, from the frustration, but the weapon won't cooperate.  A reflective flash of steel catches his eye as the bayonet is thrusted towards him.


I've made mention of Sam Hughes being known for having shady dealings with business associates in the equipping of the CEF.  No one item stands out more than the controversy attached to the Ross Rifle.  It's failures in combat are well documented facts, but the issue of why it failed is still not certainly understood.  The Ross was a great weapon in ideal conditions, range shoots gave it laurels for its function and accuracy.  The fact that it was Canadian as well suited Hughes who had the ostensibly patriotic idea that "his boys" were to be given nationally made equipment.  Although, this allowed him to give contracts to friends of his which surely didn't hurt his bottom line.  At Second Ypres, under the duress of rapid fire conditions, though, the Ross failed miserably.  On the home front, an uproar went out, and blame began to be placed. As often happens, this was not to resolve the issue but rather for some to try to escape culpability.


The most commonly cited issue for the rifle jamming is poor weapons maintenance, meaning that the Ross was temperamental in dirty conditions; a situation in abundance on the Western Front.  It's an idea of absolute rubbish.  Any rifle if not properly cared for will malfunction if dirty.  This notion points away from the manufacturer and lends squarely on the troops being negligent.  Another, lesser known issue raised was that the problem was related to the ammunition being defective.  since the same .303 cartridge was being used by the Canadians with the Ross as well as the British Lee Enfield which didn't suffer from the dame critical issues, problems stemming from ammunition can be discounted.  A third flaw could have been the bolt being a straight pull mechanism.  Since it didn't require the locking quarter turn more common in rifles of these types it could be surmised that a lack of leverage made jams more frequent and harder to clear. Again, though, other straight pull designs from Austria and Sweden are not prone to the same frequent stoppages.  I am led to believe that the case was a manufacturer's fault which had been gently brushed aside in favour of deflecting where blame should lie.  


The bolt and the receiver-where the bolt meets the chamber to seal the breech-may have been tooled with different tolerances.  What this means is that under range conditions, firing slowly and carefully aimed shots, the Ross worked well, but quick firing and the resultant heating and expansion of metal parts at different rates without chance to cool slightly would cause a weapon to stick.


The Ross was not phased out until 1916, in favour of the Lee Enfield, and even remained a weapon of choice for snipers and a popular weapon for collectors today.  It did, though, go a long way to the detriment of Canadian manufacturing.  Conversely it added to the reputation of the CEF as a unit still capable of successful operations with non-effective equipment, quite unironically a reputation that stays with the Canadian Forces of the modern era.

Taking the Ridge

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It's the taking of Vimy Ridge that I'm going to discuss today.  Years ago I wrote a highly marked essay about the battle and how it was related to Canadian identity.  I'd really rather like the existential opportunity to debate with my younger self some of the points of that work.  When I began to read more in depth about the war on the whole, works by Liddel-Hart and Keegan, I would become very upset at how little attention was paid to the Canadian effort at Vimy.  Didn't these historians know how important that victory was?  Was their British bias that obvious to not include in their work an appropriate regard to something the Colonials accomplished that they could not?  There had been two French attempts in 1915, May and September, to seize the heights from the Germans which had not met with any success and resulted in a total estimate of 150 000 casualties.  A British attempt the next year was taken as part of a counter-attack against German offensives in the area.  Limited successes gained British control of the ridge but these gains were not able to be held against a later German assault.


I think I had rather worry about my own biases before pointing fingers.  Let me say this:  Vimy Ridge was an important victory for Canadians, but taken in a larger context it was a moderate gain in a diversionary attack in support of larger operations further south.  The Canadian Corps' objective was set in March 1917 to be their contribution to what became known as the Battle of Arras.  The offensive there would be what is now known as a "containment operation."  The British goal was to keep German forces in the area engaged so as they could not be brought to support against French operations further down the line seeking that ever elusive breakthrough.


I've often heard the success of the battle being attributed to newly developed (often cited as Canadian developed) tactics.  This is not entirely true.  The victory was won through the marrying of some new ideas with established military doctrine and was completely directed by the British.  The established doctrine of assaulting fortified defences, by first digging forward running trenches and tunnels called "saps" to jump off from and using the leapfrogging method of fire and movement ( where one element uses covering fire to keep the enemy pinned while the other moves forward in turn) were elements the British had employed in previous conflicts.  They seemed new because they were new to the volunteer armies raised for the war, and not put into use until later in the war as this kind of work requires many months of practice and training.  The Canadian Corps received this training between November 1916 and March 1917 in preparation for the attack.  Section organisation, meaning the distribution of specialised weapons and the idea of moving after limited objectives in a style known as "Bite and Hold" were newer developments, but not Canadian in origin.  They came down the pipe from General Headquarters, the British commanding element on the Western Front, and were adopted by all forces under that command.


