Adapt Improvise and Overcome

By 1918, for the infantry, things had changed.  The preceding years of costly

battles for marginal gains had pushed new ideas and new weapons to the front lines.  Officers who had seen the worst of the fighting were able to give input on what might be required.  Mainly, a typical infantry company as it was in 1914/15 did not have sufficient firepower to “wind the firefight”, the initiation of fire and movement-the core of infantry battle tactics.  Lacking this ability made it extremely difficult to get within closing distance.

Much more intricate planning was to be put into offensive operations.  As we have seen in Part II, even a small scale operation of a trench raid was heavily planned.  Lt Col Odlum’s Operations Order for the Petite Douve Raid runs five pages in length giving exacting detail on each man’s role in the operation.  The artillery had learned a great deal in the interceding years as well; but more importantly, there was much better coordination and cooperation between arms.  While still not reliably able to fire to order, artillery units could range, locate and destroy enemy batteries, supress particular areas with gas, and walk a wall of fire and iron just ahead of the advance.  Mobility though, was still a setback.

The Germans had also incorporated doctrinal shifts, and this in itself would need to be addressed.  In the spring of 1918, the Germans had launched a last-ditch general offensive in the west.  Supplemented by troops lately moved from the east after Russia’s capitulation and begun before the Americans could take to the field in force, the “Kaiser’s Battle” had stretched, but not broken the Allied lines.  Materially exhausted, by summer, the Germans retained a defensive stance where they had penetrated; prepared to fall back on the well-constructed Hindenburg Line of concrete machine gun bunkers, jungles of barbed wire and anti-tank ditches.

As formidable as it was, the Hindenburg Line amounted to not much more than a shock absorber.  By design, the forward defenses would slow down and break up the momentum of any attack into fractured and isolated units.  These then could be easily overwhelmed by local reserves, beyond the reach of supportive Allied artillery, but well within the range of their own guns.  Overall, the Hindenburg Line “proved far too formidable for the humble term trench warfare to remain appropriate….This was defensive warfare raised to a new plane.  It appeared invulnerable.”[1] Allied planners were compelled by what they faced to develop strategy to compete.  If an attack devolved into a collection of isolated skirmishes, attention had to be given to tactical awareness and leadership at the lowest levels of organisation.  Maps were more widely issued, scale models of objectives called “sand tables” were built with painstaking accuracy for troops to study when out of the lines.  More attention was paid to training overall, the development of the Labour Corps in 1917 relieved the infantry of most of the chores they had to undertake while not in trenches which had been done in lieu of training.

The Allied counter-offensive, begun in August, was aimed at re-taking lost strategic ground, break the Hindenburg Line and put the Germans to the chase in the open ground beyond.  That it was successful is why this campaign became known as the “Hundred Days”; as it was still driving the enemy back by November.  Strategy from the top down dictated the time-table more so than reverses in the field.  Each objective would be a miniature battle of its own, with not only large headquarters, at Corps level, but companies, platoons and even sections having been briefed on their role-and crucially, the role of higher formations.

Infantry platoons had become better armed.  Introduction of effective hand grenades and especially the Lewis light machine gun gave a comparative level of firepower against well-defended positions. The tactics developed around these weapons- more a modification of existing notions than anything entirely new had been proven successful; at least in a limited way, in the offensives of 1917.  What is noteworthy is that despite these adjustments and improvements, the 1909 Field Service Regulations-the infantry’s instruction manual- was still not only being used as the definitive resource, but was still very much relevant.  In fact, much of this century old manual would be understood on a practical level by a modern day infantryman.  This draws the conclusion that while situations and technology may change- and had best be adapted to- the role of the infantry is immutable.

Perhaps it would be best to examine the effectiveness of these changes by making a comparative study of two actions with similar objectives- one from early in the war and the other closer to the end.  In the first part of this series, “To Close With and Destroy the Enemy”, the hasty counter-attack of the 10^th and 16^th Battalions at Kitchener’s Wood in April of 1915 was looked at.

Despite the Canadians at Kitchener’s Wood making their objective, the oversights and inexperience of these men made this attack more costly than perhaps it needed to be.  When the bombastic Lt Col Boyle, CO of the 10^th Battalion was mortally wounded, there was the loss of one of the few men who knew the battle plan, and the remaining officers and men failed to consolidate the ground they had taken.  This made it all the easier for the Germans to force them back in a counter attack of their own.  Strict adherence to orders trumped initiative, leaving German troops in possession of Oblong Farm, where they were able to effectively fire upon the Canadians’ flank.  Again, gaining one’s objectives cannot alone be the benchmark of a successful attack- as the ultimate proof of success is to be able to hold the ground taken from the enemy.

