The Inhuman Endurance of Trench Routine, Flanders,
July 1916
“At
1.30 a.m. a minor operation was carried out by our bombers
And
two Stokes guns….Our bombers threw about 500 Mills bombs
from
the saps and the Stokes guns fired 90 rounds.
The enemy retaliated.
Our
artillery also joined in the operation. Everything was quiet
again
by daybreak. Our casualties were light.”
War Diary Entry,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry[1]
18 July 1916
“Quiet”, it appears,
could be an extraordinarily relative term when used in context of the First
World War. Later on the same day,
further along the line from where the PPCLI had demonstrated, the 13th
(Royal Highlanders of Canada) Battalion was clipped in a sudden torrent of
shellfire. “At 1.05 p.m. the enemy sent
over seven bombs of some description which burst in the air…with scarcely any
warning whistle, these were followed by six 4.1 air bursts.”[2] This quick barrage killed six and wounded
thirteen, on a day aside from a few moments’ of terror which was noted in the
battalion’s War Diary as “quiet.” For
the 13th Battalion, this day in mid-July was the fourth of five
which they would spend at the Front in this rotation, all of which had been
quiet, yet each day added to a grim total of dead and wounded.
I spoke last week about
how this period- from the successful counterattack reclaiming lost ground at
Mount Sorrel to the Canadian Corps’ transfer to the Somme- gets little
historical attention; and honestly, it’s easy to see why. Notwithstanding events occurring elsewhere on
the Western Front, this period of time at this place lacks the panache which
attracts many to the history of military campaigns. Events in the Ypres Salient through July 1916
came as close to “normal” as could be found during the Great War as to be
dismissed as mundane. While 2,291
casualties reported by the Corps in July[3]
cannot be compared to the horrendous figures for the British in one day alone
in that month, their happenstance would be anything but mundane for those who
had been wounded of for the families of those killed.
This was no period of
merely “holding the line”; it couldn’t be.
Wars are not won by remaining defensive.
The purpose of the Canadian Corps at this place and time was
twofold. First, it was to prevent the
enemy from making a successful attempt to collapse the Salient inwardly to take
Ypres while making all necessary preparations for an offensive aimed at pushing
the Germans further away from this critical juncture. Corps Headquarters fully expected such an
offensive and had issued warning orders to that effect to its component
divisions. “This attack…will be carried out by the 1st Canadian
Division supported by the Heavy Artillery of the Canadian Corps….All
preparations for the attack will be completed by 31st July.”[4]
Even when not directly
engaging the enemy, it must have been terrible ground to defend. Terrain had long since lost any splendour it
had claimed as rolling Belgian countryside.
Two years’ worth of static conflict had, quite literally, reduced it to
a perversion of what it had been.
Positional battles in June had further contributed to the degradation of
a land already beaten to a pulp. The
Salient had become little more than ragged scars of ditches, given depth by
sandbag walls, mounds and craters of clotted earth, shattered limbs of trees
and endless tangles of barbed wire.
Artillery had been the chief actor in this destruction of land and men. Some sixty percent of casualties in the First
World War were caused by artillery[5]
and most of the daily effort was spent in building up defenses to improve
protection only to have them shattered again by shelling. Ypres isn’t suitable ground for deep defences
in any circumstance, a high water table makes any deep excavation prone to collapse
and flooding. Trenches here, such as
could be were mostly comprised of shallow scrapes given depth by walls of
sandbags piled in running bonds. This
landscape of milled earth and sundered trees seems as though very little
difference would be appreciated if viewed in colour as opposed to black and
white.
Amongst this confusing
devastation, where for the most part infantry seemed inconsequential,
preparations to push forward, in accordance with Corps directives still had to
be made. The 7th Brigade
undertook such preparations in their sector on the night of 17/18 July. It was reliably believed that the Germans
were withdrawing troop strength from front line positions, and minor operations
were proposed to take advantage of this.
The 7th
Canadian Infantry Brigade (3rd Canadian Division) was the closest
thing to a Regular Force brigade Canada could put in the field. One of its battalions was the Royal Canadian
Regiment, part of Canada’s pre-war Permanent Force, another was the PPCLI,
which, although war raised had an initial requirement of regular Army service
for its volunteers. By 1916 this was
less the case, the Patricias taking whatever reinforcements it could get. On the night of 17/18 July, the RCR, PPCLI
and a third 7th Brigade unit, the 42nd, a battalion of
the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) of Canada sent parties forward to establish
blocking positions and improve forward trenches for use as assembly areas. The Patricias were to, along with strong
bombing parties “thoroughly scout and assist in pushing saps forward…embodying
the German sap in our Front Line System (and) drive in all German Patrols and
Bombing Posts.”[6] This tasking illustrates to the latter day
observer how confused, close and, at times, intertwined the trenches could
be. Some of these lines were only yards
apart and the pocket battles of the month before had created trench lines
between enemies which actually intersected, making it truly difficult to
determine where everybody was. The Black
Watch would also push saps forward and conduct a raid on opposing lines “to
secure identification” of the enemy units they faced. Similar orders were given to the RCR- conduct
a raid, set up blocking points, work on re-establishing ruined trenches and
preparing specific areas for the assembly of attacking troops.
