Vigilance Prevents Disaster at the Ypres Salient,
July 1916
“I
beg to report on the situation caused by the enemy
exploding
a mine in the ‘Bluff Sector’ on the night of the 25th inst.”
-Lt. Col Gardner,
O.C. 7th Bn.
Report to 2nd
Canadian Infantry Brigade
26 July 1916
 |
| "The Ypres Salient at Night" by Paul Nash (wikimedia commons) |
At about four o’clock
in the afternoon on the 25th of July 1916, headquarters of 2nd
Canadian Infantry Brigade received information which the entire Canadian Corps
had been told to anticipate. The No. 1
Listening Post of No. 3 Tunnelling Company had picked up definite sounds of
enemy activity. Underground listening
posts had been tracking the German miners, and it was firmly believed that a
mine was being prepared for detonation.
Earlier that month Major Davis, O.C. No. 3 T Coy had ordered a
pre-emptive strike- a camouflet- to collapse a known enemy gallery opposite his
No. 6 LP. “This was apparently very
successful, smoke being seen rising from the enemy’s lines for some time after
the explosion occurred.”[1]
A charge of 1,000
pounds of the high explosive called ammonal seemed to put this German mining
effort at bay, at least for the time being.
It appears that Major Davis’ initiative had prevented a potential
disaster; but it wasn’t as if he and his miners were the only ones prepared in
the eventuality of enemy success underground.
His reports were treated with the utmost gravity; both the artillery and
infantry had been cautioned as to what may happen, and what to do in such a
case. It was plain that nobody, at any
level of the Canadian Corps wished to have repeated the catastrophe which had
opened the Battle of Mount Sorrel the month before.
On the 2nd
of June “(a) mine exploded on the battalion front at about 1 p.m. and an order
came down the line to withdraw.”[2] The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles
had been caught in what was later determined to have been a concurrent
detonation of four mines.[3] “At this time the whole front line was
flattened out and there were no trenches of any description, and very few of
the battalion were able to carry on.”[4] Destruction caused by the mines and the lack
of any counter-preparedness on the Canadian side made the following advance of
German infantry a near walk-over. It had
cost the Corps quite dearly in ground lost and men who’d simply vanished. “During the afternoon and evening of the 2nd,
about 45 men reported to Brigade HQ from the front and support lines.”[5]
Competency of the Canadian
Corps began to be under question from such a defeat. Moreover, any further successes for the
Germans here could find the vital hub of Ypres in enemy hands and the entire
Western Front in serious jeopardy. There
could be no repeat of the same type of complacency surrounding the June 2nd
explosion. It was up to Major Angus Ward
Davis and his Tunnelling Company to be vigilant enough to be able to provide
ample warning of a repeat attempt, and those above ground at all levels of
command to be prepared to take swift action in the event. Having blown the camouflet on the 17th
seemed to discourage the Germans, but it was only a week before Major Davis was
alerted again to a possible mine.
This was the nature of
the report he’d sent to 1st Canadian Division HQ on the 25th,
who then subsequently alerted the Brigades under its command. If the enemy were determined to blow a mine
on the 25th, they had picked the right day for it. 2nd Brigade was due to be relieved
by 1st Brigade all along the Division front that evening and the
Germans had the chance of creating twice the amount of casualties if their
timing matched that of the change-over.
Immediately upon
receiving intelligence of the German mine, Brigadier General Loomis, G.O.C. 2nd
Brigade put contingency planning, all worked out beforehand, in place. Within an hour of the warning, he’d ordered
Lt Colonel Gardner, whose 7th Battalion was directly above the
suspected mine “to reduce the garrison in these portions of the front so that
the localities would only be held by posts; and to organise bodies of troops
immediately in rear and on the flanks with which to make the counterattack.”[6] Col Gardner complied, re-distributing his
battalion in order to minimise the effect of any explosion and detailed a
company, split into different holding positions augmented with bombers, light
and medium machine guns under Captain William Archer Casey as the counterattack
force, thinning out his front line trenches and outposts, keeping relief forces
on hand in the support lines.