Kitchener’s Wood and Bourlon Wood were both dense copses requiring clearing

to protect vulnerable flanks, but any other similarities were incidental.  Bourlon Wood sheltered well prepared and solidly built defenses designed to prevent the Allies from approaching Cambrai from the south-west.  Months had gone into its construction, as opposed to the few hours of preparation at Kitchener’s Wood.  The approach to Bourlon Wood was a much greater distance than at Kitchener’s Wood, with quite a lot in the way to getting there.  Not the least of these was the dominating leading edge of the Hindenburg Line.  But before they could even get in the fight, the Canadians would have to cross the Canal Du Nord.

This was an artificial commercial waterway of grand proportions, in which “a frontal assault offered little but the prospect of disaster.  The canal itself was nearly 100 meters wide, and on each side a further 400 meters was flooded swampland….the ground for several thousand meters on both banks was completely open and dominated by strong German positions on the heights on the far side.”[2]  Fortunately, the war had interrupted the canal’s construction, and a 4km length had been dug but remained unflooded.  This would give the Canadians ample protection to begin their advance, but it meant that leading units would have to maneuver obliquely after crossing to press the initial objectives. 

The operation had been conceived with an eye to a new tactical development known as “Bite and Hold”.  Initial objectives-in this case the securing of a bridgehead across the canal- would be the responsibility of units in the van.  Subsequent objectives, including Bourlon Wood were to be taken by fresh battalions moving through positions consolidated by preceding outfits. A major factor in the Canadians’ favour had much to do with improved co-ordination between the infantry, artillery and engineers.  “The key to the Corps’ victory was its barrage, but the depth of the planned advance meant that most of the final objectives were out of reach of the guns.”[3] Infantry outpacing its own artillery had been a constant difficulty throughout the war, and a major factor in the ability to “win the firefight.”  A greater reliance was needed on all elements of the army working together.  Infantry would be unable to continue its advance without supporting artillery, which in turn was reliant upon combat engineers to help move their heavy, horse-drawn guns and limbers across the canal and the rough battlefield beyond.

Canadian sappers did quick work- “With one bridge completed, the first guns were across the canal at 8:40 am,” this after  a 0520 H-hour, followed by “(f)our more pre-fabricated bridges were in place within four hours, with three larger bridges available for bigger guns by 6 pm.”[4]

According to Professor Tim Cook, “the battle hinged on the capture of Bourlon Wood….The heights of the wood towered over the battlefield.”[5] German defences were well dug in and fortified, the woods offering natural concealment.  Canadian Artillery had blanketed Bourlon Wood with gas shells.  At this point in the war, the use of gas was fairly ubiquitous, but precautions in defense against chemical weapons meant that casualties from its effects were marginal.  Its main purpose was to prevent reinforcement from beyond the wood, and force those defending within to operate in physically limiting gas masks.  Gas was also employed with the design to cull draft horses upon which the artillery was reliant.  Overall, the preparation for the assault by use of gas held the Germans where they were; making it that much easier for the infantry to locate and close in on their positions.

One of the battalions assigned to take Bourlon Wood, the 102^nd, exemplifies the confidence, comprehension and instigation of the developments undertaken since 1915.  Very early in their part of the battle, some seven hours from the 0520 start at the canal, a lucky hit from German artillery effectively decapitated the battalion.  The war Diary reports “HQ (E.17.c.8.5) were struck by a shell about noon, killing Lieut. SG Moore, the Signalling Officer and 3 Runners from other units and seriously wounding Lieut-Col F Lister, DSO MC and Capt SH Okell, MC, the adjutant.

“Lieut CH Packman filled the breach temporarily and notified the GOC (General Officer Commanding) who promptly appointed Lieut Col Thompson, DSO…to take command of the 102 Battalion as well as the 75^th Battalion.”[6] Junior officers, of companies and platoons well forward of Battalion HQ probably weren’t aware of this potential disaster.  Each knew what his sub-units’ task was and pursued these objectives regardless of developments elsewhere.