It was due to the integration of old and new, along with the time allowed to perfect it (training in large groups when away from the front lines was often superseded by using the infantry as brute labour when in reserve, a detriment to professional growth) that gave the Canadian Corps a particular edge in comparison to other Corps under British command, lending credence to the idea of being an elite unit, and the success of operations of which the first was Vimy.

The victory at Vimy was a great accomplishment, removing the enemy from a high ground feature overlooking allied lines, but must be measured in the perspective of the bigger picture of which Canada was a small participant in a grander operation.  It reflects still on Canadian identity as this was the first large operation in which the Corps had undergone as a complete unit of four Divisions, from all across Canada, and historically the first quantifiable military success our country has had on the world stage.  I don't think, though that a military success, no mater what the scale or scope does much to give a complete idea of national identity, as we as a country are so much more than what can be valued by a test of arms.  

Canadian, Eh?

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There's something about the term "Canadian Expeditionary Force" that has struck me with a sense of romanticism ever since I first began to study the First World War as a grade school student.  the middle word of the title for the fighting force Canada deployed to the field conjures certain notions, and even still I sometimes can't help to picture, completely incongruously to the war explorers such as Stanley and Livingstone.  There was something of the explorer about them, what is often ascribed as a sense of adventure in their moving into uncertain, new and dangerous territory.  What I want to look at here is the first part of the designation. 


Canadian, in this instance, of course, indicates the point of origin and a certain distinctness apart from other corners of the Empire and Britain herself.  Even the fact that there was a separate entity of Canadians within the British military was a hard won privilege.  As Britain had almost exhausted its cadre of highly professional regulars in the opening campaigns of August-October 1914, the Imperial General Staff wanted to take small units from the Dominions piecemeal as they were ready to deploy and integrate them to standing British Divisions.  The idea was sound.  Troops were needed as quickly as possible, sending battalions or even companies as they were trained would plug immediate gaps rather than waiting for larger bodies to be available. As well, placing an untried battalion in amongst others with a little experience helps to smooth out the learning curve.  This did happen in a couple of cases.  The PPCLI, raised privately went overseas and served with the 80th Brigade, BEF before joining the 3d Canadian Division later.  The Newfoundland Regiment, on the basis of being separate from Canada at the time was similarly integrated into the 29th Division.


With the CEF, this looked the way in which it was going to happen as well, even to the point of projecting a policy of assigning individual drafts of replacements directly into British units as needed.  That is did not happen in this way we have to (reluctantly) thank Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia.  I say reluctantly because Hughes did plenty to the detriment of the force he helped raise.  If not quite a profiteer, he did defer to crony-ism in awarding materials contracts to equip and supply the CEF, often resulting in sub-par or unneeded items issued.  He was just carrying a long tradition in Canadian politics in corruption, since old John A. lined his pocket with railroad funds or John Graves Simcoe adjusted the route of Yonge Street to increase his property values.  On the issue of deploying troops, though, the bombastic Hughes stuck his ground and Canada never took the field in less than Division strength (a unit numbering about 12-15 000 men).  As the war went on we added three more divisions to the effort, enabling the creation of the Canadian Corps by September 1915.  Made up of 1st and 2nd Divisions, CEF it would be four divisions strong by the following year.


Taken in a certain context the term "Canada" can not, with reflection be a face value definition of its members.  Many were immigrants, mainly from the UK (speaking contemporarily it still included Ireland) or sons of immigrants.  There's nothing strange to this as Canada was a new nation and saw her growth at the time more from people arriving from other lands than were born here.  Perhaps the strong ties to homeland explains why there were a larger number of newer arrivals in the ranks than those who had been in Canada for a few generations.  Looking through the Attestation Papers for Oakville alone pulls up many birthplaces and addresses of next of kin closer to the front lines than to Canada.  The pause for thought is how strange it must have been to say goodbye to a loved one going to live so far away only to have them pass back the same way, often without the opportunity to visit before meeting their deaths in France and Belgium.


These people may not have been Canadian by birth, not unlike many Canadians today, but the effort they made helped to define what it means to be so, as had others before them and those yet to come.