Captain Casey seemed the
right choice for the job of leading the counterattack. He’d risen through the ranks quite rapidly, a
mark of an astute and indispensable man.
Part of the First Contingent of volunteers in the autumn of 1914, he’d
made Sergeant at Valcartier, gaining his commission to Lieutenant while convalescing
from shrapnel wounds received in 1915.
He’d become a Captain in February, and was shortly due to be promoted
again to Major. Col Gardner reported to
Brigade Headquarters by seven that evening that his battalion was set. The relief was to go ahead as planned, and
all battalions, incoming and outgoing had been informed and made ready to act
accordingly. Rallying points had been
set up behind the lines and units moving up to the front would hold in those
places until the situation was in hand.
Nothing, though, seemed
to be happening which was out of the ordinary.
As the sun set, the usual stream of fire- sniping and bursts of machine
guns- was reported up and down the line, though this was minimal. Oddly enough, there was no shelling by German
artillery, which General Loomis mad a note of in his after-action report: “At
9.50 p.m….the night seemed to be an exceptionally quiet one on the front of the
1st Canadian Division.”[7] He was confident the relief now underway would
be completed by midnight.
Five minutes after his observation
on how quiet it seemed, General Loomis’ Headquarters was rocked by “an
earthquake.” Colonel Gardner, near the
epicentre, immediately sent up an S.O.S. flare to signal the artillery. Within thirty seconds, three batteries, the
18th, 20th and 23rd of the Canadian Field
Artillery combined as “Dodds Group” opened up their pre-arranged salvo of high
explosive and shrapnel on the German forward lines. Col Gardner remained at his headquarters to
receive and pass upward the initial reports from his forward area, then he
proceeded to the scene to gain his own appreciation of the situation.
Much of his front line
trenches “had been obliterated and filled in”, making them impassable. Captain Casey’s men had already rushed
forward, over this destroyed ground and were setting up a strong position in
the brand new crater, which was a pretty fair size. “The crater formed was, approximately, 300
feet by 150 feet and from 25 to 40 feet deep.”[8][i] Colonel Gardner came as far ahead to the
forward most positions his men had established in “New Crater”, and was
satisfied that the situation was under control.
Machine gun and rifle fire was complimenting the artillery bombardment,
pasting the German trenches so fiercely that the enemy could make no attempt to
get beyond their own parapet. Other men
of the counterattack were watching the canal to their right for any
encroachment or were working quickly with shovels and sandbags to solidify and
consolidate this new position.
The entire affair was
over within an hour and a half. German
troops had been stopped cold by the counterattack and the fire from Dobbs
Group, which had dropped a total of 194 4.5” high explosive and 536 18pdr
shrapnel shells on the enemy’s works. A
scheme to take the Canadians by shock had been an effort wasted, in no small
part by Major Davis’ work underground and Captain Casey’s swift action
above. By 11.35 that evening, the
situation had stabilised and the 7th Battalion was relieved at the
front by the 4th Battalion, having lost 6 men killed, 25 wounded and
17 missing. It was a triumph of proper
preparation and coordination between arms, such as would become a hallmark of the
Canadian Corps, which prevented what could have been a calamity.
Captain Casey, with a
few other officers and men was singled out by Colonel Gardner and General
Loomis for praise for the “prompt and efficient manner” in how the situation
was handled. His Majority was well deserved
if not shortly held. Major William
Archer Casey was killed in action just two months later, at the Somme, once
again during a fight to keep hard won ground.
* * * * *
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[3] Cook, Tim, “At The Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the
Great War 1914-1916”, Penguin Canada, 2009 pg. 351
[6] BGen Loomis, Report of Operations 25-26 July 1916 to 1st
Canadian Division from 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, , 28th
July 1916
[8] War Diary Entry, Canadian Corps General Staff, 25 July
1916
[i]
All Primary Sources Cited, and Information Used to Construct this Article is
due to the courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.
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