Fighting in a wooded area is particularly tough.  Dense woods reduce visibility and make it easy for units to become separated and lost.  Preparation beforehand-by use of maps and models- ameliorated this; confident leadership making up for any deficiencies.  Lieutenant Graham Lyall, in his part of the attack provides an outstanding example of this.  He first led his platoon on a flanking move against an enemy strongpoint that was holding against the lead attacking company.  Lyall and his men overwhelmed the Germans, taking 13 prisoners, a field gun and four machine guns, and allowing the advance to continue.  “Later, his platoon, now much reduced by casualties, was held up by machine guns at the southern end of Bourlon Wood….(Lyall) rushed the position single handed and

killed the officer in charge.”[7] Here he took an additional 45 prisoners and another 5 machine guns.  Gathering his remaining men, Lyall pushed onto his final objective, taking it and yet another 47 prisoners.  “(H)e consolidated his position and thus protected the remainder of the company.”[8]

At a cost to the battalion of 6 officers, 44 other ranks killed, 8 officers and 151 other ranks wounded, the woods were cleared by the time third Brigade was prepared to pass through on the next phase of attack.  “The success was great and in addition to the strategically important ground taken, we captured 257 prisoners, 15 guns and 18 machine guns and inflicted heavy casualties.”[9]

In one day, the Canadian Corps had advanced almost half-way to the final objective of Cambrai.  Hasty German reinforcements moved to defend the town would make the next phase of the operation much more difficult than the startling success of 27 September.  However, employing skills, weapons, tactics and leadership not present in the early stages of the war are what can account for the opening phase being as well executed as it was.

Lt Lyall was placed in command of his company and would continue to lead from the front; taking yet more prisoners and guns the following day.  For his part in the battle over the 27^th-28^th September, he was awarded the Victoria Cross.  Lyall would die of a heart attack in Egypt in 1942, while serving as a Lt Colonel in the Royal Army Ordinance Corps.

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[1] Meyer, G.J., "A World Undone"  Delta Books 2007 pg 495

[2] Marteinson, John, “We Stand on Guard, An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army”, Ovale Publications, 1992 pg 200

[3] Cook, Tim, “Shock Troops, Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918”, Penguin Canada, 2008, pg 512

[4] Cook, Tim, ibid. pg 517

[5] Cook, Tim, ibid. pg 521

[6] 102^nd Battalion CEF War Diary, Appendix “H”: “Narrative of Operations from 27 September to 2 October 1918” courtesy Library and Archives Canada

[7] Supplement to the London Gazette, 14 December 1918, pg 14775

[8] London Gazette, ibid.

[9] 102^nd Battalion CEF War Diary, Appendix “H”

With Maximum Speed and Aggression

It had been my intention to use this space to examine the shifts in the employment of infantry over the course of the war.  Envisioning a two-part series to illustrate these changes, it occurred to me that I had used the word “evolution”, which describes a gradual approach to change.  Two parts, I found, would be too abrupt to include all the relevant aspects, and as such I have decided to expand the series: Looking at the ultimate changes in tactics a little later on while spending some time now on elements of the war which served as an intermediary between things as they were at the start, and things at the war’s end.

The prospect of a long war was becoming more evident as 1915 wore on. 

Mutual defenses made for a delicate situation regarding offensive planning.  Only a large, well coordinated attack on as wide a front as possible could breach the enemy’s line; but the requisite numbers of trained men and adequate material support would not be met until med-1916, at least.  This left a large amount of time n which to plan and prepare for such a general offensive, sharing it with the requirement to prevent or defeat any similar offensive moves on the part of the enemy. 

In December of 1915, command of British forces on the Western Front was transferred from Sir John French to Sir Douglas Haig.  Haig’s despatches, from this point to the end of the war lend valuable perspective to the overall situation as seen from the very top.  His first such report, dated 19^th May 1916 neatly describes the continual effort required to merely maintain the defensive lines- it “entails constant heavy work.  Bad weather and the enemy combine to flood and destroy trenches….all such damages must be repaired promptly, under fire, and almost entirely by night.[1] It must be taken into account that Haig’s despatches (which were publicly released in supplement to the London Gazette) have a decidedly positive spin.

This activity certainly occupied the infantry, but it would come at a cost.  Using the infantry in laborious tasks might ensure the men be kept busy, but time spent in this way reduced the amount of training such a large body of men mostly new to the army (or new to elevated levels of command) would need for a successful and complex operation that a decisive counter-attack required.  A lack of this preparation would become painfully obvious at the Somme in 1916.

