It is
Thanksgiving in Canada this week, a time for reflection on the things for which
we are grateful. I am personally
grateful for my family, and as I feel I will illustrate below, that is
inclusive of far more than relations of blood and marriage. With apologies for not posting last week, due
to a minor surgery for which I took time to recuperate, expect to see new
content here each week. Comments questions and suggestions are always welcome;
please forward them to me through this space or by following on Facebook and Twitter.
The concluding
part of the recent series on the formation of the Western Front looked at the
role that the First Battle of Ypres played in the unfolding events. It is hoped that the absolute desperation and
near destruction of the BEF was expressed clearly. For it was at Ypres that the culmination of
two months’
campaigning had brought the British to a critical point. Perhaps a good question to ask and shall be examined here is what prevented the British Army from total collapse in morale and effectiveness. It is, in answering, to be found more a matter of sociology than psychology.
campaigning had brought the British to a critical point. Perhaps a good question to ask and shall be examined here is what prevented the British Army from total collapse in morale and effectiveness. It is, in answering, to be found more a matter of sociology than psychology.
“First Ypres,”
says historian Basil Liddell Hart, “on the British side, was not merely a
soldier’s battle but a family battle- against outsiders....when formations were
broken up and regiments reduced to remnants, those remnants still held
together....After the battle was over, little survived, save the memory of
spirit.”[1]
A key word in Liddell Hart’s observation is “regiment”; and it is this type of
organisational system- often misunderstood or misrepresented, that screwed
men’s courage to the sticking place.
The regiment,
strictly speaking as a form of military organisation, has a particularly long
history, and is a body of men comprised of a number of battalions, structurally
below the level known as a brigade.
However, that is far too simplistic a definition; and can even be a bit
confusing. Regiments which have multiple
battalions will often have one of these battalions formed with others from
separate regiments to make up a brigade.
Within the British Commonwealth, it is more fitting to view the regiment
as more of an entity rather than a set number in an organisational table. Richard Holmes explains on the development of
the modern regimental system “To boost recruiting...enhance the status of the
soldier in society, and create a system which would link battalions serving
abroad with their training and recruiting bases in the United Kingdom, the old
numbered regiments of the line, with loose regional affiliations, were combined
into county regiments.”[2]
Being set up in
a geographical fashion can engender a strong tie between the regiment and the
community from which it comes, often adding much to a particular sense of
identity, not to mention that the men within would probably have social
connections outside of their military association. “On the other hand, recruitment from a single community can lead to a
concentrated and potentially devastating local impact if the regiment takes
heavy casualties.” [3]
One need only look at the devastating loss, still commemorated today of the
Newfoundland Regiment on 1st July 1916 for a particular example of
how tight geographical recruiting and association can have such an adverse
effect.
Within
this system, it is a regiment the individual joins when volunteering for the
army. High minded ideals and patriotism
may be sufficient inspiration to get a man to the recruiter, but usually aren’t
enough to be continually inspirational.
The regiment, due to its size and structure is less abstract than higher
military formations and can offer a sense of belonging, of common purpose beyond
national allegiance, “No one risks their lives for abstract things.”[4] The bonds formed by men in
their training while being indoctrinated into a well established structure
means that support in disagreements in the barroom can be transmuted into
devotion on the battlefield.
Each
regiment, while having commonalities which link it to others within the same
national force has within itself unique symbology- in distinctive badges,
headdress or uniform- and its own history and traditions which furthers the
familial aspect. “We
are all familiar with the need of families to live together in clearly defined
territories of dwellings; to take their meals together in a well defined
routine; to freely communicate under well established rules; to share a common
set of ethics developed in a well thought out doctrine; and to remember various
family deeds, birthdays and other emotional celebrations in a well balanced
program of work and play. These and other institutions and practices are
required to preserve and maintain a healthy family life.”[5]
A soldier is led to believe that his regiment is best- an attitude which is
actively encouraged. This may set a
negative pretext for rivalries among regiments, but generally the effect is
that in which if a man believes he is part of something highly valued he can be
relied upon to perform as such.

“In Canada, the
regiment is a formation of one or more units; existing almost exclusively for
reasons of heritage, the continuance of battle
honours and esprit de corps. Most Canadian
infantry regiments are reserve units composed entirely of one
under-strength battalion of between 100-250 soldiers. The three
regular force infantry regiments each consist of three regular force battalions
of approximately 600 soldiers, in addition to one or more reserve battalions.
Canadian battalions are employed tactically and administratively within mechanized brigade groups for regular units, or light brigade groups for reserve units.”[8] Many of the pre-war
regiments of the Active Militia which were to become part of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force in the First Contingent lacked requisite numbers to form
full battalions. As a result, and as
part of a notion by Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia, to form an overtly
Canadian force, regimental identities were disallowed, and battalions were
organised with no reflection of regimental heritage. A badge, in the form of a maple leaf embossed
with the battalion number would become a rather generic identifier. While the result of this was largely
positive- inspiring men to think and identify in a more national sense than
regional, it also casually discarded the benefits which come with a strong link
to tradition and heritage. This line may
well be a farther reach than the young history of Canada allows as many of the
country’s regiments take homage, name and tradition from existing British
units.
Not having strong ties
to tradition and memory but unifying the Force under a national identity may have
proven a positive influence in the long run, but certainly missed an
opportunity to use the resources a strong
social bond the regimental system
creates. While the lack of a long history within the newly raised, generically
numbered battalions of the CEF can’t be conclusively applied as reasoning for
confused performance at 2nd Ypres, it’s presence in some battalions
may be indicative of the stalwart defense of the collapsing line. The 15th Battalion was one of the
few formations in the First Contingent which was formed using members of a
single Militia regiment. They disdained
the generic badge and an officers’ council elected to retain the Highland
uniform and traditional identifying badges off the parent regiment, the 48th
Highlanders. As such, with strong bonds
of lineage, it can be deduced that the 15th Bn held the line for the
same reasons their British counterparts had done six months prior, evidenced
even further by “C” Company holding out to the last man in order to allow the
other companies to redeploy. The
15th’s stand had slowed the German advance and had bought time to
form a secondary line of defense. It
cost the battalion the entire compliment of “C” Company, mostly as
prisoners. All told, the 15th
lost 647 casualties, the worst single day’s loss by a Canadian battalion in the
entire war.[9]
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