The Patricias threw a
tremendous amount of grenades and mortars while working on forward saps. In the spirit of the gritty, limited fighting
in which the Canadians and the Germans knocked each other about in small
scraps, the next night “the enemy commenced to bombard our right trenches…with
trench mortars and rifle grenades. The
bombardment was intense…being probably in retaliation for our bombing operation
in which we probably did considerable damage.”[7]
The saps they had improved the night before were demolished. This sort of retributive action was becoming
quite common and was not entirely unlike a fight between two street gangs.
Finding the wire in
front of German lines to be “thick and strong and would form a formidable obstacle
to advancing infantry,” the patrols of the Black Watch also constructed a
sandbag barricade “30 yards long, 2 feet 6 inches thick and 2 feet high” and
prepared a detailed “stretcher system” to efficiently deal with expected
casualties. Other groups destroyed German
wire at “weak and tactically important points.”
The moon was very bright that evening, and this made any work dangerous,
the Black Watch proceeded with these tasks exercising “extreme caution.” Caution worked, as they came through this
night with no casualties taken.[8]
Men of the Royal
Canadian Regiment also tested the German wire and after a length of time
attempting to cut through it “found in this time that cutting the wire in one
night was out of the question.” Not
being able to get through the wire, the men assigned as the bombing raid were
sent instead to attack a German working party.
As this could be largely impersonal and anonymous warfare, no chance was
missed to visit death upon the enemy, making such times as when the enemy was
spotted in the open intensely personal. “At
about 1.00 a.m. Lieut. WOODS party threw 16 bombs at the enemy Working Party
and then retired….Much damage was done to enemy as the range of the bombs was
so short, being just about 12 yards. The
operation was carried out without loss.”[9]
For the moment, while
the expected offensive was being prepared for, the infantry- in their
traditional role- were peripheral to the situation, as helpless to circumstance
as those aboard a ship in rough seas; largely inconsequential in the
development of events, yet disproportionately affected by them. The 13th Battalion, also of the
Royal Highlanders of Canada, to take one example, from the 14-19 July, occupied
trenches along the front line. The War
Diary records nothing unusual in these days spent forward, daily notations on
the exchange of fire between the two sides and observances of enemy activity. Also noted was the everyday event of manpower
loss. From the advent of one major campaign to another, “the days and weeks in
between had borne witness to the slow, insidious and unpredictable phenomenon
known as ‘trench wastage.’ Men, one or
two at a time being caught by an errant shell, a sniper’s bullet or any number
of sickness or circumstance that shaved away at effective strength.”[10] Relieved on the night of 19-20 July by the 8th
Battalion, the 13th went into billets, this tour of nothing much
having cost them 16 killed and 41 wounded. For those who made it through, their
exhaustion was noted and on the following day “no parades of any kind were
held,” and very quickly life returned to as normal as it could be, or as normal
as the army could allow it: “An order was issued to the effect, that while the
Battalion is in Billets, the Highland uniform will be worn at all times, and no
man to be allowed to leave Camp, unless properly dressed.”[11]
This was the reality of
a large part of the First World War.
Over-the-top rushes and grand battles might make for more interesting
reading in the latter day, but largely fails to account for the terrifying
grinding and often deadly monotony of life at the front.
[4] Canadian Corps Operations Order 34, June 1916
[5] Mitchell, JT, Maj. & Mrs. GM Smith “History of the
Great War Based on Official Documents: Medical Services; Casualties and Medical
Statistics of the Great War” H.M. Stationary Office, London, 1931 pg.40
[6] 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Operations
Order No. 33, July 1916
[8] War Diary Entry, 42nd (RHC) Battalion, 18
July 1916
[9] War Diary Entry, Royal Canadian Regiment, 18 July 1916
[10] Harvie, Christopher J, “Killing is a Sin” (publication
pending) 2016, pg. 15
[11] War Diary Entry, 13th (RHC) Battalion, 21
July 1916
No comments:
Post a Comment