  “At night,” says Professor Tim Cook, “the once empty battlefield...swarmed with activity.”[2] Even if no major effort to bring the fight to the enemy might be in progress, it mattered a great deal to military planners, reliant on accurate information as well as the morale of individual soldiers to control the battlefield.  There being no foreseeable opportunity for offensive operations for a period of several months indicated that the infantry would need the ability to retain a high level of morale and fighting spirit.  Holding a static position gave rise to the use of patrolling and trench raids to keep the men active while concurrently maintaining pressure against the enemy. Haig goes so far as to note “One form of minor activity deserves special mention, namely the raids…which are made at least twice or three times a week against the enemy’s line[3]  

To gain perspective of the enemy defences and overall intentions, patrols would be sent even closer to and sometimes within opposing trenches.  Such were the importance of patrols that if a compromise needed to be made between “facilities for observation (and) facilities for protracted resistance”[4] the latter took precedence if ample efforts could be made for patrolling. “Their strength may be from two to eight men under a non-commissioned officer.”[5] Active patrolling taught men how to act independent of larger commands, a crucial skill to inspire initiative and a good way to educate NCO's and junior officers who may have to assume control of a battle when attrition rates leave them senior.  Becoming familiar with the ground had great benefits in planning offensives and would help to raise the men's confidence during attacks.  

Raids differed from patrols.  The purpose was not to secure territory, but to cause a limited amount of damage.  They became the epitome of keeping men at a high level of aggressiveness, and to keep the enemy off balance and over vigilant.  Trench raids varied in size, from the numbers of a regular patrol to sometimes that which could be counted as a miniature battle.  One of the most successful raids, and one which would set the template for future operations and secure a peculiar reputation for Canadians, was conducted early in the war against German trenches near La Petite Douve Farm in November 1915 by the 7th Battalion, CEF.  Raids may well have been opportunistic, but a great many relied on exacting detail.  The operations order to the Petite Douve raid runs five pages in length and leaves very little to chance. 

The German section of line opposite the 7^th Battalion was a meandering collection of sharp angles; its shape dictated by geography.  For the most part, their trenches ran generally north-south, parallel to and just west of a main road.  Where a quadrangle of buildings that was La Petite Douve Farm abutted this road, the German front line followed its outward edges. Nearly one hundred and fifty yards below the farm, the Douve River, running approximately west-east,

intersected the road.  At this point, the trenches crossed the road at a right angle and continued along the river’s path, on the northern edge of the road in an easterly direction.  The raid was to target this particular corner, as it was believed this section would be easy to isolate for a short period at least.  An added bonus would be capturing the machine gun post believed to be emplaced at the crux of the trench’s angle at river and road.  Battalion commander Lt Col Odlum set down the number of men to embark upon the raid, and what their specific jobs would be.  Captain L J Thomas was in overall command of the operation, and he would be headquartered in the forward Canadian trench with a twenty-three man reserve force to be moved up in case of heavy resistance.  The small group of men, less than seventy all told going into No Man’s Land were divided into three groups.  Twelve men and an NCO made up a support team which would occupy a listening post (LP) on the north bank of the Douve.  A covering party, of nine men and two NCO’s were to protect the makeshift bridges of which there were two that would enable the assault party to cross.  Four officers, two NCO’s and thirty six men were part of the assault party.  Under the command of Lt A Wrightson*, theirs would be the difficult task. 

On the night of 16-17 November, 1915 the 7^th Battalion, according to the operations order, would attack, (with a concurrent effort of the 5^th Battalion) “2 points in the enemy’s lines opposite its front for the purpose of draining strength & gaining information concerning his defences.”[6] Leading up to the operation, artillery fire was expected to cut the German wire and damage their trenches while trench mortars fired upon Petite Douve Farm intending to knock out machine gun emplacements there.  In the afternoon and evening of the 16^th, rifle fire from the front trenches would be used to keep the enemy fixed in place, preventing use of communications trenches, with the noise of gunfire covering the sound of the attacking party moving into their jumping off positions.  Scouts had gone ahead in the afternoon as a two man patrol “to endeavour to make a daylight report on the success secured by the artillery in cutting the enemy wire and breaking the parapet.”[7]  With this report, further patrols went out with bridging ladders to the determined crossing points and placed them there for the attack team.  At eleven o’clock, the attack team assembled in the forward trenches.  Beforehand, they had removed all identifying information such as id discs, paybooks and uniform insignia.  Each man wore a black “veiling mask” to reduce visibility, and make quick identification possible.  It could also be surmised the use of these masks was to have a psychological element upon the unsuspecting Germans.

H-hour was 11:30 pm.  The attack team moved out through gaps cut in the Canadian wire and traced along the right bank of the Douve, led by the scouts who had determined the route to the bridging point.     Once in place, the support team took up their positions at the listening post, the covering team moving over the bridge.  Midnight was when “the assault will be delivered from the bridging point.”[8]  With maximum speed and aggression, the assault team crossed the river, guided by scouts to the breached wire.  The artillery hadn’t been completely successful and wire cutters were employed to widen the breach.  Once in the trench, one group moved down the length of the trench to the left, clearing their path with hand grenades.  At a predetermined point, just beyond the junction with a communications trench, bales of wire were dropped and men with shovels went to work to create a barricade. The remainder of this group carried on down the communication trench to the support line, lobbing grenades the whole way. Another group had moved right, towards the machine gun position, taking it by force and setting up a similar block as the one on the left. The men then made their way into the support trench, meeting up with the team that had come down the communication trench.  Within minutes, the assault team had effectively taken control of a rectangular portion of enemy line defined by the bent fire trench at the road, the communication trench and the length of the support line which ran between the fire trench and the communication trench.

Twelve German prisoners were manhandled out of the trench and back towards the support team at the LP.  While several riflemen kept ready in case of a sudden counter attack from the direction of Petite Douve Farm, any valuable information, including the construction and outlay of the trench system was taken in by the scouts who were moving within the cordoned area.  Exactly twenty minutes after the assault team had made their breach; Lt Wrightson blew one long and three short blasts on his whistle, to agreed signal to withdraw.  The assault team, again guided by the scouts made their way through the wire, gathered the bridge party, crossed back to the right bank to rendezvous with the support team and then back into Canadian lines.  A pre-arranged artillery salvo was fired upon the German line where the assault had taken place.  The Germans had put a counter-attack in, but were too late, the enemy had gone and they were now exposed to heavy fire. 

The Petite Douve Raid was a tremendous success.  At the cost of one man killed and another wounded, the party of men of the 7^th Battalion had struck a fierce blow against a defended line, taken a dozen prisoners and gained credible intelligence.  It would make the reputation of the battalion, and of the Canadians as daring “raiders”; which also inspired other Canadian units to mount raids of their own in a spirit of one-upmanship.  These subsequent raids improved on technique and helped to solidify the overall esteem of Canadian troops.  The effect of such an operation would be enormous.  It would first inspire confidence in the men taking part of their own abilities and their leadership.  A successful raid showed them that the enemy could be taken by surprise and kept the ever crucial fighting spirit at a keen edge.  Also, the enemy would be unbalanced, forcing them to improve their vigilance for such attacks, which wears on physical and psychological limits; especially if there was a prospect that men in black masks could drop into a trench at any given time.  Information brought back, through prisoners and the observations of the assault party would go towards the planning of future operations.

*Lt Wrightson being given command of the assaulting team is remarkable, considering he is listed as a Private in “D” Company in the Bn’s nominal role taken upon arrival in England just one year prior.

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[1] Lt Col J H Boraston, ed. “Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915-April1919)” J L Dent & Sons Ltd. 1919 pg 4

[2] Cook, Tim, “At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916” Penguin Canada, 2007 pg 272

[3] Boraston, ibid.

[4] General Staff, War Office, “Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations” HM Stationary Office, London, 1909 pg 100

[5] General Staff, War Office, ibid. pg 110

[6] Odlum, V W, Lt Col: 7^th Battalion CEF Operation Orders No. 59, 15 November 1915; Appended to Battalion War Diary, courtesy Library and Archives Canada

[7] Odlum, V W, ibid.

[8] Odlum, V W, ibid.

To Close With and Destroy the Enemy

This is the role of the infantry, one such which has remained constant even in light of the technological and tactical advances in warfare.  In this two part series, If Ye Break Faith will examine how this role has changed little, but evolved much; how the post-industrial battlefields of WWI necessitated a large part of this evolution which introduced concepts still employed today without fundamental adjustment to doctrine which remains immutable.

It is ultimately to the infantry to seek a decisive result from battle.  It is this responsibility pared with those unique aspects of an infantryman’s experience

which allows a certain pride of place of the infantry within the military.  “It is he who must seize the ground and hold it.  And he must do this on foot, armed with only what he can carry at the mercy of the elements and over every sort of terrain.  There is nothing remote about war for the infantryman.  For him war has always had a very personal dimension.”[1] The infantry fulfills its role by use of the technique known as “fire and movement.”  Ultimately, “The main essential to success in battle is to close with the enemy, cost what it may”[2]  Fire and movement makes this possible.  By overcoming the enemy’s resistance, with superior firepower the infantry are able to press forward.  It might seem deceptively simple, but as the two tasks are undertaken concurrently, in reality this is a very complex task which requires-has always required- a great deal of control and coordination. [3] Such control can only be gained through training and repetitive drills.  This is accomplished by first smaller units perfecting their role before working in higher formations.  Practicality is the reverse of this.  The attack, by use of “fire and movement” is an exercise in diminishing values.  A divisional attack, for example, will use its artillery assets to allow the forward brigades to advance under fire.  The brigades likewise employ their own gun- with a little more precision than the division barrage- directed against the brigades’ objectives and so let the component battalions gain further approach, and so on down the line of company, platoon and section. The 1909 British Army Field Service Manual makes this notion clear “All leaders, down to those of the smallest units, must endeavour to apply, at all stages of the fight this principle of mutual support.”[4]

The process of bringing superior firepower onto the enemy is itself known as “winning the firefight.”[5] No matter the important placed on this, in itself it is just a means to an end.  Winning the firefight is what enables the infantry to move to “closing distance” from the enemy where the assault to destroy him will be carried out.  Equally matched opponents and strong defensive positions meant that this crucial step of the attack was far more difficult to achieve, almost to a point of futility during the war.  Adjustments would be required, but it would take some hard lessons to inspire them.  Textbook dictates and rehearsed technique are put in place not particularly to instill inflexibility in employment, but create such familiarity with doctrine that there is room for initiative and improvisation which the battlefield requires.  With insufficient grounding in these fundamentals the likelihood of a successful infantry attack are greatly diminished.

A curious example would be to look at the counter-attack towards Kitchener’s

Wood made by the 10^th and 16^th Battalions, First Canadian Division late on the first day of the 2^nd Battle of Ypres.  German gas attacks against French Colonial units to the left of Canadian positions had driven the defenders out of their trenches, leaving a clear path towards the immediate objective of St Julien, and the Canadian flank exposed.  In one way, the gas worked too well.  German infantry in pursuit of the fleeing French Algerians had gone much further forward than the initial advance had meant to.  These point units were supposed to have established a new defensive line to allow follow up forces to jump off for the assault against St Julien.  Instead, they had pressed into Kitchener’s Wood.  While four British guns had been captured, the Germans were too few in number and dangerously over-extended.  If an aggressive counter-attack could be made quickly, the Germans might be caught out.  Two conditions in this proposal worked against the Canadians; that they had yet to mount such an attack in earnest, and it would have to be done at night.  The 16^th Battalion had come up to 3 Brigade HQ at St Julien from reserve positions outside of Ypres, a route march which took hours to complete, the 16^th arriving by 2200hrs[6].  This battalion would be supporting the 10^th Battalion’s assault on a German trench at the south end of the wood.  Once this was taken, both battalions would move into, and clear out, the wood itself.  From the Division’s 2^nd Brigade, the 10^th Battalion made up of men from Western Canadian (Calgary and Winnipeg, mostly) Militia units would be leading the advance; its four companies lined up two abreast and two deep.  Behind them the 16^th (Canadian Scottish; an amalgamation of pre-war Highland Militia regiments) would follow in the same formation. The simplicity of the formation was accounting for the unknown ground the men would be moving over in the dark; the best solution for inexperienced officers to retain tight control of inexperienced men. Each battalion was under the ultimate command of its Colonel, but no appointment had been made for overall command of the attack.  This oversight would make for costly consequences.

German penetration had come as far forward to a built up area known as “Oblong Farm” to the southwest of the Canadian’s trench line objective.  Lt Colonel Leckie of the 16^th Bn suggested his 10^th Bn counterpart, Lt Col Boyle detach some elements to keep the farm under suppressing fire.  Interpreting his orders too literally, Col Boyle didn’t consider operating on initiative and decided to go forward without isolating Oblong Farm.  His orders, from General Alderson had made no mention of the Farm, only because Alderson had no information on it.  The ground over which the Canadians would attack had not been properly reconnoitred.  “Artillery support was provided by a British battery and the 9^th and 12^th Batteries of the 3^rd Brigade CFA (Canadian Field Artillery), firing on the northern part of the wood and beyond.”[7] This made a total of thirteen guns supporting a two battalion attack by firing at a point well beyond the primary objective.  It would hardly be adequate in either volume or area- a vital part of “winning the firefight” would then be absent from this attack.  Nevertheless, the Canadians were enthusiastic, Lt Col Boyle quipping “We have been aching for a fight and now we are going to get it.”[8]

“During the advance in the darkness over unknown ground companies and platoons lost cohesion.”[9]  The two battalions set off at 2345hrs.[10]  This made a turnaround time of six hours from the initial German attack to the Canadian counter attack.  While this may have seemed quick work at the time, but it was hardly efficient.  German soldiers had made excellent use of the interceding hours in digging hasty defenses and bringing forward machine guns.  Within the first fifteen minutes, 10^th and 16^th Battalions closed half the distance to the objective, facing minimal incoming fire.  Ordered to advance in complete silence to obscure their presence had aided in this good start.  At about the mid-point, there was discovered a fence line which had to be gotten over.  The noise of men and their equipment struggling over this obstacle alerted the Germans- both in the objective to the front, and from Oblong Farm which was now in a position to provide enfilading fire on the Canadians.  This fire was heavy and hitting the attackers on front and flank.  Out of place, in broken and mixed formations the final 300 yards was closed by rushes.

The initial attack against the trenches outside the wood were carried by the

weight of the assault.  Hand-to-hand combat was frequent.  Casualties were higher than they should have been.  Against reason, objectives were met.  With the exception of a pocket of German positions within the wood, the trench had been taken, the woods occupied and the four lost guns re-captured.  The two attacking battalions had lost about two thirds of their strength, inclusive of most of their officers- among them Lt Col Boyle who had been fatally wounded by a German machine gun.  German casualties were considerably lighter[11].  It is difficult to credit the success of the attack based upon the conditions in which it was made.  Perhaps it could be said that it succeeded more from the Canadians not knowing the odds against them.  In any analysis, Kitchener’s Wood had so many factors going against it that it wouldn’t be considered a well-executed attack- even by contemporary standards- except that the attackers had made their objectives. 

A latter day General, Brigadier General Vernon who once commanded Land Forces Central Area (Now 32 Canadian Brigade Group) offered this observation which might fit as mitigation as to why the attack at Kitchener’s Wood went as it did: “Field Marshal Slim…noted that the Army as an institution is an inverse pyramid: everything depends upon the skill, motivation and determination of the individual soldier.” This may be why novice soldiers can still achieve under circumstances which would usually project failure.  Such actions, like it was at Kitchener’s Wood are usually very costly.  Standards of proficiency-at all levels- would be required; along with the required adjustments in doctrine in keeping with the evolution of modern war.  Within two years the Canadians would have incorporated the lessons of this action, among others which would allow them to be capable of a Corps sized infantry attack- that of Vimy Ridge.

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[1] “Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle”, BBC Television, 1985.  Episode 5: Infantry (written by Richard Holmes & presented by Frederick Forsythe)

[2] General Staff, War Office, “Infantry Training 94- Company Organization) 1914”, HM Stationary Office, London, 1914 pg 134

[3] The Infantry Journal, Inc. “Infantry in Battle”, Washington DC, 1939 pg 223

[4] General Staff, War Office, “Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations” HM Stationary Office, London, 1909 pp 135-6

[5] Authority of Chief of Defence Staff, “Platoon and Section Commander’s Aide Memoire”,B-GL-309-003/FT-201, 1981 Section 3.2

[6] Zuehlke, Mark, “Brave Battalion: The Remarkable Saga of the 16^th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) in the First World War”, John Wiley & Sons, Canada, 2008, pg 51

[7] Nicholson, GWL, Col. “Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War” Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1962 pg 66

[8] Zuehlke, Mark, ibid. pg 55

[9] Nicholson, GWL, Col ibid.

[10] Greenfield, Nathan M, “Baptism of Fire: The Second Battle of Ypres and the Forging of Canada, April 1915” HarperCollins 2007 pg 98

[11] Cook, Tim, “At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916” Penguin Canada, 2007 pp 127-8